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Preamble
This doctoral dissertation deals with various areas of research in applied microeco-
nomic theory. The first chapter deals with the emergence of alliances in the market for
international roaming calls. Chapter 2 belongs to the field of political economy and
offers a dynamic explanation for the emergence of political polarization. Chapter 3 an-
alyzes a procurement problem, where specialized sellers are better informed than the
buyer about which of their products suits the buyer’s needs. Chapter 4 compares the
impact of simple policy interventions in markets where not all customers can discern
the actual quality of offered goods. All chapters are self contained and can be read
independently.
The market of international roaming is the focus of the first chapter. International
roaming provides subscribers with the possibility to use mobile telecommunication
services outside the coverage area of their home operator’s network. While subscribers
are traveling in a foreign country, they may use the infrastructure of a so-called host op-
erator. For roaming services, the host operator then charges wholesale rates to the roam-
ing subscribers’ home operator that in turn bills retail prices to its customers. By now,
technological means have been developed that allow operators to control at which for-
eign network their roaming subscribers register.1 Hence, we would expect that the
competition to host roaming subscribers results in reasonable wholesale rates.
Yet, in a recent survey on this market, the OECD (2009) finds that compared to the
underlying costs, the roaming charges are excessive. In particular, the OECD (2009,
p. 5) asserts that “the major contributor to high retail charges is the wholesale rates
charged by foreign operators”. Based on this evidence, Chapter 1 investigates whether
1See e.g. European Commission (2006).
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the formation of international roaming alliances may explain this puzzle. Indeed, after
the technologies to control the roaming traffic became available by 2003, trans-national
alliances emerged that aimed at directing their roaming subscribers preferably to other
alliance members. The OECD (2009) acknowledges that these alliances have not been
effective in bringing down roaming prices.
The model developed in the first chapter studies the interplay of the wholesale and
retail prices in the roaming market. The emphasis lies on the effects of international
roaming alliances on prices and on the operators’ incentives to form them. As we
show, these alliances may serve as a commitment device to soften retail competition.
More precisely, mutually directing subscribers to a partner network at high wholesale
prices within an alliance induces affiliated operators to offer less attractive retail deals
to potential subscribers. Since retail tariffs are strategic complements in our model, the
domestic competitor reacts by raising the own retail prices, which has a positive feed-
back effect on the profit generated by the alliance. Besides, within an alliance each
operator exclusively hosts the foreign partner’s traveling subscribers and a reciprocal
wholesale price is charged. Therefore, additional expenses caused by a higher whole-
sale price are perfectly recouped from wholesale profits earned with the partner’s trav-
eling subscribers. Not surprisingly, the prospect of higher profits due to softer retail
competition encourages operators to endogenously form these alliances.
Chapter 1 contributes in two regards to the existing literature. First, our model intro-
duces imperfect competition and non-linear retail tariffs in a setup that exhibits sym-
biotic production according to Carter and Wright (1994): Each operator offers roaming
services as intermediate products to foreign operators, and resells roaming services
from foreign operators to own subscribers. If operators are monopolists in each coun-
try, then cooperation helps to avoid double marginalization as shown by Carter and
Wright (1994). In contrast, under imperfect competition cooperation within alliances
generally deteriorates welfare. Second, we contribute to the literature on vertical re-
lations. Several papers have shown that firms may soften competition by agreeing on
a two part wholesale tariff that includes a fixed payment in order to compensate for
an excessive unit price.2 We point out that firms may also soften competition with-
2See e.g. Bonanno and Vickers (1988); Shaffer (1991); Rey and Stiglitz (1995).
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out needing to resort to non-linear wholesale tariffs when they commit to mutually
providing services.
The second chapter provides an explanation for why political leaders may want to
adopt ideological positions and maintain them over time even in the face of conflicting
evidence.3 As documented in the empirical work on Congressional voting behavior of
Poole and Rosenthal (2007), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) and others, the belief
systems of political elites can often largely be captured with a single dimension, their
ideology, which almost always mirrors party affiliation. Moreover, ideological positions
of individual members are remarkably stable, or as Poole (2007, p. 435) puts it, “mem-
bers of Congress die in their ideological boots.” Partisan politics are a frequent phe-
nomenon even regarding so-called valence issues like foreign policy for which there
should be a common agreement among the electorate.4
To address these empirical findings, Chapter 2 develops a dynamic model that ties
observable characteristics of political representatives, such as their party affiliation,
to voters’ expectations. In our setup politicians are better informed than the voting
public about an underlying state of nature that determines the desirability of a given
policy measure. The issue itself is non-partisan, that is everybody has the same pol-
icy preferences, but voters attach ideological labels to both candidates and available
policy alternatives. Given their beliefs about the prevailing state, voters form expecta-
tions about which policy candidates are likely to implement once in office, and which
of those is most likely to succeed. We show that politicians may act partisan simply
because voters’ expect them to. Suppose voters expect political candidates to systemat-
ically implement policies that are “close” to their own ideology, once in office. These
expectations induce voters to elect the representative whose perceived partisan policy
(ideology) is most likely to correspond to the underlying state, based on their current
information. This may suffice to induce candidates to actually act partisan, in the first
place. The specific motivation is one of signal-jamming: an incumbent who sticks to
3This chapter is based on joint work with Anke S. Kessler.
4In the U.S. Congress, for example, support for the president on matters of foreign policy and defense
has largely been along party lines ever since the Vietnam War [Meernik (1993)]. Two recent polls found
that Americans share common views on a wide array of foreign policy issues, and would prefer that
Democrats and Republicans seek common ground. See the website of Partnership for a Secure America
http://www.psaonline.org/.
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his partisan policy demonstrates confidence and avoids revealing that current circum-
stances would favor his opponents’ partisan position. As even inefficient policies may
turn out to be successful, this behavior potentially allows to hold up the electorates’
belief in the adequacy of the incumbent’s ideology. If voters expect partisan behavior
in the future, this makes his re-election more likely. The result is political failure in the
sense that the equilibrium partisan policy outcomes are Pareto dominated.
Thus, our model can explain policy divergence from the fact that voters perceive poli-
cies to be ideologically tinted and expect candidates to act partisan. In contrast to most
of the existing literature that requires partisan preferences, we are able to explain po-
larized and partisan politics on matters where voters commonly agree.5 Moreover,
because in the partisan equilibrium incumbents will tend to enact the partisan policy
independent of the prevailing state, policy changes only occur after the incumbent has
changed. Since this only occurs when the electorate has found evidence regarding the
incumbent’s inadequacy, our model also delivers a novel explanation for policy persis-
tence.6
Chapter 3 studies the optimal design of the procurement process for credence goods.
Darby and Karni (1973) have coined the notion of credence goods to refer to situations
where an expert seller knows better than the customer which type of good or service
suits the buyer’s needs. Credence goods comprise for instance medical treatments,
repair services or the provision of certain complex goods. In contrast to the literature
on credence goods that has concentrated on products where the seller typically sets the
price, we focus on situations where the buyer can design and commit to a procurement
mechanism.7
A major problem in credence good markets is that sellers may be tempted not to advise
truthfully if this improves their prospects to earn profits. If sellers are specialized on
different versions of a good or service, then their advice affects with whom a buyer
will finally trade. Chapter 3 studies a situation where each potential seller provides a
5See e.g. Palfrey (1984), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997), Van Weelden (2009)
or Kartik and McAfee (2007).
6Apart from Coate and Morris (1999), we are not aware of further contributions that explain policy
persistence.
7See for instance Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for a survey of the credence good literature.
Preamble 5
distinct alternative. This situation is likely to occur when different products serve the
same purpose but differ considerably in their technological nature. For example, when
Atlantic Richfield successfully drilled for oil in Alaska, the problem soon became how
to ship the oil to global markets. Boeing proposed tanker aircrafts, General Dynamics
offered a line of tanker submarines for travel beneath the Arctic ice cap, and another
group proposed extending the Alaska Railroad to the oil well.
We investigate optimal procurement schemes that account for the sellers’ incentives to
glorify the own product. More specifically, sellers have two-dimensional private infor-
mation on the costs to produce their good and on how well it suits the buyer’s needs. If
the buyer knew the suitability, he would be willing to procure from sellers with an ex-
pensive but adequate product. However, this would allow sellers that produce at low
costs to extract rents when exaggerating the adequacy of their products. Therefore,
the buyer has to reward these sellers for admitting the inadequacy of their products.
The buyer thus faces a trade-off between procuring the adequate good more often and
economizing on rents. Because of this trade-off, the optimal procurement scheme de-
pends on the expected value of the sellers’ suitability information as compared to the
magnitude of cost uncertainty. If the good’s adequacy is of little importance, the buyer
optimally commits to sometimes trading with a seller that is as expensive as its rivals
but offers a less suited product. In contrast, if the good’s adequacy is important enough,
then the principal optimally gives priority to the suitability of the good over the costs
although this requires to concede extremely high rents to the sellers.
There are two areas of application where buyers can conceivably commit to the out-
come of a procurement scheme. First, in procurement decisions concerning valuable
goods such as military equipment, we often observe contractually arranged procure-
ment procedures. If necessary, buyers may even reinforce their commitment power
by hiring a third party for designing and enforcing optimal procurement schemes. A
second application is the design of laws and provisions for transactions that involve
credence goods. For example, in the medical sector the process of identifying the opti-
mal treatment is heavily regulated. Both patients and physicians have to comply with
these provisions. Therefore, our results could be fruitfully applied when designing the
provisions that regulate the remuneration and the choice of physicians.
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Chapter 4 deals with the related problem that some consumers cannot discern the ac-
tual quality of the goods. In contrast to the preceding chapter, we now turn to goods
that do not warrant a sophisticated design of contracts between sellers and customers.
Instead, firms simply post prices and uninformed customers form beliefs regarding
the quality of the desired goods. Since uninformed customers cannot react to the ac-
tual quality of the offered products, their presence reduces firms’ incentives to invest
in quality. Market solutions like promising warranties or developing a reputation for
high quality goods may alleviate this imperfection. Yet, these instruments are often
insufficient and policy makers are concerned about poor free-market qualities when
the goods’ grade is difficult to discern. Recent examples that illustrate the alleged lack
of quality are energy efficiency or safety properties of electrical devices, the quality of
food, hazardous contents of play-toys or the sustainability in the production of timber.
Chapter 4 therefore investigates the welfare consequences of popular policy interven-
tions in these markets.
The adoption of minimum quality standards (MQS) and certification of high grade
goods are popular instruments to protect customers from poor quality products. A
MQS restricts firms not to sell goods whose quality is below this standard.8 Certifi-
cation is a process where a third party verifies if a product fulfills certain criteria. We
often observe that the government designs and enforces certification either directly,
or promotes the creation of non-governmental organizations for these tasks.9 A par-
ticularly prevalent form of certification is to award a label if a product exceeds some
publicly known criterion, but not to disclose the actual product’s quality.10
Although both instruments aim at improving the quality in the market, they differ
in their impact. While the effect of a MQS on equilibrium qualities and prices has
already received some attention in the literature, little is known about the impact of
8Examples are abundant and include safety standards for manufactured products, contents require-
ments for textiles or food, occupational licensing for professional services or environmentally related
standards.
9In contrast to a MQS, certification does not require the power of coercion and can in principle be
provided both by private and by public institutions. Yet, firms are often unable to build up a private
certifying institution because of credibility issues.
10Examples are the German “Blauer Engel” label which is directly awarded by the state (http://
www.blauer-engel.de) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) which certifies timber from sustainable
forestry (http://www.fsc.org).
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certification on oligopolistic markets.11 Chapter 4 therefore develops a model in which
firms first decide on entry and on the quality of their products and then compete in
prices with vertically differentiated products. Before firms move, the government may
either adopt a MQS or determine a certification threshold that is required to obtain the
certificate. We find that a MQS typically gives rise to less differentiated products and
intensifies price competition. In contrast, certification gives firms the choice whether
to demonstrate a high quality of its product or not and may lead to more differentiated
goods. Although this gives rise to higher quality-weighted prices, we find that suitably
chosen certification raises consumer surplus, as the positive effect from higher quality
goods dominates.
Since firms have no obligation to comply with the certification standard, certification
is only effective if at least one firm earns a higher profit when selling a high quality
product with the label compared to offering a lower quality product that lacks the cer-
tificate. Hence, the quality investments that are needed to obtain the label may not be
unduly high compared to the expected revenues. In addition, the decision to sell a cer-
tified product also depends on the profit that a firm expects to earn from selling a good
without the certificate. If the informational asymmetry is severe, the profit from sell-
ing a product without the label is low, and a firm will comply even with a demanding
certification standard. This yields the surprising result that the government has more
leeway in manipulating the market qualities when the grade is difficult to discern. Yet,
the government may be forced to reduce the certification standard so as to maintain its
acceptance, when the proportion of informed consumers increases due to exogenous
reasons such as technological developments.
An important aspect when comparing these instruments is their effect on the entry
of firms. A MQS tends to reduce the firms’ profits due to lower equilibrium prices
and higher minimum investments in quality. Especially when the goods’ quality is
opaque, so that the firms’ ability to differentiate their goods is restricted, a MQS may
deter the entry of firms. In contrast, our analysis indicates that suitable certification
fosters differentiation of goods and does not restrict entry. We thus conclude that suit-
able certification may improve welfare more than a MQS if only few customers are
11See the literature review in Chapter 4.
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informed.
Each of the four chapters emphasizes a different role of commitment - or the lack
thereof. In the first chapter, we argue that operators form alliances in order to commit
to competing less aggressively for subscribers. The ability to commit is detrimental for
subscribers, who will be confronted with less favorable retail tariffs. Hence, Chapter 1
studies a situation in which restricting the ability to commit may improve welfare. This
is in contrast to Chapter 2, where politicians would commit to efficient behavior if this
was possible. Precisely the absence of commitment power, coupled with the presence
of asymmetric information, gives rise to coordination problems and may ultimately
lead to an unfavorable equilibrium outcome. Commitment plays also a positive, albeit
different, role in Chapter 3. As the literature on credence goods has shown, the ab-
sence of commitment on the buyer’s side often yields equilibrium outcomes in which
the seller’s expert information is not efficiently used. Hence, the buyer’s ability to com-
mit leads to a more informed decision and is therefore welfare increasing. Finally, in
Chapter 4, active firms could increase their profit by committing to producing higher
quality goods. The lack of commitment gives the government the opportunity to ma-
nipulate the equilibrium qualities by help of a suitable certification policy.
Chapter 1
Do International Roaming Alliances
Harm Consumers?
1.1 Introduction
International roaming provides subscribers with the possibility to use their mobile
phone outside the geographical coverage area of their home operator’s network, by
means of a visited network. A Mobile Network Operator (MNO) that allows sub-
scribers of a foreign operator to access its network acts as host operator. For roaming
services, a host operator charges wholesale prices to the roaming subscribers’ home op-
erator that in turn charges retail prices to its subscribers.1 MNOs are typically active on
two related markets: They offer roaming services to foreign operators and buy roam-
ing services for own traveling subscribers on the wholesale market. In addition, they
compete in their home country on the retail market for subscribers.
The European market for international roaming accounted for approximately e8.5 bil-
lion or 5.7% of the estimated total mobile industry revenues in 2005 [European Com-
mission (2006)]. At the same time, roaming contributed almost 12% to the European
mobile industry profits. It is thus highly profitable and expected to further grow dur-
ing the next years. The European Commission (2006) assessed that both the average
1Roaming services include the possibility to receive or to place calls as well as to use mobile data
services such as SMS.
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roaming retail and wholesale prices were unjustifiably high. For example, it estimated
that the per-minute costs (including a margin for fixed costs) for originating, trans-
mitting and terminating an outgoing roaming call were approximately 20 cents, while
wholesale prices were on average about 75 cents and retail prices were roughly e1.10.
This raises the question why competition has not been effective in the roaming market.
In this chapter we argue that international alliances of MNOs may result in inefficiently
high wholesale prices that would not be sustainable otherwise.2 Recently, such al-
liances have been formed, claiming to facilitate the provision of roaming services.3
Affiliated operators typically agree on special roaming wholesale conditions based on
the promise to direct roaming subscribers preferably to other alliance members. In
contrast, ordinary roaming agreements usually do not encompass the obligation to di-
rect subscribers to each other.4 They just specify the roaming wholesale prices that an
operator charges when hosting traveling subscribers of another foreign operator. We
claim that because of strategic considerations MNOs prefer to form alliances in order
to commit to trade roaming services at inefficiently high wholesale prices. As we show,
this allows MNOs to soften competition on the retail market and thereby increases total
profits.
In our model, in each of two equally sized countries two MNOs compete on the retail
market à la Hotelling for subscribers.5 We ignore nationwide calls and focus instead
on subscribers’ demand for roaming calls abroad.6 To provide this service, each oper-
ator needs to access the foreign operators’ infrastructure. Operators may form inter-
national alliances and mutually promise to procure roaming services exclusively from
their partner network. In this case they jointly negotiate on a mutual wholesale price.
Operators may also post wholesale prices and buy roaming services without being af-
2International alliances are formed by operators which own networks in different countries.
3One example is the Freemove alliance whose web page can be found under http://www.
freemovealliance.com.
4The technical and contractual conditions for concluding and implementing international roaming
agreements between GSM operators have been standardized by the GSM Association. See e.g. Suther-
land (2001).
5Our model is similar to existing models of telecommunication in this respect. See e.g. Laffont, Rey,
and Tirole (1998a,b).
6Hence in our model MNOs offer the single service to their subscribers to place roaming calls once
they are abroad. However, we believe that the issues discussed in this chapter are specific to roaming
calls and orthogonal to other services usually offered by MNOs. At the loss of simplicity other services
like nationwide mobile phone calls could be easily integrated.
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filiated to an alliance. They first set the wholesale roaming prices and decide from
which foreign operator to buy roaming services. Then they offer two-part retail tariffs
to potential subscribers in their home country.
In the absence of alliances, competition among foreign operators to host traveling sub-
scribers drives down wholesale prices for roaming services. In contrast to models of
network-interconnection, there is no “competitive bottleneck” in the sense that no par-
ticular foreign operator has to provide the roaming services.7 Operators will thus di-
rect their subscribers to the foreign network that offers the lowest wholesale price.
Agreeing in an alliance on wholesale prices above the true marginal costs serves as
commitment to compete less aggressively for subscribers. At the retail level, a higher
wholesale price is perceived as an increase in the marginal cost and is passed through
to customers. Since retail tariffs are strategic complements in our model, this induces
the domestic competitor to raise its fixed fee which has a positive feed-back effect on
the first operator’s profit in turn. Besides, within an alliance each operator exclusively
hosts the foreign partner’s traveling subscribers and a reciprocal wholesale price is
charged. Therefore additional expenses caused by a higher wholesale price are per-
fectly recouped from wholesale profits earned with the partner’s traveling subscribers.
Increasing the wholesale price within one alliance also increases the profits of compet-
ing operators. This might explain why domestic competitors rarely complained when
international alliances were formed.
Our findings are interesting in light of recent technological developments that have
increased the strategic importance of roaming alliances. The European Commission
(2006) estimated that roughly 80% of the roaming traffic was already actively directed
by use of these technologies in 2006. Until recently, operators had limited technical
means to determine which foreign network their subscribers would use.8 Customers
that did not manually register in a particular foreign network were almost randomly
assigned among foreign operators. Not being able to direct subscribers to networks
7In models of interconnected networks subscribers usually become member at one particular net-
work which then becomes monopolist for the access to this subscriber. The fact that there is ex-ante
competition for subscribers but a de-facto monopoly of access ex-post is denoted as “competitive bot-
tleneck”. See e.g. Armstrong (2002); Armstrong and Wright (2007).
8For a detailed technical description, see e.g. Stumpf (2001), Salsas and Koboldt (2004) or European
Commission (2005).
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that offer cheap roaming services induced MNOs to charge high wholesale prices even
without the help of alliances.9 Hence, the strategic importance of alliances increased
with the improvement of network selection technologies.
Further practical issues can be addressed by help of our model. First, the Groupe Spe-
ciale Mobile Association (GSMA), to which most of the MNOs are affiliated, created
a common framework to simplify the negotiations on roaming agreements between
operators.10 It contains a non-discrimination clause that restricts MNOs to offer simi-
lar wholesale terms for roaming services to all foreign operators. We account for this
clause by restricting operators to apply the same wholesale price that has been fixed
within an alliance also for unilateral roaming agreements. Surprisingly, this clause
even amplifies the anti-competitive impact of alliances, since too high wholesale prices
within alliances then also obstruct competition for unilateral roaming agreements. Sec-
ond, the European Commission introduced a price cap both at the retail and at the
wholesale level in 2007 and there is an intense debate about the effects of such an inter-
vention. In our setup, introducing a binding price cap only at the retail level decreases
the usage prices but typically also reduces the consumer surplus. This may happen
because operators compete in two part tariffs at the retail level. If the usage price is
bounded above, then operators may increase the unregulated monthly fee even more.
This so-called waterbed effect may turn seemingly helpful regulatory interventions on
its head.
While our setup is tailored to the international roaming market, there are other im-
portant applications, such as the market for cash withdrawals. Banks often only own
an automated teller machine (ATM) network in their home country and have to rely
on the infrastructure of foreign banks in order to allow customers to withdraw money
abroad.
Turning to the existing literature, our model exhibits what Carter and Wright (1994)
call symbiotic production: Each operator offers roaming services as intermediate prod-
ucts to foreign operators, and resells roaming services from foreign operators to own
9We show in Section 1.6.2 that in the absence of control regarding the host network the wholesale
prices may even exceed the monopoly level.
10These Standard Terms for International Roaming Agreement (STIRA) were created in 1996 and re-
ceived conditional exemptions from the cartel prohibition under Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty according
to Stumpf (2001).
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subscribers. Carter and Wright (1994) assume that there is a monopolistic operator
in each country and find that double marginalization leads to inefficiently high re-
tail prices. They conclude that both operators and consumers would be better off if
operators cooperated and bilaterally reduced their wholesale prices. In contrast, we
show that the role of alliances is reversed when there is competition both on the retail
and on intermediate product markets. This is because in our model price competition
at the wholesale level eliminates a positive markup and thus the problem of double
marginalization without alliances.
The role of the wholesale roaming prices in our setup resembles that of the access prices
in the two-way network interconnection model of Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
They find that the collusive power of access prices vanishes if operators compete in
two-part tariffs. In our model, higher wholesale prices allow to raise profits even
though firms compete in two-part tariffs on their home market. In the roaming mar-
ket, if an operator enters into an international alliance and agrees on a high wholesale
roaming price, the domestic competitor’s perceived costs for roaming services remain
unchanged. Due to the different impact on competing operators roaming wholesale
prices are not neutral in our model.
There are also conceptual similarities to the literature of vertical relationships.11 In par-
ticular, Shaffer (1991) shows that downstream firms might prefer paying higher unit
prices for intermediate goods and receiving a fixed compensation to low unit prices if
this serves as a commitment device to soften downstream competition. For the same
reason operators prefer to commit to a high wholesale price in our model. However,
our reasoning does not require fixed payments to compensate higher unit prices since
operators mutually provide roaming services in an alliance. In addition, the existing
literature has analyzed competition in linear prices on the downstream market so far.
To our knowledge, this model is the first to show that operators may also exploit strate-
gic complementarity even though competing in nonlinear prices in the downstream
market.
Recently, a small literature that analyzes the international roaming market emerged.
Salsas and Koboldt (2004) as well as Lupi and Manenti (2006, 2009) also consider a
11See e.g. Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Shaffer (1991) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995).
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setup of two operators in each of two countries. However, Salsas and Koboldt (2004)
do not explicitly take into account that each operator is active both on the wholesale
market and on the retail market and therefore cannot consider the possibility of in-
ternational alliances. Another difference of their base setup is their assumption that
roaming traffic cannot be directed to a particular foreign network.12 Lupi and Manenti
(2006, 2009) assume that operators act as local monopolists on the retail market. There-
fore, they do not analyze operators’ incentives to set high wholesale prices in order
to soften retail competition. In their setup, alliances optimally set wholesale prices at
marginal costs, which is not in line with the current evidence. In addition, Lupi and
Manenti (2009) cannot explain why alliances emerge endogenously.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, we formally
introduce our basic model. Section 1.3 characterizes the equilibrium retail tariffs for
given wholesale prices. In Section 1.4 we first show that equilibrium wholesale prices
equal marginal cost in the absence of international alliances and typically increase in
the number of alliances. Section 1.5 adds a first stage in which alliances can be formed.
As a result, two competing alliances endogenously emerge in the absence of regula-
tory constraints. In Section 1.6, we discuss further issues such as the role of network
selection technologies, the impact of a non-discrimination clause and of introducing
price caps and we generalize the set of wholesale instruments before we conclude in
Section 1.7.
1.2 The Model
There are two countries A and B as well as two MNOs with index 0 and 1 in each
country. Operator xi is active in home country x ∈ {A, B} and has position i ∈ {0, 1}.
Each operator’s network covers only its home country. Thus, subscribers have to be
hosted by another operator while traveling abroad. Initially, we assume that operators
dispose of technological means to determine on which foreign network their traveling
12In an extension, Salsas and Koboldt (2004) assume that traffic can be (partially) directed to the cheap-
est foreign operator and they find that this assumption drives wholesale prices down.
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subscribers register.13 We focus on outgoing roaming calls that subscribers may place
while traveling abroad and assume that it is the only service which MNOs offer to their
subscribers. In particular, we abstract from nationwide calls.14
In order to allow own subscribers to place roaming calls abroad, operators have to
buy these services on the wholesale market from a foreign MNO which then hosts these
customers. Thus, each operator competes with its domestic competitor on the wholesale
market to sell roaming services to foreign operators. They also compete on the retail
market for subscribers which live in the operator’s home country.
Cost structure: Each of the four operators incurs the same marginal cost c ≥ 0 when
a traveling subscriber places a roaming call.15 In addition, operators have to incur
monthly fixed costs CF per subscriber, e.g. for billing.
Retail market: MNOs offer a two-part tariff: Operator xi charges a usage price pxi ∈ R
per roaming call and a (monthly) fixed fee Fxi ∈ R. When a consumer places q roaming
calls, she has to pay in total pxiq + Fxi.
As in Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), networks are differentiated à la Hotelling. In
each country, consumers’ tastes l are uniformly distributed on the segment [0, 1]. The
operators are located at the two extremities and the index i ∈ {0, 1} also indicates their
position. Each consumer may join at most one network which generates a fixed surplus
v0. Placing q roaming calls generates a gross surplus u(q). Consumers have quasilinear
preferences in wealth such that the (incremental) utility of a consumer with taste l who
joins operator xi and places q roaming calls is
− 1
2σ
|i− l|+ u(q)− pxiq− Fxi + v0 .
The term − 12σ |i − l| expresses the loss of utility in case the joined network does not
13By 2006, roughly 80% of the European roaming traffic was indeed directed to the desired foreign
network.
14Further services such as nationwide calls could be included in the model at the cost of tractability.
Due to competition in two part tariffs, usage prices would be set equal to perceived marginal costs. The
surplus generated by these services is then captured by the parameter v0 introduced below.
15This marginal cost includes origination, transfer and termination. For simplicity, we assume that
all roaming calls are terminated at some third party fixed network so that we can abstract from traffic
generated by the termination of roaming calls.
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correspond exactly to the consumers taste where σ > 0 parametrizes the degree of
taste differentiation. A consumer that does not join either network receives utility that
is normalized to 0. For technical convenience, we assume that joining a network is
sufficiently attractive (i.e. v0 is high enough) so that all subscribers join a network on
the relevant range of prices.16 Preferences are the same in both countries. Note that
consumers care only about their domestic operator, not about which foreign operator
handles their roaming calls.17
The optimal individual demand and the resulting consumers’ value from roaming calls
are defined as
q(p) ≡ arg max
q
{u(q)− pq} ,
v(p) ≡ u(q(p))− pq(p) .
Since subscribers have quasilinear preferences concerning wealth, the value function
v satisfies the envelope condition v′(p) = −q(p). We maintain the following mild
assumption throughout the chapter:
Assumption 1.1. Per customer demand q(p) is non-negative, continuously differentiable and
non-increasing on R: q(·) ∈ R+, q′(·) ≤ 0. Subscribers have a strictly positive demand for
roaming services at the true marginal cost: q(c) > 0.
For future reference we define the net surplus of a tariff as
w(p, F) ≡ v(p)− F . (1.1)
Economically, the net surplus indicates how much of the value v(p) created by placing
roaming calls retains with the subscriber.
If the difference between the net surpluses offered by competing retail contracts in
16This assumption is commonly made the literature on network interconnection. See e.g. Laffont, Rey,
and Tirole (1998a, p. 7) for further discussion.
17The assumption that consumers do not care which foreign network provides the roaming services
can be justified in several ways. One plausible reasoning relies on a heterogeneous coverage. Since a
subscriber usually lives and works at a priori known places, she prefers to join a network that offers
good coverage at these focal points. However, when signing a mobile phone contract, a subscriber is
usually less aware of the foreign places where she will use roaming services.
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country x is not too large (
∣∣wxi − wxj∣∣ < 12σ ), both operators achieve a strictly positive
market share.18 In this case, the market share of operator i in country x is
nxi = n(wxi, wxj) ≡ 12 + σ
(
wxi − wxj
)
. (1.2)
If instead operator i offers a contract that is far more attractive than its competitor’s
tariff (wxi ≥ wxj + 12σ ), it corners the whole market.
Wholesale market: In order to allow subscribers to use foreign networks, operators
may either conclude roaming agreements or form international alliances.
A roaming agreement specifies that operator xi hosts subscribers of operators yj but does
not contain any obligation that operator xi also buys roaming services from operator
yj. MNOs compete to become host operator for foreign subscribers by simultaneously
posting a wholesale price per roaming call.19 If operator yj accepts the offer of operator
xi, then they conclude a roaming agreement which fixes the wholesale price a˜xi.
Mobile operators with different home countries may also form international alliances.20
Within an alliance, operators negotiate on a wholesale price at which they mutually
provide roaming services. Alliance members commit to direct their subscribers to the
partner network abroad. It will become clear that the appeal of alliances lies precisely
in the commitment that subscribers are possibly not hosted by the cheapest operator
abroad. After a wholesale price has been negotiated, it becomes public knowledge.21
Note that members of an alliance may sell roaming services to foreign operators that
are outside of an alliance.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the structure of the model with an example. Operators A0
and B0 are affiliated to an alliance and host each other’s subscribers at the wholesale
price a0. In addition, operator A0 also hosts subscribers of B1 while A1 buys roaming
18See e.g. Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
19Note that the restriction to linear wholesale prices prevents the use of two-part tariffs to soften
competition as in Shaffer (1991).
20We suspect that domestic regulation agencies would prohibit alliances that would involve more
than one MNO of a country. Members of these alliances could then collude on their domestic retail
prices as well, thereby weakening competition.
21This assumption reflects that the wholesale prices, which are also called Inter-Operator-Tariffs, are
published by the GSM Association.
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services from operator B1.
nB0 nB10 1
Country A
Country B
A0
B0
A1
B1
pB0, FB0 pB1, FB1
a0
nA0 nA10 1
pA0, FA0 pA1, FA1
a˜B1
a˜A0
Figure 1.1: Model setup - overview
Timing: The base model consists of the following stages:
1. Members of an alliance negotiate on the wholesale price for roaming calls within
their alliance.
2. MNOs simultaneously post wholesale roaming prices for operators that are not
affiliated with an alliance.22 MNOs that do not pertain to an alliance choose
which foreign operator hosts their traveling subscribers.
3. Operators set retail tariffs. Consumers subscribe to their preferred network and
place their roaming calls.
The sequential structure allows MNOs to set their wholesale prices strategically. It
reflects that due to legal and practical reasons, wholesale prices can be changed less
easily than retail tariffs.23 We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria and solve the
model by backward induction.
22The results remain unchanged if wholesale prices that are set within alliances are not publicly
known before MNOs post the wholesale prices for unilateral roaming agreements.
23In Europe, the Standard Terms for International Roaming Agreement (STIRA) issued by the GSM
Association provide guidelines how wholesale prices have to be set. They prescribe that wholesale
prices have a validity of at least six months.
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1.3 Retail Equilibrium
In this section, we take as given the choice of the foreign host operator and characterize
the equilibrium retail tariffs, market shares and retail profits.
The perceived marginal cost of the reselling operator xi, which we denote as cxi,
equals the wholesale price of its host operator. For example, if roaming services
for traveling subscribers of operator Ai are provided by operator Bj then the per-
ceived marginal cost of operator Ai is cAi = aBj. Per subscriber, an operator earns
piRxi = q(pxi) (pxi − cxi) + Fxi − CF.
To derive the profit maximizing retail tariff, it is convenient to express the profit in
terms of the retail per call price pxi and the net surplus wxi rather than in terms of pxi
and Fxi.24 The implied fixed fee can then be retrieved by the identity Fxi = v(pxi)−wxi.
The retail profit is thus ΠRxi = n(wxi, wxj) (q(pxi)(pxi − cxi) + v(pxi)− wxi − CF).
The availability of two-part tariffs yields pricing at perceived marginal cost, that is
p∗xi = cxi.
25 Intuitively, setting the usage price equal to the perceived marginal cost
avoids any dead-weight loss (from the viewpoint of the reselling operator).26 The fixed
fee is then used to extract v(cxi) − wxi without causing any inefficiencies. Using the
optimal per call price, the retail profit of operator xi simplifies to
ΠRxi = Π
R(wxi, wxj, cxi) ≡ n(wxi, wxj) (v(pxi)− wxi − CF) . (1.3)
When both domestic operators serve the market, the corresponding first order condi-
tion determines the profit maximizing level of net surplus
24After this transformation, the usage price pxi does not enter the market share any more, so that the
optimal tariff does not depend on the competitor’s usage price.
25This finding is by now well understood. See e.g. Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a); Armstrong (2002).
This claim is formally proved in Lemma 1.1.
26If q
′
(cxi) = 0, then p∗xi = cxi is not a strict maximizer of pi
R(pxi, axi, cxi), and its maximum is also
attained by other per call prices. However, the usage prices do not affect the best response of the retail
competitor. As all retail per call prices that attain the maximum retail profits are economically equiva-
lent, we treat them as one equivalence class.
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w∗(cxi, wxj) =
1
2
[v(cxi) + wxj − CF − 12σ ] . (1.4)
Solving the system of best responses allows us to characterize the retail equilibrium as
follows.
Lemma 1.1. A retail equilibrium always exists. If the difference between perceived marginal
costs is not too big, namely |v(cx0)− v(cx1)| ≤ 32σ , the retail equilibrium is uniquely charac-
terized by
w∗(cxi, cxj) =
2
3
v(cxi) +
1
3
v(cxj)− 12σ − CF , (1.5)
n∗(cxi, cxj) =
1
2
+
σ
3
[v(cxi)− v(cxj)] , (1.6)
ΠR∗(cxi, cxj) =
(
n∗(cxi, cxj)
)2
σ
. (1.7)
If instead v(cxi)− v(cxj) > 32σ , then there exists a unique equilibrium in weakly undominated
strategies27 where operator xi serves the whole market and offers w∗xi =
1
2σ + v(cxj) − CF,
while its competitor sets w∗xj = v(cxj)− CF.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
Increasing an operator’s perceived marginal cost has two effects. First, it directly re-
duces operator xi’s retail profit. Second, it softens retail competition.28 Intuitively, the
competitor anticipates that operator xi optimally reduces its subscribers’ net surplus
when its marginal cost increases. Since net surpluses are strategic complements by
equation (1.4), competitor xj optimally also offers less attractive contracts to its own
subscribers.29 The total impact of an increase of operator xi’s perceived marginal cost
on its retail profit is
27See Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) for a definition of the undominated Nash Equilibrium concept.
An undominated NE may not consist of strategies that are weakly dominated.
28By Lemma 1.1, if the difference in perceived per call costs is too big so that the competitor stays out
of the market, a marginal increase in own per call costs triggers no strategic effect of softer competition.
29This conclusion relies also on the stability of the retail equilibrium. For a comprehensive discussion
of strategic complementarity, see e.g. Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
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dΠR∗xi
dcxi
=
∂ΠRxi
∂wxj
dw∗xj
dcxi
+
∂ΠRxi
∂cxj
= −2n
∗
xi
3
q(cxi) . (1.8)
Since the negative direct effect of a cost increase dominates the positive strategic effect,
an operator unilaterally prefers lower wholesale roaming prices. However, as we show
in the next section, within an alliance the negative direct effect will be offset by gains
at the wholesale level, while the strategic effect remains.
1.4 Wholesale Equilibrium
This section analyzes the equilibrium wholesale prices that obtain for a given number
of alliances. We suppose that operators with the same index i form alliances, which is
without loss of generality due to our symmetry assumptions.
Wholesale prices of unilateral roaming agreements
We first derive the equilibrium wholesale prices for roaming services that will be of-
fered to MNOs which have not formed an alliance. Recall that joining an alliance does
not preclude MNOs from selling roaming services to foreign operators that do not per-
tain to this alliance.30 So each operator xi may offer (simultaneously with its domestic
competitor xj) to act as host operator for subscribers of country y at the wholesale
price a˜xi.31 By the results of the previous section, any operator that is not member of
an alliance optimally buys roaming services from the foreign operator which offers the
lowest wholesale price.
In the absence of alliances, operators thus compete in a standard Bertrand way to serve
as host operator. It is profitable to undercut the wholesale price of the domestic com-
petitor as long as the wholesale margin a˜xi− c is strictly positive. By the usual Bertrand
reasoning, any operator offers roaming services at wholesale price a˜∗xi = c in equilib-
rium.
30Regulation authorities might prohibit alliances that force members not to sell to outsiders as this
behavior might be perceived illegal.
31For simplicity and without loss of generality, we suppose that operators cannot discriminate the
wholesale price according to which foreign operator buys roaming services.
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A similar reasoning holds if one alliance has been formed. Suppose operators xi and yi
belong to an alliance while xj and yj remain without alliance. As before, by undercut-
ting slightly any rival’s price a˜xj > c above the true marginal cost, operator xi addition-
ally earns strictly positive wholesale profits from selling to yj.32 Since undercutting a˜xj
reduces the retail market of the partner network, it also lowers the wholesale profits
generated with these subscribers. However, when undercutting slightly, this effect is
negligible since the perceived marginal cost of operator yj and hence the retail market
shares stay almost constant. As operator xj also undercuts any a˜xi > c, the unique
equilibrium prices are again a˜∗xi = a˜
∗
xj = c.
If two alliances have been created, then all operators are committed to buy roaming
services from their partner network, so that unilateral roaming agreements play no
role. We can thus summarize:
Proposition 1.1. In unilateral roaming agreements, the equilibrium wholesale price for roam-
ing services equals the cost of providing a roaming call c. In particular, this applies if interna-
tional alliances are not feasible.
Proof. In the text.
Wholesale prices within alliances
Both members of an alliance commit to buying roaming services exclusively from the
foreign partner network, even in case another foreign operator offers cheaper whole-
sale prices for roaming services. We assume that each alliance negotiates on a single
bilateral wholesale roaming price that maximizes the joint profit and applies for roam-
ing calls in both directions: aAi = aBi ≡ ai.33 We later consider richer sets of wholesale
agreements in Section 1.6.4.
Since the negotiated wholesale prices become public knowledge, the ensuing retail
equilibrium tariffs are as described in Section 1.3, treating the own wholesale price as
32Operator xi’s retail profit is unaffected by the wholesale price that it charges to deliver roaming ser-
vices outside the alliance, since the retail pricing decision of operator xj is independent of its wholesale
profits.
33In any symmetric equilibrium, operators would deliberately choose aAi = aBi even if they were
allowed to set possibly differing wholesale prices (aAi, aBi).
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a perceived marginal cost: cxi = ai. Indeed, after wholesale prices have been set in
an alliance, an operator cannot affect the retail market share of its foreign partner any
more. Hence the level of wholesale profit is treated as constant when deciding on the
own retail tariff for domestic subscribers.
Operator xi’s overall profit comes from reselling roaming calls to subscribers in its
home country x and from selling roaming services to operator yi.34 Because of sym-
metric costs and demand across countries all members of one alliance achieve equal
market shares n∗Ai = n
∗
Bi ≡ n∗i and equal retail profits ΠR∗Ai = ΠR∗Bi ≡ ΠR∗i .35 Therefore,
each member of alliance i earns the total profit
Πi = Π(ai, cj) ≡ n∗(ai, cj)
[
piW(ai) + piR∗(ai, cj)
]
(1.9)
where
piW(ai) ≡ q(ai)[ai − c]
denotes the per customer wholesale profit. Suppose now that all operators obtain a
positive market share. Then, using the results of Section 1.3, the marginal profit gener-
ated by an increase in the wholesale price of alliance i is
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, cj) = q(ai)
[
1
3
n∗i − e(ai)n∗i −
σ
3
piW(ai)
]
(1.10)
where e(p) ≡ −(p−c)q′(p)q(p) is the markup elasticity of per customer demand.36
Three effects determine the marginal profit (1.10). These arise indirectly through a
change of the ensuing equilibrium retail tariffs. The first term in (1.10) represents the
positive strategic effect of softer competition discussed in Section 1.3. The last two
terms refer to inefficiencies that arise when the wholesale price diverges from the true
34Recall that no profits can be generated by unilateral roaming agreements.
35Both operators j have the same perceived marginal cost since they either form an alliance and nego-
tiate on a reciprocal wholesale price aj or remain without alliance and buy roaming services at the true
marginal cost c.
36Note that the demand elasticity in markup terms is closely related to the price elasticity of demand
which is defined as η(p) ≡ −pq′(p)q(p) . The following relationship holds: e(p) = η(p)
(p−c)
p < η(p). In
case of c = 0, the markup elasticity coincides with the price elasticity of per customer demand. See also
Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995).
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marginal cost. By Section 1.3, an increase of the wholesale price will be passed on to
customers directly and causes undesired deadweight loss from the viewpoint of an
alliance.37 In addition, increasing the wholesale price induces the operators to offer
less attractive retail tariffs. This reduces the customer base and therefore the wholesale
profit. Note that equation (1.10) does not contain any direct price effect. Since each
member sells the same quantity of roaming calls to the foreign partner that it buys for
own subscribers, any additional expenses for roaming services at the retail level are
perfectly recouped at the wholesale level.
Setting marginal profits (1.10) to zero and rearranging, we obtain the Lerner condition
a∗i − c
a∗i
=
1
3
[
ηq(a∗i ) + ηn∗(a
∗
i , cj)
] (1.11)
where ηq(ai) ≡ − aiq
′
(ai)
q(ai)
is the price elasticity of per customer demand and ηn∗(ai, cj) ≡
−dn∗idai
ai
n∗i
= σaiq(ai)3n∗i
is the price elasticity of the equilibrium retail market share.38
We need the following technical assumption to guarantee existence and uniqueness of
a wholesale equilibrium:
Assumption 1.2. The markup elasticity of per customer demand e(p) is non-decreasing for
all prices above marginal costs whenever e(p) ≤ 1.
Assumption 1.2 assures that the marginal impact of deadweight loss is non-decreasing
in the wholesale price. It is satisfied by many commonly used demand functions, in-
cluding constant demand, linear demand or constant (price) elasticity demand.
Let a∗(cj) denote the wholesale price that maximizes alliance i’s profits when the com-
peting operators have the perceived marginal cost cj. Based on the optimality condi-
tion (1.11), the following lemma establishes that wholesale prices are strategic comple-
ments on the relevant range.39
37While the envelope theorem states that an increase in the retail per call price has no marginal effect
on retail profits, it has a negative effect on wholesale profits.
38In case of two alliances and a symmetric wholesale price, each alliance achieves a market share of
n∗i =
1
2 and the price elasticity of the market share simplifies to ηn∗(ai) ≡ 23σaiq(ai).
39Formally, the relevant range is E =
{
p ∈ R|e(p) < 13 ∧ p ≥ c ∧ q(p) > 0∧ v(p) > v(c)− 32σ
}
as
shown in Appendix A1.1.
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Lemma 1.2. If Assumption 1.2 holds, then a best response a∗(cj) uniquely exists and is strictly
increasing in cj on the relevant range.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
The own market share increases in the perceived marginal cost of the competing oper-
ators. A higher market share amplifies the strategic effect of softer competition, which
results in a higher own profit maximizing wholesale price. We now turn to our main
result:
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that Assumption 1.2 holds.
i) If a single alliance i is created, then the unique equilibrium wholesale price a1∗ within this
alliance is characterized by equation (1.11) using cj = c and exceeds the true marginal cost:
a1∗ > c.
ii) If two alliances are formed, a unique equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies exists
in which both alliances set the symmetric wholesale price a0 = a1 = a∗.40 This equilibrium
price is characterized by equation (1.11) using cj = a∗ and exceeds the bilateral wholesale
price in case only one alliance is formed: a∗ > a1∗ > c.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
Besides existence and uniqueness, Proposition 1.2 confirms that alliances set higher
wholesale prices for roaming calls than would be socially optimal.41 Assumption 1.2
assures existence and uniqueness but is not needed to derive that a strictly positive
markup on the wholesale level necessarily occurs.
To understand the intuition for part i), let us compare the situation without alliances
to that in which one alliance has emerged. Without alliances Bertrand competition be-
40This refinement is only needed in case demand is constant below c to rule out implausible equilibria.
In this case, there exist corner equilibria in which alliance i sets wholesale prices far below c and corners
the whole market while the rival alliance j sets a wholesale price above c and is driven out of the market.
The equilibrium price a∗i is then weakly dominated by ai = c. This class of equilibria is implausible since
alliance j sets a∗j far above c, knowing that lower prices would also guarantee non-negative profits and
yield strictly higher profits if alliance i would adjust its price, too.
41In contrast to Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), candidate equilibria are robust to big deviations.
According to equation (1.10), the marginal profit becomes negative when the per customer wholesale
profit piWi is large. Together with Assumption 1.2, this implies that equilibrium prices cannot exceed
the marginal costs c by too much. Hence, a deviation as to corner the market would require wholesale
prices below the true marginal costs and would not be profitable.
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tween foreign operators pushes the wholesale price down to marginal cost. Given this
wholesale price each operator offers a two part tariff setting the price per call equal
to the true marginal cost and extracting some of the consumer surplus via the fixed
fee. When operators i form an alliance, competition still keeps the wholesale prices for
the remaining two operators at the efficient level c. Within an alliance, members can
jointly decide on the wholesale price. Raising the wholesale price of the alliance above
marginal cost induces competing operators to offer less attractive retail contracts by
the strategic complementarity discussed in Section 1.3. This strategic effect increases
profits and is of first order. The additional expenses needed to procure roaming ser-
vices for own subscribers are fully recouped since the foreign partner buys the same
quantity of these services for its subscribers. A higher wholesale price also leads to a
distorted retail tariff which is set as to maximize the retail profit instead of the total
profit. However, for wholesale prices close to the true marginal cost c the optimal re-
tail tariff from the viewpoint of the alliance is almost attained, so that the impact from
distortions on the total profit is of second order.42 Hence, starting out from a wholesale
price equal to marginal cost, it is always optimal to raise the wholesale price at least
somewhat once an alliance is formed.
According to part ii) of Proposition 1.2, the equilibrium wholesale prices further in-
crease if a second alliance is formed. When the rivals j also form an alliance, they will
negotiate on a wholesale price above c by the same reasoning as above. Since the op-
timal wholesale price is upward sloping in the competitor’s price by Lemma 1.2, each
alliance will set a higher wholesale price as would do a single alliance. Note how-
ever, that the equilibrium wholesale price remains below the level that maximizes the
industry profits, characterized by a
M−c
aM =
1
ηq(aM)
.43
Relaxing the assumption of homogeneous customers does not qualitatively change our
main result of harmful alliances as we show in Appendix A1.2. There, we allow for
light and heavy users, assuming that the mean demand for roaming calls of the pop-
42This follows from the envelope theorem.
43The role of wholesale prices differs from that of access-prices in Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a). In
their model of network interconnection, even the industry monopoly profits can be attained provided
the retail equilibrium exists since the access price equally applies to both domestic competitors. In our
model, taking aj as given and increasing the bilateral wholesale price of alliance i decreases its market
share. The danger of losing too many subscribers keeps wholesale prices below the level that maximizes
industry profits.
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ulation is unchanged and that subscribers in both segments have the same degree of
taste differentiation 1/σ. We find that heavy users, which are particularly valuable for
operators, are more inclined to switch to the competitor after an increase of the usage
price. We show that even though the fear of losing heavy users reduces the equilibrium
wholesale price somewhat, it remains strictly above the true marginal cost, where the
marginal loss from distorted retail tariffs is still of second order.
Comparative Statics
We now present some comparative statics of the equilibrium wholesale price when
two alliances are in place, which will be shown to be the configuration that obtains if
alliances are endogenously formed.44
Proposition 1.3. Suppose that Assumption 1.2 holds.
i) The equilibrium wholesale price a∗ decreases in the degree of competition on the retail market
σ.
ii) The equilibrium wholesale price a∗ decreases if the per customer demand is multiplied by
some constant λ > 1.
iii) Suppose that the per customer demand function q˜ is more elastic than q: ηq˜(p) > ηq(p) ∀p.
Denote the associated symmetric equilibrium wholesale prices by a˜∗ and a∗. If the per
customer demand q˜ is weakly higher than q at the equilibrium price a∗ (i.e. q˜(a∗) ≥ q(a∗)),
then the wholesale equilibrium price decreases in the elasticity of customer demand: a˜∗ <
a∗.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
Part i) of Proposition 1.3 states that wholesale equilibrium prices are lower if taste dif-
ferences of customers (1/σ) are small. In this case the negative effect of losing market
share when increasing the wholesale price is strong compared to the competition soft-
ening effect.
According to part ii), the equilibrium price decreases if the per customer demand rises
uniformly. Intuitively, a higher demand implies that the usage price becomes more
44The same comparative statics obtain in case of only one alliance.
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important relative to the differences in taste so that the market share becomes more
elastic. Thus, increasing the wholesale price leads to a stronger reduction in market
share and the forgone wholesale profit per customer increases due to a higher demand
per customer. Due to the amplified negative effects from distorted retail tariffs, the
equilibrium price decreases.45
Part iii) compares differences in the elasticity of demand. When demand is more elas-
tic, the dead-weight loss invoked by setting the wholesale price above marginal costs
becomes more pronounced and thus disciplines alliances. The proposition also re-
quires that the more elastic demand function q˜ exceeds the demand q at the equilib-
rium price a∗. This condition assures that operators have no countervailing incentive
to raise the wholesale price due to a reduced elasticity of the market share.
Examples. The results of this section can be illustrated by some common demand
functions that admit explicit solutions. First, we assume that the per customer demand
q is constant: q(p) = q¯. Clearly, in this case there is no concern of deadweight loss
and an alliance trades off solely the benefits from softer competition with the loss of
market share. The elasticity of the retail market share becomes ηn(ai) =
σai
3n∗i
q¯ and the
equilibrium wholesale price can be explicitly determined by solving condition (1.11):
a∗¯q = c + 12σq¯ . This formula confirms that the equilibrium price is decreasing in the
degree of competition σ and in the demand q¯.
Another example that admits an explicit solution is the commonly used constant elas-
ticity demand q˜(p) = Ap . Using this specification, the equilibrium wholesale price is
a∗˜q = c+
c
2+2σA . If A ≥
(
cq¯ + 12σ
)
then q˜(a∗¯q) ≥ q¯ and the hypothesis of Proposition 1.3,
part iii) is satisfied. Indeed, for A =
(
cq¯ + 12σ
)
, we have a∗˜q = c +
c
3+2σq¯c < a
∗¯
q .
45Note that from condition (1.11), the wholesale equilibrium price depends only on the elasticity of
per customer demand ηq and on the elasticity of the market share ηn∗ =
σaiq(ai)
3n∗i
. Since multiplying the
demand q(·) by some constant λ > 0 leaves the demand elasticity unchanged, it has the same effect on
the market equilibrium price as multiplying σ by λ.
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1.5 Endogenous Formation of Alliances
We now endogenize the choice of MNOs to form alliances. Operators whose home
network is in the same country may not collaborate within an alliance, for example
due to legal constraints.46 Therefore any alliance consists of exactly one MNO with
home country A and another of country B.
Formally, we introduce a formation stage that takes place before wholesale prices are
set. For simplicity, we assume that operator A0 may form an international alliance
with B0 and A1 with B1.47 Competing operators simultaneously decide on creating an
alliance. In order to circumvent coordination issues we assume that operators form an
alliance whenever this increases the total profit of its members.48 Thus, to analyze how
many alliances are created in equilibrium, we simply have to compare the equilibrium
profits of each configuration.
Creating an alliance dominates staying alone. Suppose first that operators j do not
create an alliance and therefore buy roaming services at a wholesale price of c. Form-
ing an alliance allows operators i to commit to a wholesale price that exceeds the true
marginal cost. Since marginally increasing the wholesale price is profitable at c, this
raises the total profit: Π(a1∗, c) > Π(c, c). Suppose now that operators j form an
alliance. Then, creating an additional alliance is even more profitable, since it ad-
ditionally induces operators j to further increase their wholesale price to a∗ > a1∗,
which makes setting a high wholesale price within an alliance even more profitable:
Π(a∗, a∗) > Π(c, a1∗).49 This yields the following prediction:
Proposition 1.4. Suppose that Assumption 1.2 holds. Then a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium exists with two competing alliances being formed. In every country, the market is equally
split between both alliances. Both alliances set the equilibrium wholesale price a∗ characterized
by Proposition 1.2, part ii).
46Otherwise, all operators would agree on a wholesale price that maximizes joint industry profits.
47By the symmetry assumptions, this restriction is without loss of generality.
48Putting aside coordination issues, this formulation generates the same results as a more complicated
formation stage in which operators announce their choice and alliances are only formed if two operators
agree to form an alliance.
49Formally, this inequality follows from ∂Π∂aj (ai, aj) =
1
3 q(aj)
[
2n∗i + σpi
W(ai)
]
> 0.
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Proof. In the text.
Decomposing the total equilibrium profit shows that alliances increase the wholesale
profit without lowering the equilibrium retail profit. Due to our simple Hotelling
framework, the retail equilibrium profit ΠR∗i =
(n∗i )
2
σ depends only on the market
share but not on the absolute level of retail prices. Since the retail market is equally
shared when either all operators stay alone or two alliances have been created, the
retail equilibrium profit remains unchanged. However, with alliances, operators addi-
tionally earn a strictly positive wholesale margin which makes them better off in total.
Subscribers are unambiguously worse off once alliances are introduced since the equi-
librium retail usage price increases while the equilibrium fixed fee remains unchanged.
Note that the strategic effect cannot be achieved if operators Ai and Bi merge rather
than form an alliance. A merged operator i possesses a network in both countries.
It therefore sets the retail prices in each country as to maximize the sum of retail and
wholesale profits of both countries. Within a merged operator, the perceived marginal
cost when setting the retail tariff remains at c, independently of the chosen (virtual)
wholesale price. Hence, conducting a merger generates no strategic effects and leads
to the same profits as staying alone. As a policy implication, if creating an interna-
tional alliance or an international merger generates additional positive effects beyond
this model, then competition authorities should promote international mergers instead
of alliances. Indeed, the OECD (2009) observes that the prices for roaming services
drop, once operators with networks in different countries merge and therefore cannot
credibly commit to excessive wholesale prices any longer.
1.6 Extensions
1.6.1 Non-Discrimination Clause
The STIRA framework which was introduced by the GSMA in 1996 contains a so
called non-discrimination clause. According to this clause, an operator should apply
the same terms and conditions on the wholesale market to all foreign operators when
CHAPTER 1. Roaming Alliances 31
providing access to its network. In this section, we show that the non-discrimination
clause impairs competition for unilateral roaming agreements and allows alliances to
raise the rivals’ marginal cost. Compared to the results of our base model, this leads to
even higher usage prices and further increases equilibrium profits.
In the spirit of this clause, we now assume that operators have to charge the same
wholesale price that has been negotiated within an alliance whenever they sell roaming
services to non-affiliated operators. Thus, in contrast to the timing considered above,
only operators that have not joined an alliance may post a wholesale price.
Since the non-discrimination clause only affects the equilibrium wholesale prices if
exactly one alliance has emerged, suppose now that only operators i have formed an
alliance.50 Then operators j generate positive wholesale revenues only if they offer a
lower wholesale price than alliance i.51 For a given ai, the wholesale profit of operator
xj that charges a wholesale price of axj is
Π˜W(axj, ai) ≡
0 if axj > ain∗(axj, ai)piW(axj) if axj ≤ ai
where n∗(ai, axj) ≡ 12 + σ3
(
v(ai)− v(axj)
)
and piW(ai) ≡ q(ai)[ai − c] remain as al-
ready defined in Section 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. Denote by a˜∗(ai) the best response
of the non-affiliated operators j as a function of the wholesale price ai set by alliance
i. We show in Proposition 1.5 below that a˜∗(ai) equals any wholesale price ai up to
some uniquely defined threshold a¯†: a˜j∗(ai) = ai if ai ∈
[
c, a¯†
]
. This threshold lies
above the wholesale equilibrium price a∗ defined by Proposition 1.2.52 This is because
operator xj sets a˜xj in order to maximize its wholesale profit and only internalizes that
increasing the wholesale price reduces the retail market share but not that it also lowers
the retail per customer profit of the reselling operator yj.
50In case of two alliances, their members are committed to buy roaming services only within the same
alliance. So, wholesale prices for non-affiliated operators play no role.
51As a tie-breaking rule that assures equilibrium existence, we assume that whenever all operators of
one country offer the same wholesale price, operators that do not pertain to an alliance buy all roaming
services from a non-alliance operator.
52We formally prove this result in Proposition 1.5 below.
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We now illustrate why the equilibrium price53 aND∗ that obtains when only one al-
liance i has been formed unambiguously exceeds a∗. Alliance i cannot earn profits
from selling roaming services to any operator j since non-affiliated operators weakly
undercut the negotiated wholesale price whenever ai > c. Moreover, any wholesale
price ai below a¯† yields a retail market share for alliance i of 1/2 since the non-affiliated
operators j will exactly match this price. Raising the wholesale price from a∗ to a¯† > a∗
thus allows the alliance to increase its wholesale profit without losing market share.54
Therefore, if only one alliance has emerged, the equilibrium wholesale prices of all
operators are at least a¯†.55
The following proposition establishes that indeed all operators’ profits are highest
when only one alliance is formed and that this configuration obtains in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose that assumption 1.2 holds and a non-discrimination clause is in
place. Then a single alliance that sets the unique profit-maximizing wholesale price aND∗
emerges in equilibrium. The wholesale price aND∗ strictly exceeds the price a∗ characterized
by Proposition 1.2. Introducing a non-discrimination clause unambiguously increases all op-
erators’ profits and decreases both customer surplus and welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
Intuitively, a non-discrimination clause allows operators in an alliance to commit not
to undercut the wholesale prices of non-affiliated operators.56 Similar to Ordover, Sa-
loner, and Salop (1990), this commitment assures that rival operators will have to pay
high wholesale prices for roaming services. The clause thus severely restricts compe-
tition to provide non-affiliated operators with roaming services and essentially allows
53The superscript ND refers to non-discrimination
54In the proof of Proposition 1.5 we show that e(a¯†) > 1 so that lower per customer demand is more
than offset by a higher margin.
55Note that higher wholesale prices partially obtain since the alliance sets its wholesale price before
the non-affiliated operators. Since wholesale prices are strategic complements as shown by Lemma 1.2,
if two alliances chose their wholesale prices sequentially, higher wholesale prices than a∗ would obtain.
But whenever aND∗ = a¯†, then aND∗ even exceeds the wholesale price that would be set by the alliance
i, if another alliance j observed ai before negotiating on aj. A sufficient condition for aND∗ = a¯† is
σpiW(a¯†) ≤ 1.
56In a different setup with secret contracts, Rey and Tirole (2007) recently reported that a non-
discrimination clause may be harmful, since it confers commitment against opportunistic but socially
desirable behavior. We have thus discovered another reason why commitment obtained by help of a
non-discrimination clause may be advantageous for firms.
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an alliance to soften competition both at the retail and at the wholesale level.57 Inter-
estingly, the prediction that some operators join alliances while others do not seems to
be in line with the actual behavior of European MNOs.
1.6.2 The Role of Host Network Selection
This section serves to analyze the competitive impact of recent technological develop-
ments that have improved the home operators’ control over the choice of foreign host
networks for roaming.58 Departing from our assumption of perfect network selec-
tion technologies, we now consider the other polar case of operators having no control
which foreign network their subscribers use.59 Appendix A1.3 covers intermediate lev-
els of control. As we show, the possibility of traffic direction increases the competitive
pressure in the wholesale market. We find that alliances are without bite if the host
network is randomly determined and conclude that the importance of international
alliances has increased with recent technological improvements.
We assume that operators cannot discriminate the retail usage price contingent on
which foreign network is used. If price discrimination was feasible, subscribers would
always choose the cheapest network.60 Hence, operators could perfectly control the
network selection by setting the price of the preferred foreign network lower than that
of the non-desired network. The outcome would then be economically equivalent to
our base model.
When buying roaming calls from foreign MNOs on the wholesale market, operator xi’s
perceived marginal cost is:
cxi =
1
2
(
ay0 + ay1
)
(1.12)
57These results are partially driven by our assumption that only two networks operate in each country.
However, we suspect that in a symmetric setup of N operators, the non-discrimination clause would
induce the creation of N − 1 alliances.
58Salsas and Koboldt (2004) offer a more extensive treatment of recent technological developments.
59In the past, operators indeed accepted that their traveling subscribers were assigned almost ran-
domly to foreign networks, for several reasons like e.g. coverage. For a more extensive discussion, see
Salsas and Koboldt (2004).
60However, according to European Commission (2005) there is empirical evidence that few sub-
scribers are aware or engaged in manual network selection.
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Again, the optimal per call price equals the perceived marginal cost: p∗xi = cxi. The
retail equilibrium net surplus, market share and the equilibrium profits remain as es-
tablished in Lemma 1.1. Since each operator has to procure half of the roaming services
from each foreign operator, cxi = cxj. Thus the retail market is perfectly shared and the
equilibrium profit is constant in ayi by our results of Section 1.3: ΠˆR∗xi =
1
4σ .
No international alliances. In the absence of alliances the total wholesale demand of
operator xi is Qˆxi ≡ 12 q
(
1
2 (ax0 + ax1)
)
. The demand does not depend on the actual
market share of the reselling operators, since both purchase half of their traffic from
operator xi. The total profit of operator xi is:61
ΠˆNAxi = Πˆ
R∗
xi +
1
2
(axi − c) q
(
1
2
(ax0 + ax1)
)
(1.13)
Similar to Section 1.4, operator xi sets its wholesale price so as to maximize its whole-
sale profits (axi − c)Qxi. The following mild technical assumption assures that the per
customer demand is elastic enough for an equilibrium to exist:62
Assumption 1.3. The markup elasticity of per customer demand e(p) is increasing for all
prices above marginal costs whenever q(p) > 0 and there exists some p˜ > c with e( p˜) = 2.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose that Assumption 1.3 holds and that operators cannot select the
host network of their subscribers. If no alliances are feasible there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium wholesale price aNA∗, characterized by
aNA∗ − c
aNA∗
=
2
ηq(aNA∗)
(1.14)
where ηq(·) is the price elasticity of per customer demand.
Proof. Rearranging the first order condition that is necessary for maximization of ΠˆNAxi
yields condition (1.14). Rewriting the marginal profit in terms of markup-elasticity
and evaluating at axj = axi yields ∂Πˆ
NA
∂axi
= 12 q (axi)
[
1− 12e (axi)
]
. Thus the first order
condition is satisfied at p˜ which uniquely exists by Assumption 1.3. The profit is strictly
quasiconcave since e′ (p) > 0 whenever q(p) > 0 by assumption.
61The superscript NA refers to “no alliance”.
62Since now the market share does not decrease in the own wholesale price, Assumption 1.3 has to be
stronger than Assumption 1.2.
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By Proposition 1.6, if operators cannot influence which foreign network their sub-
scribers use to place roaming calls, the resulting equilibrium wholesale price is ex-
tremely high. Unilaterally increasing the wholesale price axi causes a negative exter-
nality on the rival, since the wholesale demand of operator xj is reduced while only the
margin of operator xi increases. As operators do not take this externality into account,
the resulting equilibrium price even exceeds the monopoly price.
Two international alliances. We now analyze the equilibrium outcome after operators
with the same location have formed two competing alliances and omit the country
index for brevity. Operators have to offer roaming services on the wholesale market
to all foreign operators for the same price ai that is negotiated within an alliance.63
Thus, the only remaining virtue of alliances is to set the wholesale price cooperatively
instead of competitively.
If both alliances have negotiated wholesale prices ai and aj, the profit of each operator
in alliance i is
Πˆi = ΠˆR∗i +
1
2
(ai − c) q
(
1
2
(a0 + a1)
)
. (1.15)
Since both the retail and the wholesale profit is the same as in the case of no alliances
treated above, we conclude:
Proposition 1.7. Suppose that Assumption 1.3 holds and that operators cannot select the
host network of their subscribers. The formation of two alliances does not affect the wholesale
equilibrium price, which remains characterized by (1.14). Ceterus paribus, with two alliances
the equilibrium wholesale price under random network selection lies above that under perfect
network selection given by Proposition 1.2, part ii).
63This restriction facilitates the comparison with the results of the base model. When allowing MNOs
to discriminate between members of the alliance and non-members, then the wholesale price aˆi that
applies to non-members will be set extremely high and in many cases there is no equilibrium. Intuitively,
as foreign operator j that is not in alliance i has to buy half of its roaming calls from operator i, setting
a high aˆi increases the perceived marginal costs of operator j and therefore increases the retail market
share of alliance i.
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Proof. The proof of existence and uniqueness parallels that of Proposition 1.6, since the
same objective function is maximized. For Proposition 1.11 in Appendix A1.3 we
prove that the equilibrium price decreases with the quality of network selection.
Intuitively, there are two reasons why equilibrium prices are now higher than in the
base model. Due to random network selection, the perceived marginal costs ci of oper-
ators within alliance i and those of the rival alliance j equally depend on the wholesale
price ai. First, this makes an alliance’s retail market share insensitive to increases of the
own wholesale price. Second, raising the wholesale price ai may increase the wholesale
profit generated from sales to operators of the competing alliance.
The insight that without network control the presence of alliances does not affect
the wholesale prices is at first glance surprising. One might be tempted to conjec-
ture that alliances mitigate the problem of double marginalization as in Carter and
Wright (1994).64 Indeed, assuming linear retail and wholesale prices, Lupi and Ma-
nenti (2009) find that even without control of network selection, alliances negotiate
reciprocal wholesale prices equal to marginal costs. However, as we analyze compe-
tition on the retail market with two part tariffs, no deadweight loss is caused at the
retail level and double marginalization is not an issue. Hence, there is no externality
that an alliance could internalize when coordinating on a wholesale price. Our model
therefore provides an explanation why in Europe international roaming alliances were
formed mainly after powerful network selection technologies have become available.
1.6.3 Policy Intervention
We now investigate the effects of imposing a retail price cap when two alliances have
emerged. In practice, implementing a retail price cap does not require collaboration
with foreign regulators since it directly affects the country in which it is imposed. In
contrast, a wholesale price cap clearly increases both welfare and consumer surplus in
64In contrast to our model, Carter and Wright (1994) assume that there is a monopolist in each country
and that the monopolists set linear tariffs both at the wholesale and retail market. They find that if
operators cooperatively set wholesale prices to maximize their profits, then both consumer surplus and
profits exceed the uncooperative outcome since the double-marginalization problem is circumvented.
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our model but usually requires international cooperation between regulators. Know-
ing the precise effects of a retail price cap appears thus necessary in order to select the
optimal policy. The interest in this question is exemplified by the intense debate that
took place before the European Commission introduced a price cap both at the retail
and at the wholesale level in 2007. Indeed, our results suggest that solely restricting the
retail usage price is likely to have a detrimental effect on consumer surplus even in the
absence of any informational asymmetries.
We first analyze the impact of a retail usage price cap p on the retail equilibrium tariffs
for given wholesale prices. Remember that each operator xi optimally sets the retail
usage price pxi so as to maximize the retail surplus. If the wholesale price ai exceeds the
price cap, then the optimal choice is to set the usage price as high as possible, namely
p∗xi = p. The maximized surplus generated on the retail stage is therefore:
65
v(ai) ≡
v(p) + q(p) (p− ai) if ai > pv(ai) if ai ≤ p (1.16)
Clearly, restricting the usage price not to exceed p reduces the surplus created at the
retail level whenever ai > p and when the demand is decreasing at p. The retail profit
per customer is now piiR = v(ai)− wi − CF where wi is the subscriber’s net surplus.
Since the retail equilibrium tariffs derived in Section 1.3 depend on ai only through
v(ai), they remain valid when a price cap is in place after replacing v(ai) by the function
v(ai). Whenever the wholesale prices of the competing alliances are close enough,
namely |v(a0)− v(a1)| < 32σ , both operators achieve a positive market share given by
n∗(ai, aj) = 12 +
σ
3 [v(ai) − v(aj)]. In this case the equilibrium level of net surplus w∗i
conceded to consumers reads as follows:
w∗i =
2
3
v(ai) +
1
3
v(aj)− CF − 12σ (1.17)
In particular, for symmetric wholesale prices the equilibrium per customer profit is
pii
R∗ = 12σ as in Section 1.3.
66
65We make the realistic assumption that operators cannot restrict the quantity of roaming calls per
subscriber.
66Since a price cap usually reduces the retail surplus, the fact that retail profits remain constant implies
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Concerning the equilibrium wholesale prices, we assume that the cap is imposed be-
fore operators negotiate on wholesale prices. For wholesale prices above p that give
rise to a shared market, the total marginal profit of an operator is
∂Π∗
∂ai
(ai, aj) =
q(p)
3
[
n∗i − σpiWi
]
(1.18)
where piWi ≡ q(p)(ai− c) denotes the per customer wholesale profit in case of a binding
price cap. Since increasing the wholesale price above p leaves the retail usage price
unchanged, the deadweight loss is not exacerbated. Setting the marginal profit equal
to zero yields that the per customer wholesale profit is piW∗ = 12σ in any symmetric
equilibrium. It exceeds its counterpart without price cap piW∗ = 1−3e(a
∗)
2σ derived from
condition 1.10. Using piW∗ = 12σ with (1.16) and (1.17) yields that the equilibrium net
surplus per customer is w∗ = v(a∗) − piW∗ − 12σ − CF = v(p) + q(p) (p− c) − 1σ −
CF which is clearly maximal for p = c. The next proposition establishes that even
introducing the optimal retail price cap p = c usually decreases consumer surplus.
Proposition 1.8. Denote by a∗ the equilibrium wholesale price without price cap according
to Proposition 1.2. Suppose that Assumption 1.2 holds and that demand is decreasing at a∗:
q
′
(a∗) < 0. Then introducing a retail per call price cap p ≤ a∗ decreases consumer surplus and
increases industry profits. If the price cap is not set below the true marginal cost and p < a∗,
total welfare increases. If the price cap is sufficiently close to the unrestricted equilibrium
wholesale price (i.e. q(p)− q(a∗) < 3e(a∗)2σ(a∗−c) ), then the equilibrium wholesale price increases.
Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
If the mild conditions of Proposition 1.8 are satisfied, restricting the retail per call price
decreases deadweight-loss and thus increases total welfare since the market remains
covered.
Two countervailing effects determine how a price cap influences the wholesale equilib-
rium price. A retail price cap prevents operators from passing through high wholesale
prices to subscribers. Therefore, increasing the wholesale price does not aggravate the
deadweight-loss, which renders higher wholesale prices more attractive. On the other
that even if the regulator could impose a cap on the usage retail prices and fix the symmetric wholesale
prices, the consumer surplus would be generally reduced.
CHAPTER 1. Roaming Alliances 39
hand, a cap on the retail price guarantees that each subscriber places at least q(p) calls.
This increases the wholesale profit per customer and renders subscribers more valu-
able, thereby inducing alliances to set lower wholesale prices. Whenever the condition
q(p) − q(a∗) < 3e(a∗)2σ(a∗−c) holds, the first effect dominates and higher wholesale prices
obtain. If e(a∗) > 0, a price cap which is set close enough to a∗ satisfies this condition
and thus increases the wholesale price.
Our results suggest that in order to protect subscribers, price caps should preferably be
imposed on the wholesale level. This might explain why national regulation authori-
ties have mostly chosen not to regulate retail roaming prices prior to the intervention
of the European Commission.
1.6.4 Wholesale Fees per Roaming Subscriber
So far, we have assumed that operators can only charge linear prices at the wholesale
level. This assumption reflects roughly the wholesale price structure that is used in
practice at the moment. However, in this section we show that two-part tariffs on the
upstream level render alliances even more profitable. Now, operators may both charge
a per call wholesale-price and a fee that has to be paid for any foreign customer that
visits the network.67 As in Section 1.4, we assume that operators with same position
have formed alliances and omit the country index for brevity.
The per customer fee enters as perceived fixed cost and therefore renders customers
less attractive at the retail level. The optimal retail per call price remains equal to the
wholesale per call price of the alliance. Thus, the per customer profit is now p˜iRi =
v(pi) − wi − φi − CF. The retail profit of operator i conditional on alliance i having
agreed on the wholesale price ai and the per customer fee φi reads ΠRi = n(wi, wj)p˜i
R
i .
Solving for the retail equilibrium as in Section 1.3 yields the retail equilibrium net sur-
plus w∗i =
2
3 [v(ci)− φi] + 13
[
v(cj)− φj
]− 12σ − CF.
Denote the per customer wholesale profit by p˜iWi = q(ai) (a˜i − c) + φi. The first order
conditions which characterize the optimal per call wholesale price a˜∗i and the optimal
67Note that this pricing structure differs from two-part tariffs used for example as franchise fees. In
our setup, the fixed fee φxi is paid for any customer. In contrast, a franchise fee is paid only once.
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per customer wholesale fee φ∗i are
σ
3
p˜iR∗i =
σ
3
p˜iW∗i + n
∗
i e(a˜
∗
i ) , (1.19)
p˜iR∗i = p˜i
W∗
i (1.20)
where e(·) refers to the per customer demand elasticity in terms of markup as before.
Inserting condition (1.20) into condition (1.19) yields n∗i e(a˜
∗
i ) = 0 which for n
∗
i 6= 0
is only satisfied for a˜∗i = c. Hence, as long as operator i expects to achieve a strictly
positive retail market share, it is optimal to set the wholesale per call price equal to the
true marginal costs.
Proposition 1.9. Suppose that Assumption 1.2 holds, that q
′
(c) < 0 and that operators have
formed two competing alliances. If each alliance can negotiate both on a wholesale per call
price and on a per customer fee, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. The equilibrium
wholesale per call price equals the true marginal cost c and the wholesale profit is p˜iW∗i =
φ∗i =
1
2σ . Compared to the symmetric equilibrium without per customer fees, characterized by
Proposition 1.2, each operator’s wholesale profit and welfare is higher.
Proof. First note that in any symmetric equilibrium, each operator has market share
n∗i =
1
2 and hence earns the retail profit p˜i
R∗
i =
1
2σ . Inserting these values and a˜
∗
i = c
into equation (1.20) yields φ∗i =
1
2σ . Furthermore, this critical point is a maximum,
since ∂
2Π
∂φ2i
(φi, φj) = −13 − σ9 < 0 for (φi, φj) such that n∗i ∈ (0, 1). It can be easily verified
thatΠ(φi, φj) ≤ Π(φj− 32σ , φj) for all φi < φj− 32σ , so that cornering the market is never
optimal. If wholesale per customer fees are not feasible, by Proposition 1.2, piW(a∗i ) =
1
2σ − 32σe(a∗i ) < 12σ = p˜iW∗i . The difference in welfare is −
´ a∗i
c (x− c) q′(x)dx > 0.
Intuitively, increasing the per customer fee reduces the per customer retail profit and
thus softens retail competition. Starting from φi = 0 and ai = c, raising the per cus-
tomer fee avoids deadweight loss and is thus more attractive than raising the wholesale
price from the viewpoint of an alliance.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a tractable model of international roaming in which operators
compete both at the wholesale and at the retail level. We have shown that operators
have incentives to form alliances and to commit to mutually providing roaming ser-
vices at inefficiently high wholesale prices. As Section 1.6.2 points out, these alliances
serve to alleviate the competitive pressure that has lately increased due to recent im-
provements in network selection technologies.
Our analysis yields a number of policy implications. International alliances that are
often claimed to improve efficiency, might reduce welfare and harm consumers. If op-
erators mutually sell roaming services, it is difficult for regulatory agencies to discover
whether wholesale prices are set for strategical reasons. As we have shown, in the
roaming market, fixed fees as suggested by Shaffer (1991) are not needed in order to
soften competition. From the perspective of a regulatory agency this means that the
absence of two-part tariffs as often observed in the roaming wholesale market does
not imply that wholesale prices are not set at a inefficiently high level for strategical
reasons.
Another important insight is that the so-called waterbed effect might render seemingly
helpful regulatory interventions useless or even detrimental. As is shown in Sec-
tion 1.6.3, when regulators impose a binding retail price cap but leave the monthly fees
unregulated, the waterbed effect might even cause consumer surplus to decrease. Our
analysis suggests that whenever regulators restrict one price instrument, then reactions
of operators concerning their remaining instruments should be taken into account. If
the regulation of all price instruments is not desired, then other measures might be
more effective. For example, according to our model, a ban of international alliances
might bring roaming prices down and increase welfare. Our suggestion might have
constituted an alternative approach than the price cap on roaming prices which was
introduced by the European Parliament in 2007.
Our model also illustrates that non-discrimination clauses that look innocent at first
sight might have detrimental effects once the interaction with international alliances is
taken into account. Therefore we advise to carefully review the rules of conduct that
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have been introduced by organizations as the GSM Association with respect to their
competitive impact.68
Notably, central predictions of Lupi and Manenti (2009) who also analyze the inter-
national roaming market are almost reversed in our model.69 However, their model
differs in important characteristics such as the retail price structure and the degree
of retail competition. Therefore, regulators should carefully analyze which of the cur-
rently available models captures best the key characteristics of a given roaming market.
There remain further open questions that merit future research, even though we have
already extended our base model in several directions. While our assumption of a
balanced demand for roaming services helped to simplify the setup and to keep the
model tractable, it would be certainly interesting to explore to what extend our results
carry over in a less balanced setting. Even though demand imbalances would render
a more sophisticated negotiation game necessary, we suspect that operators could still
rely on inefficiently high wholesale prices to soften competition. Furthermore, our
model delivers testable predictions for future empirical work.
A1.1 Appendix - Proofs of Lemmas & Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1.1
We omit the country index for brevity in what follows.
Suppose that
∣∣v(ci)− v(cj)∣∣ < 32σ . We first show that (1.4) indeed maximizes re-
tail profits given w∗j . Since
∂ΠR
∂pi
(pi, wi, wj, ci) = niq
′
(pi)(pi − ci), ΠR(pi, wi, ci) −
ΠR(ci, wi, ci) = ni
´ pi
ci
q
′
(p)(p− ci)dp ≤ 0 with strict inequality whenever ni > 0 and
q(ci) 6= q(pi). Thus p∗i = ci maximizes ΠRi independently of wi and wj. Moreover,
∂ΠR
∂wi
(ci, wi, w∗j , ci) = 2σ
(
w∗i − wi
)
so that ΠR
(
ci, w∗i , w
∗
j , ci
)
> ΠR
(
ci, wi, w∗j , ci
)
.
68See www.gsmworld.com. Interestingly, the GSMA consists of almost all MNOs, so that possibly
rules of conduct have been developed in order to increase the industry profit.
69Assuming linear prices and monopolistic demand on the retail level, Lupi and Manenti, 2009 find
that alliances improve efficiency since they serve to circumvent the double marginalization problem.
However, they predict that alliances do not emerge in equilibrium.
CHAPTER 1. Roaming Alliances 43
Solving simultaneously the reaction functions (1.4) for both operators yields equa-
tion (1.5). Being a system of linearly independent equations, the solution is unique.
The condition
∣∣v(ci)− v(cj)∣∣ < 32σ assures that the market share stays between zero
and one.
We now show that whenever v(ci) − v(cj) ≥ 32σ there exists a unique equilibrium in
pure weakly undominated strategies, which entails n∗i = 1 and n
∗
j = 0.
We first establish that any such corner equilibrium necessarily involves p∗i = ci,
w∗i =
1
2σ − CF + v(cj), p∗j = cj and w∗j = v(cj) − CF. Define w˜i such that given(
wj, v(ci), v(cj)
)
, operator i just serves the whole market: 12 + σ
(
w˜i − wj
)
= 1. Note
that whenever n∗i = 1 then necessarily w
∗
i = w˜i as setting wi > w˜i(wj) would yield
strictly lower profits.
We now show that whenever n∗j = 0, then necessarily w
∗
j = v(cj)− CF: Any strategy
with wj > v(cj)− CF entails piRi < 0 and is weakly dominated by pj = cj and wj = w∗j .
Now suppose that wj < v(cj)− CF was an equilibrium. By the preceding discussion,
necessarily wi = w˜i(wj). Then player j could achieve a strictly positive retail profit by
deviating to wj +
v(cj)−CF−wj
2 which contradicts equilibrium.
We now show that a unique corner equilibrium arises iff v(ci) − v(cj) ≥ 32σ . If-
Existence: Given, w∗j = v(cj) − CF and w∗i = 12σ − CF + v(cj), it can be directly ver-
ified that ∂Π
R
∂wi
(wi, w∗j , ci) > 0 for wi < w
∗
i and
∂ΠR
∂wj
(wj, w∗i , ci) < 0 for wj > w
∗
j
which together with the preceding paragraphs confirms that w∗i and w
∗
j are mutually
profit maximizing. If-Uniqueness: There exists no interior equilibrium since inserting
v(ci)− v(cj) ≥ 32σ into (1.6) yields n∗i ≥ 1 which is not interior. Only-if : Suppose that
0 ≤ v(ci) − v(cj) < 32σ : For w∗j = v(cj) − CF as required in any corner equilibrium,
the best response of player i is w∗i < w˜i which implies n
∗
i < 1 and therefore causes a
contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Define E =
{
p ∈ R|e(p) < 13 ∧ p ≥ c ∧ q(p) > 0∧ v(p) > v(c)− 32σ
}
. First we estab-
lish some auxiliary lemmas that will be also useful for other proofs.
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Lemma 1.3. Define ψ(p) ≡ x(p) [z− e(p)]− ypiW(p) with x(p) ≥ 0, x(c) > 0, x′(p) ≤
0, z ∈ (0, 1] and y > 0. If Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold, then the equation ψ(p) = 0 has a
unique solution p∗ > c. This solution satisfies ψ′(p∗) < 0.
Proof. There are three cases: a) There exists some pˆ with e( pˆ) = 1; b) limp→∞ e(p) = 1
which implies that limp→∞ piW(p) > 0; c) limp→∞ e(p) = e < 1 which implies that
limp→∞ piW(p) = ∞.70 In the first case, ψ( pˆ) < 0, while in the other two cases
limp→∞ ψ(p) < 0. Since ψ(c) = x(c)z > 0, by continuity there exists a p∗ > c
s.t. ψ(p∗) = 0. As ψ′(p) = −x(p)e′(p) +
(
x
′
(p)− yq(p)
)
(z − e(p)) < 0 whenever
ψ(p) ≥ 0, p∗ is unique.
Lemma 1.4. If Assumption 1.2 holds, then:
i) piW(ai) is concave on E in ai.
ii) Given aj ∈ E , any ai ∈ E that satisfies the first order necessary conditions for being a local
maximum of Π(ai, aj) strictly maximizes Π(ai, aj) in E .
Proof. Part i) ∂pi
W
∂p (p) = (p − c)q
′
(p) + q(p) = q(p) (1− e(p)). Hence ∂2piW
∂p2 (p) =
q
′
(p) (1− e(p)) − q (p) e′(p) < 0 as e′(p) > 0 by Assumption 1.2 and 1− e(p) > 0
for p ∈ E .
Part ii) By definition of E , ∀ai, aj ∈ E , since |v(c)− v(ai)| < 3σ2 we have n∗
(
ai, aj
) ∈
(0, 1). Define ϕ(ai, aj) ≡ (1− 3e(ai)) n∗i − σpiW(ai) and note that by (1.10),
∂Π(ai,aj)
∂ai
=
1
3 q(ai)ϕ(ai, aj). The result follows from
∂ϕ(ai,aj)
∂ai
= −2σq(ai)
[2
3 − e(ai)
]− 3e′(ai)n∗i < 0,
which is true since σ > 0, e(ai) < 13 and e
′
(ai) ≥ 0 by Assumption 1.2.
Lemma 1.5. For all (ai, aj) s.t. n∗(ai, aj) ∈ (0, 1) the following inequalities hold:
i) If ai < c then
∂Π(ai,aj)
∂ai
> 0.
ii) If q(ai) = 0 then Π(c, aj) > Π(ai, aj).
iii) If ai > c, q(ai) > 0 and e(ai) ≥ 13 then
∂Π(ai,aj)
∂ai
< 0.
iv) If Assumption 1.2 holds and ai > c, q(ai) > 0, v(ai) < v(c)− 32σ then
∂Π(ai,aj)
∂ai
< 0.
Proof. Part i) By Assumption 1.1, q(ai) ≥ q(c) > 0 which implies that piW(ai) < 0 for
ai < c and thus by equation (1.10), ∂Π∂ai (ai, aj) > 0.
70Integrating up −(p−c)q
′(p)
q(p) ≤ 1− e ∀p ≥ c yields
´ q′(p)
q(p) dp ≥ −e
´ 1
(p−c)dp. Using p > p > c, we get
pi(p) ≥ pi(p)
[
p−c
p−c
]e
which goes to infinity as p→ ∞.
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Part ii) Any ai with q(ai) = 0 implies that ai > c and q
′
(ai) = 0 by Assumption 1.1.
As q(a
′
) = 0 ∀a′ ≥ ai, we have v(aj) ≥ v(ai) and hence n∗(ai, aj) ≤ 12 . In addition,
q(ai) = 0 implies q(ai) (ai − c) = 0. Hence Π(ai, aj) = 1σn∗(ai, aj)2 < 1σn∗(c, aj)2 ≤
Π(c, aj) holds which contradicts ai being optimal. To see that Π(c, aj) ≥ 1σn∗(c, aj)2,
distinguish two cases: if v(c)− v(aj) ≤ 32σ , thenΠ(c, aj) = 1σn∗(c, aj)2 by Lemma 1.1. If
v(c)− v(aj) > 32σ , then by the same Lemma piWi > 1σ and hence Π(c, aj) > 1σn∗(c, aj)2.
Part iii) Since e(ai) ≥ 13 and q(ai)(ai − c) > 0, ∂Π∂ai (ai, aj) =
q(ai)
[
−σ
3 q(ai)(ai − c) + n∗(ai, aj)
(
1
3 − e(ai)
)]
< 0.
Part iv) If e(ai) ≥ 13 then by part iii) the claim follows. If e(ai) < 13 then by Assump-
tion 1.2, for all a˜i ∈ [c, ai], e(a˜i) ≤ e(ai). By definition v′(p) = −q(p) and the condition
v(c) − v(ai) < 32σ is equivalent to
´ ai
c q(a)da <
3
2σ . By Assumption 1.2, e
′
(a˜i) ≥ 0
for a˜i ∈ [c, ai] and thus piW(ai) =
´ ai
c (1− e(a)) q(a)da ≥ (1− e(ai))
´ ai
c q(a)da.
Therefore,
´ ai
c q(a)da ≥ 32σ implies piW(ai) ≥ (1− e(ai)) 32σ . From (1.10) we
have ∂Π∂ai (ai, aj) ≤
[
1
3 − e(ai)− σ3piW(ai)
]
q(ai) ≤
[
1
3 − e(ai)− 12 (1− e(ai))
]
q(ai) =
1
2
[
−13 − e(ai)
]
q(ai) < 0 where the first inequality is because
(
1
3 − e(ai)
)
n∗i ≤ 13 −
e(ai).
Proof of Lemma 1.2.
Note that for all ai, aj ∈ E , n∗(ai, aj) ∈ (0, 1) by definition of E .
Existence & Uniqueness: By Lemma 1.3, for any aj ∈ E there exists a unique aˆ ∈ E
such that (1− 3e(ai)) n∗(aˆ, aj)− σpiW(ai) = 0. Since ∂Π(ai,aj)∂ai =
1
3 q(ai)ϕ(ai, aj) and by
Lemma 1.4, part ii), ai = aˆ strictly maximizes Π(ai, aj) in E . By Lemma 1.5, aˆ remains a
strict maximizer in R.
Monotonicity in aj: Any profit maximizing wholesale price a∗(aj) involves
∂Π
∂ai
(a∗(aj), aj) = 0. By Lemma 1.4, part ii), any critical point is also a strict maximum
which implies ∂
2Π
∂a2i
(a∗(aj), aj) < 0. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, the
claim is true if ∂
2Π
∂ai∂aj
(a∗(aj), aj) > 0. Differentiating (1.10) with respect to aj yields
∂2Π
∂ai∂aj
(a∗(aj), aj) = σ3 q(ai)
2
(
1
3 − e(ai)
)
> 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2
We first prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 1.6. In any equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies both alliances have a posi-
tive market share: n∗(a∗i , a
∗
j ) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that n∗(a∗i , a
∗
j ) = 1 which implies Π(a
∗
j , a
∗
i ) = 0.
Define the highest wholesale price that allows to corner the market ai implicitly by
v(ai) = v(a∗j ) +
3
2σ . We show that any ai < c is weakly dominated by a
∗
i = c: When-
ever a∗j is such that ai < c, then for ai ∈ (ai, c), by equation (1.10), ∂Π∂ai (ai, aj) =
q(ai)
[(
1
3 − e(ai)
)
n∗i − σ3piW(ai)
]
> 0 since piW(ai) < 0 and e(ai) ≤ 0. For ai < ai,
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, aj) = −q(ai)e(ai) ≥ 0. Thus for ai < c and for any ai < c, Π(c, a∗j ) > Π(ai, a∗j ).
If ai ≥ c, then Π(c, a∗j ) ≥ Π(ai, a∗j ).
Since a∗i ≥ c, the corner equilibrium involves Π(a∗i , a∗j ) ≥ ΠR(a∗i , a∗j ) ≥ 1σ . Then devi-
ating to aˆj = a∗i yields Π(aˆj, a
∗
i ) ≥ 14σ contradicting optimality of a∗j .
Proof of Proposition 1.2.
Part i) By Proposition 1.1 and Lemma 1.2, a1∗ = a∗(c) uniquely exists.
Part ii) Recall that E =
{
p ∈ R|e(p) < 13 ∧ p ≥ c ∧ q(p) > 0∧ v(p) > v(c)− 32σ
}
. We
first show existence of a symmetric equilibrium a∗0 = a∗1 = a
∗ and consequently n∗0 =
n∗1 =
1
2 . By Lemma 1.5 of Section A1.1 this equilibrium involves a
∗ ∈ E . Define
ψ(p) ≡ (1− 3e(p))− 2σpiW(p). By Lemma 1.3 of Section A1.1, there is a unique aˆ > c
with ψ(aˆ) = 0.
It remains to show that the candidate aˆ is indeed a symmetric equilibrium. By def-
inition of ψ , ai = aˆ satisfies the necessary first order condition when aj = aˆ. By
Lemma 1.4 of Section A1.1, the first order conditions are also sufficient for being a
global maximum on E . By Lemma 1.5, ai = aˆ remains a maximizer on the set of all
ai ∈ R such that n(ai, aj) ∈ (0, 1). Setting ai high enough so that ni = 0 cannot be
optimal either, as this gives zero profits.
It remains to show that Π(aˆ, aˆ) ≥ Π(a˜i, aˆ) for a˜i such that n(a˜i, aˆ) = 1. Since aˆ ∈ E , the
inequality v(c) < v(aˆ) + 32σ holds. Cornering the market requires v(a˜i) ≥ v(aˆ) + 32σ ,
CHAPTER 1. Roaming Alliances 47
and thus a˜i < c . For any ai < c such that v(ai) > v(aj) + 32σ , marginal profits are
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, aj) = −q(ai)e(ai) ≥ 0 since e(ai) ≤ 0. Thus Π(a˜i, aˆ) ≤ Π(c, aˆ) < Π(aˆ, aˆ).
Uniqueness: There is no other symmetric equilibrium since any interior equilibrium
must belong to E and since in E the necessary first order condition is uniquely satisfied
at aˆ by the previous discussion.
We now show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists. Suppose to the contrary that an
asymmetric equilibrium with a∗i > a
∗
j and hence n
∗
i < n
∗
j exists. By Assumption 1.2,
a∗i > a
∗
j implies e(a
∗
i ) ≥ e(a∗j ). By Lemma 1.6, this equilibrium must involve a strictly
positive market share for both alliances and a strictly positive per customer demand.
The necessary first order conditions are:
(
1
3
− e(a∗i )
)
n∗i −
σ
3
piW(a∗i ) = 0(
1
3
− e(a∗j )
)
n∗j −
σ
3
piW(a∗j ) = 0
But e(a∗i ) ≥ e(a∗j ) and n∗i < n∗j implies
(
1
3 − e(a∗i )
)
n∗i <
(
1
3 − e(a∗j )
)
n∗j . Furthermore,
by Lemma 1.5, a∗i , a
∗
j ∈ E . Hence 13 ≥ e(a∗i ) ≥ e(a∗j ) and thus piW(a∗i ) > piW(a∗j ).
Taken together this implies
(
1
3 − e(a∗i )
)
n∗i − σ3piW(a∗i ) < n∗j
(
1
3 − e(a∗j )
)
− σ3piW(a∗j ) =
0 which contradicts the first order necessary conditions.
Finally, we show that a∗ > c: The necessary condition for a∗i = c is n
∗(c, a∗j )
q(c)
3 = 0
which is never true as q(c) > 0 by Assumption 1.1.
Rearranging the equilibrium condition ψ(a∗) = 0 yields the equilibrium per customer
profits.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Rewriting condition (1.11) for a symmetric equilibrium yields
2σq(a∗) (a∗ − c) + 3e(a∗)− 1 = 0 (1.21)
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Part i and ii) Applying the implicit function theorem on this condition, the claim is
true if ∂∂a (2σq(a
∗) (a∗ − c) + 3e(a∗)) > 0. By Assumption 1.2, e′(a∗) > 0. In addition,
∂
∂a q(a
∗) (a∗ − c) > 0 since e(a∗) < 13 which completes the proof.
Part iii) Consider any pair of demand functions q and q˜ with ηq˜(a) > ηq(a) ∀a ∈ R
and q˜(a∗) ≥ q(a∗). Since e(a) = ηq(a) a−ca , ηq˜(a) > ηq(a) implies eq˜(a) > eq(a) for
a − c > 0. We show that the equilibrium wholesale price a˜∗ that corresponds to per
customer demand q˜ is higher than the equilibrium price a∗ for demand q. By the proof
of Proposition 1.2, the function ψq(a) ≡ 2σq(a) (a− c) + 3eq(a)− 1 is increasing in a
for a ∈ E and ψq(c) = −1. Define ψq˜(a) likewise for demand q˜. To show that a˜∗ < a∗,
just note that ψq˜(a∗) > ψq(a∗) = 0 where the inequality comes from the hypothesis
q˜(a∗) ≥ q(a∗) and eq˜(a)− eq(a) > 0 and the last equality is the equilibrium condition
of a∗ being an equilibrium for demand q. Since ψq˜(a∗) > 0, by continuity there exists
an a˜∗ < a∗ such that ψq˜(a˜∗) = 0. This equilibrium candidate is indeed an equilibrium
for demand q˜ by the proof of Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.5
For brevity we omit the country index whenever possible. Suppose w.l.o.g. that opera-
tors i have formed an alliance. The marginal wholesale profit of non-alliance operators
j for aj < ai is
∂Π˜W
∂aj
(aj, ai) = q(aj)
[
n∗(aj, ai)
[
1− e(aj)
]− σ
3
piW(aj)
]
. (1.22)
If assumption 1.2 holds, then the wholesale profit is strictly quasiconcave since
−2σq(aj)3
(
1− e(aj)
)− n∗(aj, ai)e′(aj) < 0. In addition, by Lemma 1.3 of Section A1.1,
there exists an unique a†(ai) such that n∗(a†(ai), ai)
[
1− e(a†(ai))
]− σ3piW(a†(ai)) = 0.
Quasiconcavity assures that the best response of operators j is
a˜j∗ = a˜∗(ai) ≡
ai if ai ≤ a¯
†
a†(ai) otherwise
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where a¯† is the highest value of ai such that the operators j find it optimal to offer the
same wholesale price. a¯† is uniquely defined by
1
2
[
1− e(a¯†)
]
− σ
3
piW(a¯†) = 0 (1.23)
due to Lemma 1.3. Clearly for all c < ai < a¯†,
da˜j∗
dai
= 1. Denote the equilibrium whole-
sale price that obtains with two alliances according to Proposition 1.2 by a∗. Comparing
equation (1.22) and (1.23), shows that whenever Assumption 1.2 holds, then a¯† > a∗.
For later use, we show that a˜∗(ai) > a∗ whenever ai > a∗. This property is clearly satis-
fied for a¯† ≥ ai > a∗. For ai > a¯†, note that a†(ai) > a∗(ai) > a∗ where the first inequal-
ity is because n∗(aj, ai)
[
1− e(aj)
] − σ3piW(aj) > n∗(aj, ai) [13 − e(aj)] − σ3piW(aj) and
both sides are decreasing in aj whereas the second inequality comes from the mono-
tonicity of a∗(ai) and the fact that a∗(a∗) = a∗.
We now analyze the equilibrium price aND∗i (the superscript ND refers to non-
discrimination) that obtains when only one alliance has been formed. Taking into
account the best response of operators j, the marginal profit of a member of alliance
i reads now as follows:
∂ΠND
∂ai
(ai) = q(ai)
[(
1
3
− e(ai)
)
n∗(ai, a˜j∗)
+
σ
3
(
q(a˜j∗)
q(ai)
da˜j∗
dai
(
2n∗(ai, a˜j∗)
σ
+ piW(ai)
)
− piW(ai)
)] (1.24)
For c < ai < a¯†, equation (1.24) simplifies to ∂Π
ND
∂ai
(ai) = q(ai)12 (1− e(ai)) because
a˜∗(ai) = ai implies that the market share and thus the retail profits remain constant as
ai is slightly increased.
Now we show that a maximizer aND∗ exists. By equation (1.22), e(a˜∗j ) < 1 which
implies e
′
(a˜∗j ) ≥ 0 by Assumption 1.2. For ai > a¯†, applying the implicit function
theorem yields
da˜∗j
dai
=
σq(ai)
(
1− e(a˜∗j )
)
2σq(a˜∗j )
(
1− e(a˜∗j )
)
+ 3e′(a˜∗j )n∗(a˜
∗
j , ai)
CHAPTER 1. Roaming Alliances 50
and thus 0 ≤ q(a˜
∗
j )
q(ai)
da˜∗j
dai
< 12 . Inserting this into equation (1.24) yields
∂ΠND
∂ai
(ai) ≤ q(ai)
[(
2
3
− e(ai)
)
n∗(ai, a˜∗(ai))− σ6pi
W(ai)
]
≤ q(ai)
[(
2
3
− e(ai)
)
1
2
− σ
6
piW(ai)
]
for ai > a¯†.
If ∂Π
ND
∂ai
(a¯†) ≤ 0, define aˆ = a¯†. Otherwise, define aˆ as the solution to (23 − e(ai)) 12 −
σ
6pi
W(ai) = 0 which uniquely exists according to Lemma 1.3. By Assumption 1.2,
∀ai > aˆ, ∂ΠND∂ai (aˆ) ≤ 0. Since [c, aˆ] is a compact interval, by the Weierstrass-Theorem,
there exists some aND∗ ∈ [c, aˆ] that maximizes ΠND(ai) and which is also a global
maximum by the preceding paragraph .
To see that aND∗ > a∗, note that for all ai < a¯†, a˜∗(ai) = ai and therefore ∂Π
ND
∂ai
(ai) =
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, ai) + q(ai)
(
1
3 +
σ
3pi
W(ai)
)
. Since a∗ < a¯†, ∂Π∂ai (a
∗, a∗) = 0 and ∂Π∂ai (ai, ai) >
0 ∀ai ∈ [c, a∗] implies ∂ΠND∂ai (ai) > 0 ∀ai ∈ [c, a∗]. Hence aND∗ > a∗.
Given the equilibrium prices, each operator sells roaming services to exactly one for-
eign operator, so that the total profits remain as defined in equation (1.9). To see that
Π(a˜j∗(aND∗), aND∗) > Π(a∗, a∗) , note that a˜j∗(aND∗) > a∗ as shown above. Since
also a˜j∗(aND∗) ≤ aND∗, Π(a˜j∗(aND∗), aND∗) ≥ Π(a˜j∗(aND∗), a˜j∗(aND∗)) > Π(a∗, a∗)
where the last inequality is due to e(aND∗) < 1. Since aND∗ maximizes ΠND,
Π(aND∗, a˜∗(aND∗)) ≥ Π(a¯†, a˜∗(a¯†)) = Π(a¯†, a¯†) > Π(a∗, a∗). Since also Π(a∗, a∗) >
Π(c, c), it is straight forward to show the following: If Π(aND∗, a˜∗(aND∗)) >
Π(a˜∗(aND∗), aND∗) then only one operator in country B and both operators in coun-
try A announce to form an alliance in the unique (up to relabeling) equilibrium. If
Π(aND∗, a˜∗(aND∗)) < Π(a˜∗(aND∗), aND∗) then exactly one operator in country A and
both operators in country B announce to form an alliance. If Π(aND∗, a˜∗(aND∗)) =
Π(a˜∗(aND∗), aND∗), then either one operator in country A or one operator in country B
do not announce to form an alliance. Anyways, exactly one alliance emerges in equi-
librium.
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Proof of Proposition 1.8
We first prove the following auxiliary Lemma:
Lemma 1.7. If assumption 1.2 holds and q
′
(a∗) < 0, then v(c)− v(a∗) < 12σ , where a∗ is the
equilibrium wholesale price defined by Proposition 1.2.
Proof. The equilibrium condition ∂Π∂ai (a
∗, a∗) = 0 yields piW∗ ≡ q(a∗)(a∗ − c) = 1−3e(a∗)2σ .
Assumption 1.2 implies that v(c)− v(p) ≤ piW(p)1−e(p) for any p ∈ E . Both results together
yield v(c) − v(a∗) ≤ piW(a∗)1−e(a∗) = 1−3e(a
∗)
2σ(1−e(a∗)) <
1
2σ where the last inequality is due to
1
3 ≥ e(a∗) > 0.
We now show existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium. Denote the wholesale price
that obtains after the retail price cap has been introduced by a∗ and the equilibrium net
surplus as w∗. By the same reasoning as in Lemma 1.4, the first order condition is
sufficient for a (local) maximum. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.2, we define
ψ(a) ≡ 6q(p) ∂Π
∗
∂ai
(a, a) = 1− 2σq(p)(a − c). We claim that that wholesale prices a0 =
a1 = a∗ with a∗ being uniquely characterized by ψ(a∗) = 0 support an equilibrium.
By definition of ψ, the equilibrium price a∗ locally strictly maximizes both alliances’
profits.
Next we show that Π(ai, a∗) is strictly quasiconcave in ai if both alliances have a
positive market share: Define n∗(ai, aj) ≡ 12 + σ3
[
v(ai)− v(aj)
]
using the general-
ized value v(·) of (1.16). For ai ≥ p, ∂Π∂ai (ai, a
∗) = q(p)3
[
n∗(ai, a∗)− σ3piW(ai)
]
with
piW(ai) ≡ q(p)(ai − c). Since ∂Π∂ai (a
∗, a∗) = 0 and n∗(ai, a∗) decreases in ai while piW(ai)
increases in ai, we have (a∗ − ai) ∂Π∂ai (ai, a
∗) > 0 for ai > p and ai 6= a∗. For ai < p,
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, a∗) =
q(ai)
3
[
(1− 3e(ai)) n∗(ai, aj)− σpiW(ai)
]
which differs from (1.10) only by
the market share n∗(ai, a∗) instead of n∗(ai, a∗). We show below that v(a∗) < v(a∗)
which implies n∗(ai, a∗) > n∗(ai, a∗) for ai < p. Since by hypothesis p ≤ a∗, we have
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, a∗) > ∂Π∂ai (ai, a
∗) > 0 where the last inequality is due to Lemma 1.4.
It remains to prove that drastic deviations in order to corner the market are unprof-
itable. We first show that given p ≤ a∗, any deviation wholesale price a˜i to corner the
market requires that a˜i < c or equivalently v(a˜i) > v(c). To derive a lower bound for
v∗ ≡ v(a∗), note that v∗ = v(p)− q(p) (a∗ − p) = v(c)− piW∗ − ´ pc e(p)q(p)dp with
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piW∗ ≡ q(p)(a∗ − c). The equilibrium condition ψ(a∗) = 0 implies piW∗ = 12σ . Besides,
p ≤ a∗ ∈ E guarantees that ´ pc e(p)q(p)dp ≤ e(p) (v(c)− v(p)) ≤ 13 (v(c)− v(a∗)) <
1
6σ , where the last inequality is due to Lemma 1.7. Taken together, v
∗ > v(c)− 46σ . Cor-
nering the market requires v(a˜i) ≥ v∗ + 32σ > v(c) + 56σ > v(c). For any ai < c such
that v(ai) > v∗ + 32σ , marginal profits are
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, aj) = −q(ai)e(ai) ≥ 0 since e(ai) ≤ 0.
Thus Π(a˜i, a∗) ≤ Π(c, a∗) < Π(a∗, a∗).
The preceding two paragraphs establish that there is no profitable deviation, which
completes the proof of existence.
We now show that v∗ < v(a∗), which suffices to prove that any binding price cap
reduces the consumer surplus since w∗ − w∗ = v∗ − v(a∗). The condition v∗ =
v(p) − q(p) (a∗ − p) < v(a∗) can be rewritten as v(p) + q(p) (p− c) − piW∗ < v(a∗)
and is satisfied if v(c)− piW∗ < v(a∗) since v(p) + q(p) (p− c) ≤ v(c). Reordering this
condition and using piW∗ = 12σ yields v(c)− v(a∗) < 12σ which is true by Lemma 1.7.
If p < a∗, then clearly v(p) + q(p) (p− c) > v(a∗) + q(a∗) (a∗ − c) and total welfare
increases.
Comparing ψ(a) to ψ(a) defined in the proof of Proposition 1.2 yields ψ(a)− ψ(a) =
3e(a) + 2σ (q(a)− q(p) (a− c). Therefore, the condition ψ(a∗) > ψ(a∗) = 0 holds by
the hypothesis q(p)− q(a∗) < 3e(a∗)2σ(a∗−c) . Since ψ
′
(a) = −σq(p) < 0, ψ(a∗) > 0 implies
ψ(a∗) = 0 for a∗ > a∗.
A1.2 Appendix - Heterogeneous Consumers
Our main result of this section is that heterogeneous consumers lead to unambiguously
lower profits in equilibrium. However, alliances still allow to raise equilibrium profits.
We assume that operators of both countries with same position in their home market
have formed alliances and omit the country index for brevity of notation. We focus
on candidate symmetric equilibria that satisfy the necessary first order conditions of
profit maximization.
Retail demand structure. In contrast to our main setup, there are two types of con-
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sumers indicated by θk with k ∈ {L, H} and θL < θH.71 A consumer of type θk values
roaming calls according to vk(p) ≡ θkv(p)with v(p) defined as in Section 1.2. Likewise,
uk(q) denotes the utility that a subscriber of type θk obtains from consuming q roaming
calls.72 Subscribers still have quasilinear preferences so that the demand of an θk sub-
scriber is given by qk(p) ≡ θkq(p). The measure of subscribers remains normalized to 1
in every country. A proportion β of these are light users with type θL and relatively low
demand. The remaining fraction of 1− β are heavy users characterized by θH. Without
loss of generality, we normalize θL < 1 < θH such that βθL + (1− β) θH ≡ 1.73 For fu-
ture reference, we define the heterogeneity of consumers as the variance of their type:
ρ ≡ β (θL − 1)2 + (1− β) (θH − 1)2. The base model with homogeneous consumers
corresponds to ρ = 0. All consumers have the same degree of differentiation σ and
the consumers’ location is stochastically independent from their type. The consumers’
type is observable by the MNOs. We discuss below the implications of relaxing this
assumption.
Retail pricing structure. Similar to Section 1.3, operator i sets the retail per call price
pki and the fixed fee Fki for a type θk subscriber. We equivalently express the problem
in terms of price per call pki and net surplus wki ≡ vk(pki)− Fki.
Wholesale pricing structure. MNOs cannot discriminate the wholesale prices accord-
ing to which type of customer the roaming calls are sold finally. They still charge a
linear wholesale price ai to foreign operators.
Retail equilibrium. By the same reasoning as in Section 1.3, it is optimal to set the
usage price equal to marginal cost. Given the perceived marginal cost ci and the per
customer cost CF, the retail profits of operator i are then
ΠRi = βnLipi
R
Li + (1− β) nHipiRHi (1.25)
with piRki = pi
R
k (wki, ci) ≡ vk(ci) − wki − CF being the per customer retail profit and
nki = nk(wki, wkj) ≡ 12 + σ(wki − wkj) being the market share in segment k ∈ {L, H}.
71In a model of network interconnection, Dessein (2003) uses a similar setup.
72Note that due to our specification, uk(q) 6= θku(q) in general.
73 This normalization allows us to interpret q(p) as the mean demand per consumer at the per call
price p.
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Solving for the equilibrium net surplus and market share yields
w
∗
ki = θk
(
2
3
v(ci) +
1
3
v(cj)
)
− 1
2σ
− CF (1.26)
n∗ki =
1
2
+
θkσ
3
(
v(ci)− v(cj)
)
(1.27)
The further results of this section can be conveniently expressed in terms of the equi-
librium share of roaming calls (as opposed to the market share of subscribers), defined
as n˜∗i ≡ βn∗iLθL + (1− β) n∗iHθH. Inserting the equilibrium retail market shares (1.27)
yields n˜∗i =
1
2 +
σ
3
(
v(ci)− v(cj)
)
(1+ ρ). The factor 1 + ρ indicates that the equilib-
rium share of roaming calls n˜∗i reacts more sensitively to differences in the perceived
marginal costs compared to the equilibrium share of subscribers n∗i . According to (1.26),
an operator that faces higher unit costs offers a less attractive tariff especially to heavy
users. Since the degree of differentiation 1/σ is independent of the type, the market
shares in the heavy user segment are less balanced than in the light user segment. In-
serting the optimal tariffs in (1.25) and rearranging yields the retail equilibrium profit
ΠR∗i = Π
R∗(ci, cj) ≡ σρ9
(
vi − vj
)2
+
1
σ
(
1
2
+
σ
3
(
vi − vj
))2
(1.28)
with vi ≡ v(ci). The marginal retail equilibrium profit with respect to the perceived
unit cost is
∂ΠR∗
∂ci
(ci, cj) ≡ −2q(ci)3 n˜
∗
i . (1.29)
Wholesale equilibrium. When setting the retail tariffs, operators consider the nego-
tiated wholesale prices as perceived marginal costs. Thus, the profit per member of
alliance i is now Πi = Π(ai, aj) ≡ n˜∗i q(ai) (ai − c) +ΠR∗(ai, aj). Whenever the whole-
sale prices a0 and a1 do not differ too much, that is |v(a0)− v(a1)| < 32σθH , the marginal
profit is:
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∂Π
∂ai
(ai, aj) = q(ai)
[(
1
3
− e(ai)
)
n˜∗i −
σ
3
piW(ai) (1+ ρ)
]
Rearranging the first order condition yields the Lerner formula
a∗ − c
a∗
=
1
3
[
ηq(a∗) + ηn˜∗i (a
∗)
] (1.30)
where ηq(ai) is the price elasticity of the mean per customer demand and ηn˜∗i (ai) ≡
−dn˜∗idai
ai
n˜∗i
refers to the price elasticity of the equilibrium share of calls. In particular, a
symmetric equilibrium entails n˜∗i =
1
2 and thus ηn˜i(ai) =
2σ
3 (1+ ρ) aiq(ai). Now we
can identify the effect of consumer heterogeneity on the candidate equilibrium whole-
sale price:
Proposition 1.10. Suppose that equation (1.30) uniquely characterizes the equilibrium whole-
sale price and that Assumption 1.2 holds. Then an increase in consumer heterogeneity ρ, hold-
ing everything else constant, reduces the symmetric wholesale equilibrium price.
Proof. In any symmetric equilibrium, the condition
(
1
3 − e(a∗)
)
1
2 − σ3piW(a∗) (1+ ρ) =
0 must be satisfied. The left hand side is clearly decreasing in ρ and if Assumption 1.2
holds, it is decreasing in a∗. Application of the implicit function theorem on this con-
dition yields da
∗
dρ < 0.
Intuitively, consumer heterogeneity renders increasing the wholesale price less prof-
itable relative to the gains from softer retail competition, since this leads to a loss of
disproportionately many heavy users.
Non observable customer types: Even when customer types are unobservable for the
MNOs, the results of this section are likely to carry over. In this case, MNOs have to
elicit this information by offering incentive compatible contracts. However, it is easy
to verify that for any symmetric wholesale price, the retail tariffs (1.26) indeed satisfy
the incentive constraints for truth telling.74 This somewhat surprising finding is in line
with the observation of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) that
74However, after a deviation from a symmetric equilibrium wholesale price, the incentive conditions
may bind.
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private information of consumers may not cause any quantity distortions in certain
competitive environments.75
A1.3 Appendix - Continuous Network Selection
We assume that at most the proportion γ¯ ∈ [0.5, 1] of roaming calls can be directed to
a particular foreign network.76 This bound on the proportion reflects the fact that the
restriction does not come from capacity constraints (which would render an absolute
constraint more plausible) but rather from an unreliable technology that cannot guar-
antee that a subscriber registers in the preferred network. We have analyzed the polar
cases of perfect network selection (γ¯ = 1) and of no control (γ¯ = 0.5) in the base model
and in Section 1.6.2, respectively.
For clarity, we present the results from the viewpoint of operators with home network
in country A. When buying roaming calls from foreign MNOs on the wholesale mar-
ket, operator Ai may decide to buy proportion γAi from operator B0 and proportion
1− γAi from operator B1. Operator Ai’s perceived marginal cost is:
cAi = γAiaB0 + (1− γAi) aB1 (1.31)
Assuming that operators cannot discriminate the retail prices according to which host
network provides the roaming services, the optimal per call price equals the perceived
marginal cost: p∗Ai = cAi. The equilibrium net surplus, market shares and the retail
equilibrium profits remain as established in Lemma 1.1.
We now turn to the wholesale market.
No international alliances. As discussed in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, operators prefer to
buy roaming calls from the cheapest foreign operator.
75 They also discuss the sensitivity of this result with respect to assumptions like symmetry.
76This specification is equivalent to the following assumption: Operators can direct their subscribers
to the desired foreign network only with probability γ˜ ∈ [0, 1]. The remaining subscribers are assigned
randomly to the host networks. Then one immediately sees that γ = γ˜+ 12 (1− γ˜) = 12 (1+ γ˜). See also
Salsas and Koboldt (2004), Section 3.5 for a slightly different assumption.
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γ∗Ai =
γ¯ if aB0 < aB11− γ¯ if aB0 > aB1
We define the optimized perceived marginal cost of operator Ai as the cheapest possi-
ble mean cost for roaming calls, given the posted prices of foreign operators:
c∗Ai = c
∗(aB0, aB1) ≡ γ¯min{aB0, aB1}+ (1− γ¯)max{aB0, aB1}
The main implication of imperfect host network selection is that operators may gener-
ate positive demand even when not offering the cheapest wholesale price. We assume
for simplicity that foreign operators divide the traffic evenly among both domestic net-
works if these offer equal wholesale prices. Using the results of the retail equilibrium,
in the absence of alliances the total wholesale demand of operator Ai (where the su-
perscript NA means “no alliance”) is:
QNAAi = Q
NA(aAi, aAj) ≡

γ¯q
(
(1− γ¯) aAj + γ¯aAi
)
if aAi < aAj
1
2 q(aAi) if aAi = aAj
(1− γ¯) q ((1− γ¯) aAi + γ¯aAj) if aAi > aAj
The demand is independent of the actual market share of the reselling operators, since
for all price combinations, both foreign operators purchase the same part of their traffic
at operator Ai. The overall profit of operator Ai is therefore:
ΠNAAi = Π
NA(aAi, aAj) ≡ ΠR∗(cAi, cAj) + (aAi − c)QNA(aAi, aAj)
Operator Ai sets its wholesale price in order to maximize its wholesale profit
(aAi − c)QNA(aAi, aAj).
Lemma 1.8. Suppose that Assumption 1.3 holds. For γ¯ ∈ (0.5, 1), there is no pure strategy
equilibrium.
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Proof. We first show that there is no symmetric equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary
that a∗A0 = a
∗
A1. If a
∗
A0 = c, then increasing the own price increases wholesale profits. If
a∗A0 > c, then undercutting slightly increases the profit.
We now show that there is no asymmetric equilibrium. Let p∗ denote the maxi-
mizer of (p− c) q(p).77 Suppose to the contrary w.l.o.g. that a∗A0 6= a∗A1. Then there
exists an operator Ai such that a∗Ai 6= p∗. But then there exists an aˆAi such that
sign(aˆAi − aAj) = sign(a∗Ai − aAj) and |aˆAi − p∗| <
∣∣a∗Ai − p∗∣∣. By assumption 1.3,
this implies that (aˆAi − c)QNA(aˆAi, a∗Aj) >
(
a∗Ai − c
)
QNA(a∗Ai, a
∗
Aj) and therefore con-
tradicts equilibrium.
Under imperfect network selection the fully competitive equilibrium of Section 1.4
vanishes and there is no other equilibrium in which both operators set higher whole-
sale prices. Intuitively, there is no equilibrium with a∗A0 = a
∗
A1 = c because deviating
upwards generates strictly positive wholesale profits.
Two international alliances. We now analyze the equilibrium outcome after operators
with the same location have formed two competing alliances and omit the country
index for brevity. We maintain all assumptions of Section 1.6.2, except that now, the
proportion γ¯ ∈ [0.5, 1]of an operator’s subscribers are directed to foreign partner net-
work to place roaming calls.
If both alliances have negotiated the wholesale prices ai and aj, the equilibrium whole-
sale demand for roaming calls of operator i is
Qi = Q(ai, aj) ≡ γ¯n∗i q
(
γ¯ai + (1− γ¯) aj
)
+ (1− γ¯) (1− n∗i ) q
(
γ¯aj + (1− γ¯) ai
)
where
n∗i =
1
2
+
σ
3
[
v
(
γ¯ai + (1− γ¯) aj
)− v (γ¯aj + (1− γ¯) ai)]
is the equilibrium retail market share. The profit of each operator in alliance i is:
77Which exists by Assumption 1.3.
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Πi = Π(ai, aj) ≡ ΠR∗(ci, cj) + (ai − c)
[
γ¯n∗i q (ci) + (1− γ¯) (1− n∗i ) q
(
cj
)]
(1.32)
If both firms realize a strictly positive market share, the marginal profit with respect to
the own wholesale price is:
∂Π
∂ai
(ai, aj) = Q(ai, aj) +
dn∗i
dai
[
2
n∗i
σ
+ (ai − c)
(
γ¯q(ci) + (1− γ¯) q(cj)
)]
+(ai − c)
[
γ¯2n∗i q
′
(ci) + (1− γ¯)2 (1− n∗i ) q
′
(cj)
]
(1.33)
with
dn∗i
dai
=
σ
3
(
(1− γ¯) q(cj)− γ¯q(ci)
)
.
Considering a symmetric equilibrium with a∗i = a
∗
j = a
∗ and therefore c∗i = c
∗
j = a
∗ as
well as n∗i =
1
2 yields
a∗ − c
a∗
=
1− 23 (2γ¯− 1)[(
γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2
)
ηq(a∗) + (2γ¯− 1)2 ηn(a∗)
] (1.34)
where ηq(·) is the price elasticity of the per customer demand and ηn(a∗) ≡ 23σa∗q(a∗)
is the price elasticity of the retail market share for aj = ai = a∗ in case of perfect traffic
direction.78
Comparing (1.34) with the equilibrium characterization (1.11) of the base model reveals
that for the same wholesale price ai, the right hand side of (1.34) is always larger than
that of (1.11) since 1 − 23 (2γ¯− 1) ≥ 13 , γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2 ≤ 1 and (2γ¯− 1) ≤ 1 hold.
These observations allow to establish that imperfect traffic steering leads to higher
equilibrium wholesale prices:
78Both ηq(·) and ηn(a∗) are defined as in Section 1.4.
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Proposition 1.11. Suppose that assumption 1.2 holds. Then the equilibrium wholesale price
a∗ in any symmetric equilibrium is decreasing in the quality of the traffic steering technology γ¯.
Proof. Using (1.33) with ai = aj and
dn∗i
dai
|ai=aj = σ3 q(ai) (1− 2γ¯) and reordering, yields
the first order condition
1− 2
3
(2γ¯− 1) [1+ (2γ¯− 1) σ (a∗ − c) q(a∗)]− e(a∗)
(
γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2
)
= 0
As the the middle term is strictly negative for γ¯ > 0.5 and 0 for γ¯ = 0.5, it follows that
e(a∗)
(
γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2
)
< 1. Applying the implicit function theorem yields
da∗
dγ¯
=
2 [1+ 2σq(a∗) (a∗ − c)] + 2e(a∗) (2γ¯− 1)
− (2γ¯− 1)2 σq(a∗)
(
1−
(
γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2
)
e(a∗)
)
− 32
(
γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2
)
e
′(a∗)
Clearly, the denominator of the right hand side is strictly negative since 1 −(
γ¯2 + (1− γ¯)2
)
e(a∗) > 0 and e′(a∗) ≥ 0 by assumption 1.2. The numerator is strictly
positive. Taken together da
∗
dγ¯ < 0.
Intuitively, there are two channels that cause a higher equilibrium price when network
selection is imperfect (γ¯ < 1). First, compared to the base model (γ¯ = 1), the re-
tail market share is less sensitive to increases of the wholesale price. This is because
the perceived marginal costs ci of operators within alliance i depend less on the own
wholesale price ai while the perceived marginal costs of operators of the rival alliance
j depend partly on ai. Second, under imperfect traffic direction, operators of alliance j
have to procure a proportion 1− γ¯ of their roaming calls from alliance i. When selling
to non-alliance operators, the alliance does not take lower retail profits that are implied
by a higher wholesale price into account, which renders a high wholesale price more
attractive.
Chapter 2
Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship
and Persistence in Politics∗
2.1 Introduction
Political leaders often define themselves in terms of a set of beliefs and values that they
adhere to, and consistently base their political action on that set. Such leaders, who
place greater weight on ideology as a collection of ideas about how society should
work and the best way to achieve this goal, can be referred to as ideological leaders
or ideologues. One has to look no further than to contemporary American politics to
find plenty of ideologues: “liberal”, “conservative”, “moderate”, “leftist” – politicians
routinely use ideological labels to describe themselves and their opponents, and the
American public, led by journalists and political activists, are happy to join in. Of
course, one may wonder what’s in a name. Surprisingly much as it turns out.
As documented in the empirical work on Congressional voting behavior of Poole and
Rosenthal (2007), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) and others, the belief systems
of political elites can often largely be captured with a single dimension, their ideology,
∗This Chapter is based on joint work with Anke S. Kessler.
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which almost always mirrors party affiliation: with just the label “conservative” (Re-
publican), for example, one can fairly accurately predict a politician’s stance on policy
issues as disparate as taxes, gun control, affirmative action, health care, and abortion.
Moreover, ideological positions of individual members are remarkably stable. That
is, based upon the roll call voting record, once elected to Congress, members adopt
an ideological position and maintain that position throughout their careers – once a
liberal or a conservative or a moderate, always a liberal or a conservative or a mod-
erate.1 As Poole (2007, p. 435) puts it, “members of Congress die in their ideological
boots.” Clearly, this phenomenon is neither exclusive to the U.S., nor is it confined
to positional (divisive) issues that voters have different preference over, depending on
their socio-economic status, race, gender, or religion. Partisan politics are a frequent
phenomenon even regarding so-called valence issues for which there should be a com-
mon agreement among the electorate (such as crime, foreign policy, corruption and
economic growth).2
To analyze these issues, this chapter suggests a theory of ideology for public leaders.
We seek to answer three questions. First, why do political elites adopt ideological la-
bels and play them out in partisan politics, especially on policies where voters would
prefer their representative to seek common ground? Second, why ideological views
are so persistent, even in the face of changing circumstances to the point where they
are at odds with the facts? Third, what are the cost of such behavior? To this end,
we develop a dynamic model that closely ties observable characteristics of political
representative (such as their gender, their party affiliation, or their district) to voters’
1What is more, members of Congress seem to remain ideologically consistent even in the face of
changing personal or electoral conditions: members’ voting records remain essentially the same, re-
gardless of whether they plan to retire, plan to run for a higher office, serve in a higher office, or have
their districts redrawn. See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Poole (2007) and the references therein.
2In the U.S. Congress, for example, support for the president on matters of foreign policy and de-
fense has largely been along party lines ever since the Vietnam War [Meernik (1993)]. On a more general
note, empirical evidence from the U.S. Congress support the view that partisanship of political rep-
resentatives often does not simply mirror equally divided constituents. Rather than representing the
district voters, a representative’s own ideology is the primary determinant of roll-call voting patterns
[Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and Levitt (1996)]. In either case, voter polarization is presumably a
lesser danger for valence issues. Polling data on foreign policy confirm this presumption. Two recent
pools conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations (CCFR) found that Americans share common views on a wide array of foreign policy
issues, and would prefer that Democrats and Republicans seek common ground. For details, see the
website of Partnership for a Secure America (http://www.psaonline.org/), an organization dedicated
to recreating the bipartisan center in American national security and foreign policy.
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expectations. Our model starts from the observation that voters are often uncertain
about how policy instruments map into policy outcomes. To capture this idea, we as-
sume that the electorate does not observe external circumstances that make a specific
policy more desirable than others. Given their beliefs about the prevailing state, vot-
ers therefore form expectations about which policy candidates are likely to implement
once in office, and which of those is most likely to succeed. Importantly, voters attach
ideological labels both to the various policy alternatives that are available and to the
political candidates running for office. To develop our argument in the strongest man-
ner possible, we assume that candidates derive the exact same utility from the policy
measure as the electorate at large,3 so that their ideological characterization is truly
nothing more than a label.
Our main finding is that, politicians may take a persistent ideological stance and act
partisan simply because voters’ expect them to.4 The argument is as follows. Suppose
voters expect political candidates to act partisan once in office, i.e., to remain “true to
their colors”, implementing policies that are “close” to their own ideology as perceived
by the voting public. Given these expectations, voters have a straightforward incentive
to elect the representative whose perceived partisan policy (ideology) corresponds to
what they think is in their best interest based on their current information. As we show,
this may suffice to induce candidates to actually act partisan, i.e., according to their
ideology, in the first place. The specific motivation is one of signal-jamming: an in-
cumbent who sticks to his partisan policy avoids revealing that current circumstances
would favor his opponents’ partisan position, making his re-election more likely if vot-
ers expect partisan behavior in the future.5 As even inefficient policies may turn out to
be successful, this behavior potentially allows to hold up the electorates’ belief in the
3It should be emphasized that the theory also applies for non-valence (positional) issues. There
already is an extensive literature on these type of policies, however, which provides a range of com-
plementary explanations for why candidates diverge in platforms and voting records. We refer to this
literature in more detail below.
4The theory implies, for instance, that a female Democrat from California is likely to take a liberal
stance on most issues, not because her true preferences or her belief system necessarily reflects this view,
but because her constituents expect a female Democrat from California to be a liberal (and elected her
for this very reason).
5Alesina and Cukierman (1990) study an environment in which voters are unsure about the ideo-
logical position of candidates (as opposed to the state of the economy as in this chapter). Akin to the
signal-jamming effect we find, they show that politicians may want to deliberately choose “ambiguous”
policies in order to conceal their true preferences, thereby keeping their ideological advantage.
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incumbent’s ideology. The result is political failure in the sense that the equilibrium
partisan policy outcomes are Pareto dominated. Thus, the model can explain policy
bias and divergence from the fact that voters perceive policies to be ideologically tinted
and expect candidates to act partisan. Both sides are caught in an ideology trap: because
voters expect the ideology of office holders to determine their political actions, an offi-
cials (re-)election chances will vary with his or her perceived ideology. In their desire
to influence the outcome of the election, these expectations induce the officials to act
partisan. Importantly, the issue itself can be non-partisan, meaning that neither voters
nor politicians have to display any intrinsic preferences for either policy: a leader does
not have to be a “true believer” to be an ideologue. Because incumbents will tend to
enact the partisan policy independent of the prevailing state in equilibrium, our anal-
ysis also explains why office holders will maintain their ideology and deny conflicting
evidence, resulting in policies that are likely to persist.6
Our theory is related – and contributes to – three different strands of the literature.
First, there is a growing economic literature on the origins of ideologies as a collec-
tion of ideas and firmly held beliefs. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Bénabou (2008)
study voters’ perceptions about a fundamental property of the underling economy,
and show that maintaining beliefs that contradict reality can be an equilibrium phe-
nomenon. In forming their beliefs, individuals optimally trade off the benefit of being
able to motivate themselves (or their children) toward effort and the costs of misin-
formed decisions. While these papers can explain ideology as a collectively held belief
system, our contribution focuses on leaders and political elites who publicly act upon –
rather than genuinely entertain – certain beliefs in order to maintain their power and
leadership role.7
Second, our argument also bears on the important question of why political parties and
politicians seeking office diverge in their positions on critical issues, contrary to what
6The resilience of economic policies that benefit (target) a specific groups of voters has been studied
by Coate and Morris (1999) who use a dynamic model to formalize the intuition that implementation of
a policy increases the political effectiveness of its beneficiaries in lobbying. The main difference between
Coate and Morris (1999) and our approach is that we focus on non-partisan (valence) issues, which do
not target specific groups.
7At the same time, our setting is not ideology free, since we require the electorate to attach ideologi-
cal labels to policies and politicians alike, e.g, the Military Commissions Act (which effectively excluded
U.S. prisoners of war from protection of the Geneva Conventions) is universally perceived to be “con-
servative”, as is a male Republican candidate from Texas.
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the Downsian model would predict. In the past two decades, scholars in economics
and political science have identified a number of factors that contribute to policy diver-
gence, including the multi-dimensional issues [Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000)], the
threat of third-party entry [Palfrey (1984)], citizen candidates [Osborne and Slivinski
(1996), Besley and Coate (1997)], improved electoral control [Van Weelden (2009)], and
an electorate that is imperfectly informed about candidates’ types [Kartik and McAfee
(2007), Callander and Wilkie (2007) and Callander (2008)]. All of these explanations,
however, require partisan preferences. Moreover, since enacted policies in these models
directly reflect the preferences of the electorate, they are silent on why policies can per-
sist over time even in the face of new (and conflicting) evidence. Indeed, the only other
contribution known to us that is able to explain polarized and partisan politics on mat-
ters where voters commonly agree is Carrillo and Castanheira (2008).8 In their paper,
candidates choose polarized positions in order to commit to investing in the quality of
their platform. In contrast, our explanation relies on the dynamic consideration that
an incumbent may tow the party line in order to improve the prospects of reelection.
Finally, our model is closely related to the literature on political failure. In a model
similar to ours, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) show that if voters are imperfectly in-
formed about an incumbent ideology, an incumbent’s electoral prospects may increase
the more atypical is the policy he proposes to implement. Harrington (1993), Canes-
Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001) and more recently, Maskin and Tirole (2004) empha-
size a negative incentive effect of elections: if the office-holding motive is sufficiently
strong, politicians may choose the most popular (rather than the optimal) alternative.
In a similar vein, Stasavage (2007) shows that if debates are held under the public eye,
candidates may ignore their private information about the true desirability of various
policy measures and instead promote policies popular among their constituents, lead-
ing to deeper polarization and dissent. Our analysis goes beyond these contributions
by emphasizing how the inefficiency can depend solely on voters’ expectations about
a candidate’s future policy intentions, rather than on a true discrepancy between the
ideal policy of a candidate and that of the electorate at large.
8Another line of research has focused on explaining the prevailing polarization on “moral” issues,
such as abortion or gay marriage. Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro (2005) identify a form of strategic
extremism, which helps politicians to induce their core constituents to vote.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The basic framework is devel-
oped in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides an in-depth analysis of the model, and shows
that both partisanship and non-partisanship can arise in equilibrium. Section 2.4 con-
siders two extensions. We first demonstrate that our model uniquely predicts which of
these equilibria occurs if candidates have arbitrary small biases towards their partisan
policy. Second, we show that partisan behavior becomes even more plausible if the
prospects of inefficient policies are themselves uncertain. Section 2.5 concludes this
chapter.
2.2 A Dynamic Model of Partisanship
2.2.1 Preferences and Economic Environment
Consider an infinite-horizon economy in discrete time. The economy is populated by
an infinite number of risk-neutral consumer-voters who derive the same per-period
benefit bt = b(at, st) ∈ {0, b} from a policy decision at. For simplicity, we take at to
be binary; in particular, there is a “left-wing” alternative at = l and a “right-wing”
alternative at = r.9 Consumers know the set of feasible policies (and have common
views on which they perceive as being left-wing and right-wing, respectively) but are
uncertain about the underlying state of the economy st ∈ {l, r}.10 As an example, take
the issue of state versus market provision of public services (such as health care and
education): here, the underlying state st captures the relative efficacy of government
provision and the policy decision is whether or not the service is publicly provided,
where public provision is commonly viewed as the “left-wing” alternative and private
9Assuming a binary political decision also has some appeal in that voters may find it difficult to
make subtle distinctions between policies, e.g., they may only take note of whether government spend-
ing goes up or down. In this sense, policies may be quite broadly defined and fit well into the ideological
spectrum of “left” and “right”. The presumption of one-dimensionality is supported by empirical ev-
idence from the US Congress: in well-known study using data on roll-call votes from the House and
the Senate, Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2007) show that more than 80 percent of representatives’ voting
records over the past 40 years can be explained solely on the basis of a one-dimensional variable (i.e.,
their “ideology”).
10Even if there was a small i.i.d probability ν that consumers observe the true state at the end of
each period, our results would be qualitatively robust. If ν > 0, then signal jamming by implementing
an inappropriate policy becomes less attractive. Yet, for small ν there still exists a non-empty set of
parameters that admits the partisan equilibrium discussed below.
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provision is universally perceived as a “right-wing” policy.
Voters’ per period payoff stochastically depends on the unobserved state st as follows:
b(at = st) = b with probability 1
b(at 6= st) =
b with probability pi0 with probability 1− pi
In other words, if the policy choice matches the state, the policy is successful with prob-
ability one and voters receive a certain payoff of b. Otherwise, the policy fails with
probability 1− pi > 0 in which case we normalize payoffs to zero. 11
The state of the economy evolves over time according to a symmetric transition func-
tion
Pr (st+1 = st) = γ = 1− Pr (st+1 6= st) , (2.1)
independent of the policy chosen. We assume that the state is persistent, in the sense
that γ ∈ (0.5, 1). Letting µt denote the likelihood voters attach to the left-state st = l,
we can write individual preferences as in period t
E
∞
∑
j=0
βjbt+j = E
∞
∑
j=0
βjb
(
at+j, st+j
)
. (2.2)
where β < 1 is the discount factor. Note that, by construction, the issue is non-partisan
(ideologically neutral) in the sense that all voters unanimously agree on the best al-
ternative: if they knew the state to be s, they unanimously preferred the policy that is
appropriate for the state, i.e., a = s. Since they do not know s but share a common
belief µ, voters prefer policy l over policy r in any given period t if and only if µt ≥ 12 .
Political decisions are not taken in direct democratic vote. Instead, voters elect an office
holder as their representative in each period, who selects and implements the policy
alternative at. Unlike voters, politicians observe the state s, which may simply reflect
their greater expertise, better access to resources, or their greater incentive to become
11Our results do not hinge on the simplifying assumption that a political failure perfectly reveals
that a non-matching policy has been implemented. Assuming instead that a policy that matches the
state is successful with probability ζ > pi would not change our analysis qualitatively as long as ζ >
1− (1−pi)(1−γ)γ . Moreover, the expressions in this chapter are the limit for ζ → 1.
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informed.12
There are two observable types of politicians, left-wing L and right-wing R. We inter-
pret the type i ∈ {L, R} as politicians’ “ideology” or “party affiliation”, but any other
observable characteristic such as the candidates’ gender, their home district, or their
previous position on a different (unrelated) policy issue would work equally well.
Consistent with our notion that the issue is non-partisan, politicians derive the same
utility from the policy a given state s as the voters, independent of their type i. How-
ever, they also care about holding office. We formalize this second motive in the usual
fashion by a rent φ that politicians receive from being elected to office in period t. In
summary, the per-period utility of an incumbent of type i in period t when the state is
st is
uit = b(at, st) + φ. (2.3)
When not in office, politicians receive a continuation utility of zero.13 We thus assume
that not being re-elected is an absorbing state, i.e., a once defeated incumbent never
returns to holding office.
The timing of the stage game is as follows. First, nature draws the state st, which is
immediately revealed to politicians but not to ordinary citizens. Next, elections are
held in which voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent or whether to newly
elect the challenger for office (a period defines a term of office). Throughout, we restrict
attention to the case where the challenger has a different ideology or party-affiliation
than the incumbent. Once elected, the office holder chooses a policy alternative at.
Finally, voters and politicians observe whether the policy was a success (bt = b) or a
failure (bt = 0).
12The natural assumption that politicians are generally better informed than the electorate at large is
often evoked in the literature. See, e.g., Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) or Maskin and Tirole (2004).
Kessler (2005) provides an analysis where officials to endogenously acquire competence on the issues
they oversee and specialize in policy formation.
13Thus, a politician cares for the legacy tied to successful policies. In particular a politician does not
benefit from the legacy of policies that are enacted by a successor. Under the alternative assumption that
politicians remain policy-motivated after after having been ousted from office (that is uit = b(at, st)), our
results carry over as long as the office rent φ is large enough.
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2.2.2 Equilibrium Definition
As is common in these types of models, we will restrict attention to pure strategy,
stationary and symmetric Markov perfect equilibria of this game. In those equilib-
ria, players ignore all details of the history (including its length) and condition their
strategies only on the pay-off relevant information. Note that because there is no
link between periods other than the information revealed by politicians about the un-
derlying state and the evolution of that state, the latter can be summarized for the
electorate by its belief µt at time t. A strategy for a representative voter specifies
the probability Pi(µt) ∈ [0, 1] with which candidate i is elected, based on µt, with
PL(µt) + PR(µt) = 1.14 When voters are indifferent between two candidates, we as-
sume either stands equal chances of winning the election. Similarly, a strategy for a
type-i candidate ai(µt, st) maps voters’ beliefs µt (and hence, election outcomes) as well
as the current state st into a policy choice a ∈ {l, r}. In equilibrium, strategies must be
mutual best responses and beliefs evolve in a way consistent with Bayes rule whenever
possible. Strategies are optimal if they maximize the value functions of candidates and
voters. The value function for a representative voter can be written as
U(µt) = max
Pi(µt)
E
[
∑
i
Pi(µt)b(ai(µt, st), st) + βU(µt+1)
]
(2.4)
where the expectation is taken over bt and st given current beliefs µt. Note that in
general, beliefs µt+1 at time t+ 1 will depend on the elected candidate, the equilibrium
strategy, the implemented policy and the success or failure of the policy in t. The value
function of a type i candidate is
Vi(µt, st) = max
ai(µt,st)
Pi(µt)E
[
b(ai(µt, st), st) + φ+ βVi(µt+1, st+1)
]
, (2.5)
where the expectation is over bt and st+1, given st.
14There will be unanimity among electorate, of course, but since no single (infinitesimally small) voter
can influence the outcome of an election, every voting strategy is consistent with equilibrium. To elimi-
nate this artificial multiplicity, we will throughout consider a representative voter whose optimal strat-
egy maximizes (2.4) below, i.e, a strategy that would be optimal in case the voter was decisive (the
unique weakly undominated strategy if there is a finite number of citizens).
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2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the following we will use the term non-partisan politics to characterize the Pareto-
optimal policy choice, i.e., the office holder implements at = st, regardless of her type i.
Partisan politics, in contrast, involves politicians selecting the alternative that corre-
sponds to their ideology, i.e., at = l if i = L and at = r if i = R, irrespective of the
state st. Recall from (2.3) that an office holder’s per-period utility is independent of her
ideology or party affiliation. Consequently, the sole channel through which ideology
can possibly influence the choice of policy is through voters’ expectations, which for the
politicians will translate into the likelihood they are (re-)elected to office. It is this link
between actual policy choices and voters’ expectations about candidates’ post-election
behavior – partisan or non-partisan – we are most interested in. What matters, as we
will see below, are solely voters’ perceptions as to a) what constitutes a left-wing and
a right-wing policy alternative, and b) who is a left-wing and a right-wing politician.
To highlight the interdependencies, we have eliminated all other well-studied deter-
minants of partisan politics (partisan voters, partisan politicians etc.), not because we
consider them implausible but simply because they would only serve to disguise the
true effects at work here.
2.3.1 The Non-Partisan (Efficient) Equilibrium
As a benchmark, we first construct an equilibrium in which candidates choose poli-
cies in a Pareto efficient manner along the equilibrium path, and voters – because they
correctly expect non-partisan behavior from their representatives – have no preferences
for either type of politician. Thus, suppose incumbents always choose ait = st, irrespec-
tively of their ideology or party affiliation i. Since both types of politicians implement
the same Pareto efficient alternative in every period, voters hold no preference for the
incumbent or the challenger and elect either with probability 1/2.15 Let U(i, µt) be
voter’s utility from electing an i-type candidate in period t along the equilibrium path.
15The important property of the voting behavior to support this equilibrium is that the prospect of re-
election is independent of the implemented policy. Without the restriction that each candidate is elected
with equal probability in case the voters are indifferent, there would be a continuum of efficient equilib-
ria with Pi(µt) being constant in µt.
CHAPTER 2. Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics 71
We have
U(L, µt) = U(R, µt) and Pi(µt) =
1
2
∀µt, t, i.
The implementation of an efficient policy alternative – precisely because it is necessar-
ily conditional on the current state – provides voters with additional information about
st. Indeed, since the choice of at = st perfectly reveals st, the only uncertainty about
the underlying economy stems from the fact that the conditions may change from one
period to the next according to (2.1). For any initial belief µ0, beliefs in this equilibrium
therefore evolve according to
µt+1(at, µt) =
γ if at = l1− γ if at = r ∀µt, t.
In what follows, we will for notational simplicity focus on left-wing politicians i = L,
dropping the index i whenever possible. The argument for right-wing politicians i = R
is analogous. Recalling that bt ≡ b if at = st the value function of an incumbent
politician if he or she implements the efficient alternative is
V(st) =
1
2
{b + φ+ β E [V(st+1)]} .
Note that V(st) is independent of µt, because given the electorate’s voting rule any in-
cumbent faces equal chances of being re-elected and defeated, respectively, regardless
of beliefs. If the incumbent deviates by choosing at 6= st in some t, the value function
becomes
Vˆ(st) =
1
2
{pib + φ+ βE [V(st+1)]} ,
which by inspection is strictly less than V(st) for any pi < 1. Hence, at = st is indeed
the utility-maximizing choice for incumbents in each period. We can thus conclude
that non-partisan politics and an electoral rule that assigns equal election chances to
incumbents and challengers in all periods form an equilibrium. In fact, it is the Markov
perfect equilibrium with the highest payoff to the electorate,
Umax =
∞
∑
t=0
βtb =
1
1− βb.
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Proposition 2.1. [Non-Partisan Equilibrium] There always exists an equilibrium in which
elected office holders act non-partisan and are re-elected with probability 1/2. In this equilib-
rium, voters have full information about the prevailing state following the policy choice in each
period, and receive the highest possible utility.
Proof. In the text.
While the non-partisan equilibrium always exists and Pareto-dominates all other equi-
libria for the voters, it is not the only possible outcome. In the following sections, we
will not only demonstrate that partisan politics can be supported in equilibrium as
well, but also that non-partisan politics are fragile in the sense that they cannot survive
if citizens’ expectations about office holders’ behavior are subject to (small) uncertainty.
2.3.2 The Partisan Equilibrium
We next study the possibility of a partisan equilibrium. Intuitively, suppose voters’
expect office holders to play partisan and choose at = i in every period, independent
of the current state st. The key to observe is that voters are no longer indifferent across
politicians with distinct ideologies. In particular, if a voter knew the state to be st = l,
he or she would strictly prefer a type-L candidate to a type-R candidate, because only
the former’s partisan behavior coincides with the efficient policy choice in period t. A
direct consequence of this strict preference ordering is that period-t incumbents now
face a dilemma whenever their ideology does not match the state. A type-L office
holder who selects the non-partisan choice of at = r would reveal the state to be st = r,
and would not be re-elected. Similarly, a type R-incumbent who implemented the
efficient left-wing alternative at = l because the state was st = l would face certain
defeat. A partisan choice of at ≡ i 6= st, on the other hand, will conceal the true state
and thus may ensure – conditional on the observed success of the policy – re-election. It
is then intuitive that this effect can induce partisan behavior provided politicians care
sufficiently strong about their (re-)election prospects. The remainder of this section
establishes this result formally.
To this end, consider a type-i candidate whose strategy is to choose the partisan pol-
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icy whenever in office in period t. Given µ0 ∈ [1− γ,γ], the voters’ belief along the
equilibrium path then evolves as follows
µLt+1(at = l, µt) =
1− γ+ (2γ− 1)
µt
µt+(1−µt)pi if policy at = lwas a success
1− γ if policy at = lwas a failure
(2.6)
µRt+1(at = r, µt) =
γ− (2γ− 1)
1−µt
1−µt+µtpi if policy at = rwas a success
γ if policy at = rwas a failure.
Note that the office holders’ policy choice reveals no new information about the current
state on the equilibrium path since the implemented policy always corresponds to the
politcians’ affiliation. Formally, the beliefs satisfy the property E[µLt+1|at = l, µt] =
E[µRt+1|at = r, µt] = γµt +(1−γ)(1−µt). Thus, the electorate only learns by observing
whether the policy has been successful or not.
As usual, beliefs are not defined off the equilibrium path, i.e., when the electorate
observes the non-partisan policy being implemented. Off equilibrium, we make the
natural assumption that non-partisan politics are perfectly revealing
µLt+1(at = r) = 1− γ and µRt+1(at = l) = γ, (2.7)
i.e., if the electorate unexpectedly observes a left-wing office holder to select at = r, it
assumes that the non-partisan state st = r must have occurred, and vice versa.16
Now suppose voters elect the left-wing (right-wing) candidate for beliefs µt > 1/2
(µt < 1/2) and give both candidates equal chances of winning for µt = 1/2. The value
function of the electorate is then
U(µt) =
(µt + (1− µt)pi)
(
b + βU(µLt+1)
)
+ (1− µt)(1− pi)βU(1− γ) µt ≥ 12
(1− µt + µtpi)
(
b + βU(µRt+1)
)
+ µt(1− pi)βU(γ) µt < 12 .
(2.8)
Closer inspection of (2.8) reveals that U(µt) is increasing in µt for values µt > 1/2 and
16After adapting the Cho&Kreps intuitive criterion to our dynamic framework, it is easy to verify that
this out of equilibrium belief is the unique belief satisfying the corresponding concept of equilibrium
dominance, on which the intuitive criterion is based.
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decreasing in µt otherwise (at µt = 1/2, the function assumes a minimum). Intuitively,
more extreme beliefs increase the benefit of electing the appropriate politician. Related
to this property is that voters would never want to ’experiment’, i.e., elect a candidate
who subsequently is less likely to implement the efficient policy in order to receive
more precise information about the state.17 Doing so would only increase the chances
of a policy failure, in which case voters would be even more convinced that the elected
candidate was not appropriate. Put differently, the electorate would dispose of a more
accurate belief only if the implemented policy goes awry. In the unlikely case of success
on the other hand, the resulting belief is less precise than the one that would have
resulted from having the appropriate candidate successfully implement his partisan
policy.
Turning now to candidates, we will without loss of generality again consider the be-
havior of left-wing candidates, omitting the index L whenever possible. Anticipating
the voting behavior of the electorate, the equilibrium value of acting partisan for a
left-wing candidate is
V(µt, st) =
P(µt) {b + φ+ βE [γV(µt+1, l) + (1− γ)V(µt+1, r)]} if st = lP(µt) {pib + φ+ βE [(1− γ)V(µt+1, l) + γV(µt+1, r)]} if st = r
where the expectation is taken over bt (and, consequently, µt+1) given st, and
P(µt) =

1 if µt > 12
1
2 if µt =
1
2
0 otherwise
. (2.9)
A candidate who deviates by setting at = r in period t, in contrast, would reveal the
true state to be st = r. Voters’ beliefs at the beginning of the next period are therefore
µt+1 < 1/2, resulting in certain defeat and a utility normalized to zero. Hence, we can
17See Lemma A2.1 in Appendix A2.1, which formally establishes how U(µt) depends on µt and shows
that experimentation does not improve voters’ payoffs.
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write the office holder’s utility Vˆ(µt, st) from such a deviation as
Vˆ(µt, st) =
P(µt) {pib + φ} if st = lP(µt) {b + φ} if st = r.
Obviously, no rational incumbent would ever want to select an opponent’s partisan
policy in a state where in fact her own partisan policy is myopically optimal. Thus, the
strategy at = l is trivially utility maximizing in the ‘partisan’ state st = l. It remains
to study when politicians are willing to sacrifice the utility from the Pareto-optimal
choice of at = r by choosing at = l in state st = r. Comparing V(µt, r) with Vˆ(µt, r),
we see that the answer is yes if V(µt, r) ≥ Vˆ(µt, r) or
βE [γV(µt+1, l) + (1− γ)V(µt+1, r)] ≥ (1− pi)b. (2.10)
On the right-hand side of (2.10) are the short-term gains from deviating, as reflected in
the additional expected benefit from the optimal non-partisan choice over the subopti-
mal partisan choice. The left-hand side captures the utility lost by facing certain defeat
in this case; it is the future value from remaining in office, which naturally increases in
the discount factor β and office rents φ (see below). But another, and perhaps less ap-
parent, factor also plays a crucial role: by acting partisan, the candidates must also be
able to improve their (re-)election chances by a sufficient margin. For the remainder of
this section, we will therefore assume that the success probability pi of a sub-optimally
chosen partisan policy is small enough, such that an office holder who chooses the
partisan policy has a chance of being re-elected for any belief µ ∈ [1− γ,γ]. In other
words, even for µt = 1 − γ, the electorate’s updated belief satisfies (1−γ)(1−γ)+γpi > 12 ,
which is equivalent to
Assumption 2.1.
pi <
1− γ
γ
. (A2.1)
Under Assumption 2.1, a success guarantees re-election (and failure results in sure
defeat) irrespective of the state st or of the belief µt. In this case, V(µt, st) assumes a
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particularly simple form. It is constant (and equal to zero) for beliefs µt ∈ [1− γ, 12)
where the candidate is not elected in equilibrium, takes on a single intermediate value
for µt = 1/2, and is constant again for all higher beliefs µt ∈ (12 ,γ], where the candidate
is elected with probability one. Formally, ∀µt ∈ (12 ,γ] we have P(µt) = 1 and µt+1 >
1/2 if the policy was successful and µt+1 = 1− γ < 12 otherwise. V(µt, st) ≡ V¯(st) for
all values in this interval. Similarly, ∀µt,∈ [1−γ, 12), P(µt) = 0, implying V(µt, st) ≡ 0.
Selecting the non-partisan policy in state r then will not be optimal if
b + φ ≤ pib + φ+ piβ[(1− γ)V¯(l) + γV¯(r)]
or
Assumption 2.2.
(1− pi)b ≤ piβ[(1− γ)V¯(l) + γV¯(r)] (A2.2)
where V¯(r) and V¯(l) can explicitly be computed to read
V¯(r) =
bpi(1+ β(1− 2γβ)) + (piβ(1− γ) + 1− βγ)φ
piβ(β(2γ− 1)− γ) + 1− βγ
V¯(l) =
b(piβ(1− 2γ) + 1) + (1− β(piγ+ γ− 1))φ
piβ(β(2γ− 1)− γ) + 1− βγ . (2.11)
We can conclude:
Proposition 2.2. [Partisan Equilibrium] Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, there exists an equi-
librium in which elected office holders act partisan regardless of the state. In this equilibrium,
politicians are re-elected with probability one if their implemented policy was a success and face
certain defeat if it was a failure, and voters receive no information about the prevailing state
from the choice of policy (other than ex post from its success or failure).
Proof. In the text.
It is important to contrast the equilibrium behavior in Proposition 2.2 to the well-
known danger of office-motivated representatives “pandering to public opinion”. Har-
rington (1993) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) investigate this phenomenon, which turns
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the accountability role of elections on its head. The authors show that, because the
electorate is unable to evaluate the official’s actions directly, the desire to be (re-)elected
may lead representatives to pursue the most popular, rather than the welfare maximiz-
ing, course of action. While similar in its consequences, the policy choice in a partisan
equilibrium does not follow the most popular course of action. Instead, incumbents
in our model stick to their once enacted policies so as not to reveal that “times have
changed”. Moreover, what is at the heart of the resulting policy bias is a perceived –
as opposed to a real – non-congruency: ideology is a social perception not an innate
characteristic of the candidates.
In particular, comparing Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, the blame for the policy bias can be
squarely laid on the fact that voters perceive policies to be ideologically tinted and ex-
pect candidates to act partisan. If any one of these conditions is missing, i.e., policies
are perceived to be ideologically neutral or candidates are expected to act non-partisan,
even the most office-minded politician has no incentive to deviate from what is optimal
for the electorate [Proposition 2.1]. Only if voters expect partisan politics in the future
will they have an incentive to elect the candidates whose perceived position corre-
sponds to what they think is in their best interest given their current information. And
it is the voters’ expectations, in turn, which induce candidates to actually act partisan
in the first place. Put differently, voters and representatives are caught in an ideology
trap: because voters expect the ideology of office holders to determine their political
actions, an official’s (re-)election chances will vary with his or her perceived ideology.
In their desire to influence the outcome of the election, these expectations induce the
officials to act partisan. Shifts from non-partisan politics to partisan politics confirm the
electorate’s assessed likelihood of the latter, cementing the polarization even further.
Ideologues emerge who are not true believers. Instead, ideology is purely a social per-
ception based on observable characteristics of candidates. Thus, issue bundling occurs
not because preferences are bundled, but because voters’ expectations tie candidates’
policy intentions to their observed characteristics such as their party affiliation.
Similarly, the model also should be contrasted with the widely-used adverse selec-
tion approach of reputation in repeated games, initially formalized by Kreps, Mil-
grom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982). In these models, small
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amounts of imperfect information regarding their payoff can induce players to attempt
to build a reputation for being of a certain type, as to trigger more favorable responses
from others.18 Translated into our framework, this approach would assume that politi-
cians can be of two unobservable (payoff) types, a “partisan” type and a “non-partisan”
type, where the latter is strictly preferable to the electorate. In such a world, candidates
with partisan preferences would be tempted to implement an efficient policy so as to
appear non-partisan. Obviously, one could not possibly explain ideologically tinted
behavior with this line of argument. In contrast, there is no uncertainty about the
candidates’ type in our model. Thus, implementing efficient policies in the partisan
equilibrium cannot serve as a signal for being an efficient type. Rather, the electorate is
unsure about the current state of the world, and an incumbent who implements a non-
partisan policy will at most signal that a certain state prevails, which in turn makes it
desirable to out him from power.
There are two possible misgivings one could have against this line of reasoning. First,
voters are strictly better off in the non-partisan equilibrium than in the partisan equilib-
rium, and thus there may a priori be little reason to expect partisan behavior to prevail.
Second, non-partisan behavior is not observed on the equilibrium path in the partisan
equilibrium: by assumption, if voters unexpectedly see candidates acting non-partisan,
they infer that the state must be unfavorable to their ideological position. As we will
see, both concerns are rooted in the simple nature of the model and can easily be ad-
dressed. We do so in Section 2.4 below, where we develop a) a straightforward refine-
ment that selects the partisan equilibrium whenever it exists, and b) a natural extension
of the model in which incumbents act non-partisan on the equilibrium path.19
The qualitative results of this section in no way depend on our assumption that there
is no uncertainty in the voting behavior of the electorate, which makes competition be-
tween candidates especially fierce. In particular, a standard probabilistic voting model
where candidates face uncertain electoral prospects and cater to the swing voter would
18In a recent application of this approach to a related question, Morris (2001) for example assumes that
political advisers can be either good or bad. A priori, both types of adviser would like being perceived
as good, which may prompt them to keep their advice “politically correct” (against better knowledge).
19In general, the model may have further equilibria. Assuming myopic voters and β = 1, however,
it is possible to show that generically in any symmetric pure strategy Markov equilibrium both parties
either always act partisan or their actions converge to efficient play.
CHAPTER 2. Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics 79
yield similar conclusions.20
We close this section by studying the set of parameters that supports partisan behavior
as an equilibrium phenomenon. First, note that Assumption 2.1 is satisfied for small
values of either pi or γ, or both. Ceteris paribus, a partisan equilibrium is thus more
likely to exist if either i) the electorate is sufficiently uncertain about the underlying
state or ii) the success and failure of policies is a sufficiently accurate signal of the state.
Intuitively, these conditions ensure that challengers do not credibly deviate to non-
partisan behavior (which in turn would make their election optimal for voters). If the
state persists over long time horizons (γ → 1) or if the signal of a policy’s success or
failure is very inaccurate (pi → 1), a challenger who unexpectedly (i.e., off the equi-
librium path) won an election would have no incentive to act partisan because even if
her partisan choice was successful, the electorate would not be sufficiently convinced
of an underlying state change to re-elect her.
Second, to better understand the restrictions embodied in Assumption 2.2, we can sub-
stitute for V¯(r) and V¯(l) in condition (A2.2) using (2.11), which yields
b
φ+ b
≤ piβ (1− β(2γ− 1))
(1− pi) (1− βγ) (2.12)
Not surprisingly, partisan behavior is more likely to arise whenever politicians have
a strong office holding motive: their rent from holding onto power φ, relative to the
the payoff b they forgo by not choosing the correct policy must be sufficiently high.
Moreover, the incumbent will be more inclined to play partisan for high values of pi,
i.e., whenever the efficiency cost of inappropriate policies is low because they are still
likely to succeed (note the tension to Assumption 2.1 though, which requires pi to be
low enough for a successful partisan policy to be convincing). Less obviously, the left
hand side of (2.12) decreases in γ. Intuitively, since the incumbent faces the trade-
off between reelection and efficiency only if the state is unfavorable (st = r), a more
persistent state lowers the chances that the partisan policy will become efficient in the
near future. The prospect of repeatedly having to implement inefficient policies lowers
the expected value from staying in the office when the state is more persistent. We can
20If P(µt) is an arbitrary increasing function of µt then the partisan equilibrium exists when the office
motive φ is sufficiently high.
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thus conclude:
Corollary 2.1. The partisan equilibrium is more likely to exist whenever the office holding
motive is strong (φ high), the environment is volatile (γ low) and whenever inappropriate
policies are unlikely to fail but successful policies are still convincing (intermediate values of
pi).
2.3.3 Properties of the Partisan Equilibrium
As explained above, the specific motivation for acting partisan given voters’ expecta-
tions is one of “signal-jamming”. An efficient policy choice conveys information about
the state of the world, making it less likely that the incumbent office holder is re-elected
if he is expected to act partisan in the future. To improve his chances of re-election, the
incumbent thus “jams” the voters’ inference problem by instead using the partisan
policy, which is both inefficient and less responsive to current circumstances.
The latter fact is noteworthy, not only because it can explain the emergence of “ide-
ologues” but also because, by definition, an ideologue’s preferred policy choice does
not vary with the underlying state. Thus the model can also provide a possible expla-
nation for inefficient policy persistence: along the equilibrium path, there will not be
a deviation from a given policy unless voters oust a politician from office. Moreover,
the probability that the policy (ideology of the office holder) varies with the state and
changes from one period to the next is smaller than in the non-partisan equilibrium.
Finally, despite the fact that incumbents who “stick to their political colors” and do not
change policies enact inefficient policies, the political failure does not result in lower
election chances. In fact, it is easy to show that – relative to the efficient equilibrium –
incumbents enjoy an advantage in the partisan equilibrium: their chances of winning
another term in office are strictly higher than even.21
These observations are summarized in
21One may object to this assertion that since voters are indifferent between candidates in the non-
partisan equilibrium, any probability of re-election is consistent with equilibrium behavior (including
perfect incumbency advantages with re-election probabilities equal to one). Note, however, that such
outcomes would require voters to co-ordinate their voting strategies, an implausible scenario when the
electorate is large.
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Proposition 2.3. In a partisan equilibrium:
i) voters receive strictly less utility than in the non-partisan equilibrium [Policy Failure]
ii) incumbents’ policies do not vary with the current state and in the long run policies are less
likely to be changed than would be efficient [Policy Persistence], and
iii) the long run probability that an incumbent wins another term in office is strictly greater
than one half [Incumbency Advantage].
Proof. See Appendix A2.1.
The implication of policy persistence is particularly interesting for two reasons. First,
it shows that policies may be resilient not just because they are targeted and thus allow
for the formation of powerful interest groups who subsequently lobby for their contin-
ued enactment as in Coate and Morris (1999). Persistence may also be a problem for
non-targeted (valence) issues, simply because incumbent politicians may be reluctant
to abandon their previously enacted policies so as to not openly admit that “times have
changed”. Second, this persistence gives rise to political failure. Rather than the result
of a struggle between powerful interest groups and the public at large, the inefficient
inertia in the political process is driven by the fact that, in a world on partisanship,
office holders are reluctant to admit that new circumstances warrant a new policy and,
therefore, new leaders in the eyes of the electorate.
Both policy persistence and incumbency advantage distinguish our model from other
models of policy divergence (such as the citizen-candidate model) and can potentially
be tested for empirically. While a full-fledged empirical analysis of these phenom-
ena is beyond the scope of the present chapter, we confine ourselves to point out that
these implications are consistent with empirical observations regarding democratic
two-party systems. As stated in the Introduction, studies of voting behavior in the
U.S. Congress in particular confirm our theoretical predictions of ideological position-
ing and polarization along party lines [McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006)]. Using
data from roll call voting records, Poole (2007) presents a variety of evidence show-
ing that, once elected, members adopt a consistent ideological position and maintain
it over time. Moreover, in spite of (or perhaps even because of) their stubborn behav-
ior, re-election rates for senators and House members are regularly above 80 percent.
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In 2002, for instance, 398 House members ran for reelection, of which only 16 were
defeated. In the Senate, a mere three out of 26 senators running for reelection lost.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Candidate Behavior
As mentioned above, one possible objection to the partisan equilibrium is that it is
Pareto dominated by the non-partisan equilibrium for the voters (though not for the
politicians). Arguably, this could make sub-optimal partisan behavior less likely to be
observed: if the electorate collectively benefits from expecting representatives to act in
its best interest, then why should it expect otherwise? We will show in this section that
there are compelling arguments in favor of the partisan equilibrium. Specifically, the
non-partisan equilibrium is fragile (unstable) in the sense that it does not survive small
perturbations in voters’ expectations. Formally, suppose that the electorate expects the
office holder to choose the partisan policy with some small probability e > 0.22
Proposition 2.4. Suppose there is an arbitrarily small and i.i.d. probability e > 0 that of-
fice holders follow their ideology in each period and that Assumption 2.1 holds. If Assump-
tion 2.2 holds with strict inequality, then the partisan equilibrium continues to exist and there
is no equilibrium in which each candidate plays non-partisan (with probability 1− e) along the
equilibrium path. Conversely, if Assumption 2.2 is violated, then there exists an equilibrium
in which each candidate plays non-partisan (with probability 1− e) along the equilibrium path
and there is no partisan equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A2.1.
Proposition 2.4 shows that generically, a small amount of voter uncertainty regarding
candidate behavior suffices to select the inefficient, partisan equilibrium whenever it
22One explanation for why voters could expect partisan behavior to arise with positive probability is
party pressure [see Cukierman and Tommasi (1998)]. The possibility of a “partisan shock” could then
formalized by a probability e with which the office holder realizes an additional benefit B whenever
he chooses the policy a corresponding to her ideology or party affiliation i, and assuming that the per-
period payoff from a partisan choice is sufficient to compensate for the expected loss from not choosing
the efficient alternative.
CHAPTER 2. Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics 83
exists according to Proposition 2.2. Intuitively, non-partisan behavior is unstable be-
cause everyone is equally good as long as he or she is expected to act non-partisan. In
such a situation even small amounts of uncertainty regarding candidates’ subsequent
behavior will make voters strictly prefer the candidate whose ideological position is
more likely to succeed given their beliefs about the current state.23
While we use the result in Proposition 2.4 primarily to select among equilibria, the
fragility of non-partisan equilibria has obvious implications concerning how shifts in
voters’ expectations translate into policy changes. Consider a situation where non-
partisanship has historically prevailed along the equilibrium, so voters have no reason
to suspect politicians to enact (inefficient) ideological policies. Yet, a relatively small
change in the perception of voters concerning an increased likelihood of partisan be-
havior would be sufficient to trigger a major trend towards partisanship and polariza-
tion. On matters of foreign policy, for example, partisanship as measured by the lack of
support for the President by members of the U.S. congress increased dramatically fol-
lowing the Vietnam war (an event that may well have changed peoples’ expectations
about partisan behavior).24 Conversely, a seemingly extraneous act such as a public
appeal for non-partisanship could revert voters’ expectations, thus helping political
actors to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. For this reason, the result is also con-
sistent with – and can possibly account for – occurrences of within-party polarization
and convergence, such as the split between Southern and Northern Democrats during
the Civil War area and its diminishing importance in the past decades.
2.4.2 Policy Prospects
In this section we allow voters to be uncertain as to the prospect of an inefficiently
chosen policy. Apart from capturing reality, the extension serves two purposes. First,
since candidates will prefer to implement efficient (non-partisan) policies whenever
their partisan policy is unlikely to succeed, voters will observe non-partisan behavior
23For the same reason, even in an equilibrium where the incumbents implement non-partisan poli-
cies with probability 1− e, the voting behavior now depends on the voters’ beliefs, in contrast to the
equilibrium discussed in Section 2.3.1.
24Using data on foreign policy and defense roll-call votes in the U.S. House and Senate, Meernik (1993)
documents that the Vietnam War had a significant impact on bipartisan presidential support: whereas
substantial consensus existed prior to the War, is has become much more infrequent afterwards.
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on the equilibrium path, eliminating out-of equilibrium beliefs. Second, the partisan
equilibrium will exist for a wider range of parameters.
Specifically, assume that the probability of success of an inefficient policy choice pit
evolves stochastically over time in the following way: in each period t, it is either
pi > 0, as before, or zero. The latter case captures a situation where it is very important
to pick the right policy: inefficient policy choices never succeed and, consequently, the
electorate always learns when the wrong policy was implemented. To fix ideas, we
will refer to such a period as a crisis. Let q be the probability of a normal period (with
success probability pi), so a crisis occurs with probability 1− q, independent of the state
st ∈ {r, l}. Candidates learn pit at the beginning of each period, together with the state
of the world. Voters do not observe pit.25 Since a crisis doesn’t persist by assumption,
voters’ beliefs over pit are the same each period, and we can w.l.o.g. condition the
election probabilities exclusively on the belief over the state, as before.
Turning to equilibria, observe first that the non-partisan equilibrium still exists since
deviating to a partisan policy is even less attractive in a crisis. As in the baseline model,
though, a ‘partisan’ equilibrium where politicians act partisan in normal times and
efficient in a crisis is also supported. In this equilibrium, voters again elect the left-
wing (right-wing) candidate for beliefs µt > 1/2 (µt < 1/2) and give both candidates
equal chances of winning for µt = 1/2. To begin with, suppose the left-wing candidate
has been elected in a crisis period and st = r. A partisan policy at = l will surely fail,
leading to a current payoff of φ and next period’s belief of µt+1 = 1−γ. A non-partisan
choice at = r on the other hand will be successful, yielding a higher current payoff of
b + φ with the same next period’s belief µt+1 = 1− γ. Therefore, non-partisan politics
are optimal in a crisis.
As before, a candidate is only willing to implement the partisan policy if this assures
reelection in case of success; in particular this must be true if the electorate holds the
worst possible beliefs, µt = 1− γ. However, since the partisan policy is less often im-
plemented than in the base model, observing a successful partisan policy now contains
more information and therefore has a larger effect on the posterior belief. Specifically,
25The assumption that voters do not observe the success probability at all is made to simplify matters.
Our qualitative argument remains valid as long as there is some residual uncertainty with regard to pit.
CHAPTER 2. Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics 85
Assumption 2.1 becomes
pi <
(1− γ)
γq
. (2.13)
Next, let Vc(µt, st) denote the left-wing candidate’s expected discounted value if state
st occurs, the electorate has belief µt and he follows the equilibrium strategy for the
rest of the game. We can adapt the condition (2.10) of the base model that supports
partisan behavior in any normal period,
βE [γVc(µt+1, l) + (1− γ)Vc(µt+1, r)] ≥ (1− pi)b (2.14)
where the value functions are slightly modified to account for the additional uncer-
tainty induced by pit:
Vc(µt, st) =
P(µt) {b + φ+ β [γV
c(µt+1, l) + (1− γ)Vc(µt+1, r)]} if st = l
P(µt){qpib + (1− q)b + φ+ qβpi [(1− γ)Vc(µt+1, l) + γVc(µt+1, r)]} if st = r
It is easy to show that Vc(µt, st) = 0 for µt < 1/2 and Vc(µt, st) ≡ Vc(st) for µt > 1/2,
as in section 2.3.2.
Simple algebra shows that condition (2.14) is equivalent to condition (2.10) from sec-
tion 2.3.2. To intuitively understand why condition (2.10) remains unchanged, assume
for the moment that (2.10) is satisfied with equality. Then, the office holder is indiffer-
ent between implementing his inefficient partisan policy and the efficient one when-
ever pit = pi. In this case, the value of being in office in the non-partisan state and
following the equilibrium strategy equals that of implementing the efficient policy af-
ter observing pit = 0 (and not getting reelected afterwards): V
c
(r) = φ+ b. Since the
value in state r equals that of the base model, and both the strategy and the payoff
in state l remain as in section 2.3.2, we must also have V(l) = Vc(l). Now suppose
that condition (2.10) holds with strict inequality, which renders holding office more
attractive. By the preceding paragraph, both in the base model and in this section, an
incumbent would prefer to implement the partisan policy whenever pit = pi. Since
incumbents implement the efficient policy if pit = 0, the possibility of a crisis ceteris
paribus decreases the value of office holders in the partisan equilibrium whenever it
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exists, i.e. Vc(l) ≤ V(l) and Vc(r) ≤ V(r).
Proposition 2.5. Under condition (2.13) and Assumption 2.2, there exists an equilibrium in
which elected office holders act partisan in normal times and efficient in times of crisis. In this
equilibrium, politicians are re-elected with probability one if their implemented policy was a
success and face certain defeat if it was a failure or they implemented the non-partisan policy.
Proof. See Appendix A2.1.
In summary, we find that the possibility of a crisis renders the partisan equilibrium
more plausible. Intuitively, if the electorate is uncertain about the prospects of in-
efficient policies, it expects the candidates sometimes to implement the non-partisan
policy. If voters observe that a politician has abandoned his ideology, they know that
he did so to avoid a certain political failure - as a result, they (correctly) do not interpret
this behavior as a sign of honesty and therefore do not draw inferences regarding the
politician’s future strategy. Finally observe that the partisan equilibrium continuously
converges to the equilibrium in the basic framework as q → 0, thereby justifying the
off-equilibrium beliefs of section 2.3.2: upon observing the non-partisan policy being
implemented, the electorate assumes that the incumbent has been forced to abandon
his ideology, simply because the conflicting evidence was too strong.
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2.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposes a theory of ideology for public leaders. We have shown that
there are circumstances under which elected officials may adopt ideologically opposed
positions, resulting in inefficient partisan policies even in areas that are generally per-
ceived to be non-partisan. In contrast to existing explanations of partisanship, equilib-
rium polarization can emerge in our model despite the fact that voters and their repre-
sentatives are in complete agreement as to which is the optimal course of action. The
problem the parties face can be viewed as an “ideology trap”, which emerges because
voters perceive alternative policy measures to be ideologically tinted, and expect can-
didates to remain ‘true to their ideology’ which itself is a social perception grounded in
observable characteristics (such as their gender, their party affiliation, or their position
on a different policy issue).
Thus, the model can explain policy bias and divergence from the fact that voters per-
ceive policies to be ideologically tinted and expect candidates to act partisan. More-
over, such partisan politics are persistent in the sense that equilibrium polices are less
volatile and less responsive to changes in the underlying state than efficient policies.
Importantly, the inertia is not driven by a fear of appearing incompetent. Rather, in a
partisan world, leaders are reluctant to abandon previously enacted policies and admit
that ‘times have changed’ because new circumstances will warrant a new policy and,
therefore, new leaders in the eyes of the electorate.26
The key insight from our analysis provides a plausible explanation for a range of em-
pirical regularities that, collectively, the previous literature on polarization cannot ac-
count for. In particular, the theory shows why ideology plays a role on matters that
should be non-partisan (e.g., national security), why differences in observed character-
istics such as party affiliation, gender, or electoral district can lead to differences in the
political platforms of candidates that otherwise share similar policy preferences, why
these differences can lead to issue bundling, and why bad, ideology driven policies can
26Using the US relations to Iraq as an example, take George W. Bush’s reluctance to admit that his
strategy in Iraq failed. According to our model, it is not the gain from appearing competent (or the loss
from appearing incompetent) that causes the political failure. Instead, admitting mistakes would imply
that the Democrats’ strategy to deal with the situation in Iraq was preferable, which in turn implies that
a Democrat could do better when in office.
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persist. The model is also consistent with the observation that the ongoing polariza-
tion in the U.S. (which is largely driven by increased extremism within the Republican
Party) is not mirrored by an equal shift in the American public.
Finally, we believe that our model could fruitfully be applied to other settings where
leadership and ideology are tied together. While we have cast the discussion within
the framework of policy formation in a representative democracy for obvious reasons,
it is important to note that our basic line of argumentation is valid in a broader con-
text: as long as a leader needs supporters to stay in power and is challenged in his
leadership (implicitly and explicitly) on occasion, he will have an incentive to live up
to his supporters expectations. If those expectations are ideologically biased, then ide-
ologues will emerge irrespective of whether the context is one of political, religion, or
ethnic affiliation.
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A2.1 Appendix
The following lemma establishes that there is no “experimenting” in equilibrium
Lemma A2.1. Suppose that both candidates implement their partisan policy in each period and
that β < 1. Then the electorate’s value function U(·) is unique and
i) is axially symmetric around 0.5, i.e U(µt) = U(1− µt) for µt ∈ [1− γ,γ],
ii) satisfies U′(µt) ≤ −(1− γ) (1− pi)2 b for µt < 0.5 and U′(µt) ≥ (1− γ) (1− pi)2 b
for µt > 0.5,
iii) satisfies b + βU(µt)− βU(1− γ) ≥ (1− γ) (1− pi) b ∀µt ∈ [1− γ,γ].
The electorate’s optimal voting strategy is identical to that of a myopic electorate.
Proof. Let the function ϕL(µt) ≡ 1− γ + (2γ − 1) µtµt+(1−µt)pi map the the belief µt in
period t into the belief that results in t+ 1 when incumbent L successfully implements
the policy l. Define ϕR(µt) ≡ γ− (2γ− 1) 1−µt1−µt+µtpi similarly for incumbent R.
Step 1: We prove uniqueness and properties i)-iii) by use of the Contraction Mapping
Theorem: Define the functional operator T : U 7→ U that maps the space of bounded
continuous functions U defined on [1− γ,γ] with range R+into itself as follows:
TU(µ) =
(µ+ (1− µ)pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(µ)
)
+ (1− µ)(1− pi)βU(1− γ) µ ≥ 0.5
(1− µ+ µpi) (b + βU(ϕR(µ))+ µ(1− pi)βU(γ) µ < 0.5
Since T is a contraction, there exists a unique electorate’s value function U(·).27 We
will prove properties i), ii) and iii) of U by use of Corollary 1 of Stokey and Lucas
(1989, Theorem 3.2). We have to show that if U satisfies these properties, then TU also
satisfies them. Suppose that U satisfies properties i), ii) and iii).
27It can be easily verified that this operator is a contraction since it satisfies the Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions of discounting and monotonicity according to Stokey and Lucas (1989, Theorem 3.3). As U
together with the sup-Norm is a complete metric space, the contraction mapping Theorem Stokey and
Lucas (1989, Theorem 3.2) applies.
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i) Since ϕL(0.5 + x) = 1− ϕR(0.5− x), TU also satisfies TU(0.5− x) = TU(0.5 + x)
for x ∈ [0,γ− 0.5].
ii) For µt > 0.5,
TU′(µt) = (1− pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(µt)− βU(1− γ)
)
+ (µt + (1− µt)pi) βU′(ϕL(µt))ϕL′(µt)
≥ (1− γ) (1− pi)2 b
where the inequality is because of b + βU(µt) − βU(1 − γ) ≥ (1 − γ) (1− pi) b by
property iii) and because the second term is non negative by property ii). For µt < 0.5,
an analogous argument applies.
iii) For µt > 0.5 we have TU(µt) = (µt + (1− µt)pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(µt))− βU(1− γ)
)
+
βU(1− γ) which implies
b + βTU(µt)− βTU(1− γ) = b− (γ+ (1− γ)pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(γ))− βU(1− γ)
)
+ (µt + (1− µt)pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(µt))− βU(1− γ)
)
≥ b− (γ+ (1− γ)pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(γ))− βU(1− γ)
)
≥ (1− γ) (1− pi) b
where we used property i) repeatedly. The first inequality is due to property iii) and
the last one due to property ii).
Step 2: Now we show that it is indeed optimal to vote for the left party if µt > 0.5 (an
analogous argument holds for µt < 0.5 ). Deviating once and electing the right party
yields Uˆ(µt) = (1− µt + µtpi)
(
b + βU(ϕR(µt)
)
+ µt(1− pi)βU(γ). Hence
U(µt)− Uˆ(µt) = (2µ− 1)(1− pi)
(
b + βU(ϕL(µt))− βU(γ)
)
+(1− µt + µtpi)
(
βU(ϕL(µt))− βU(ϕR(µt))
)
≥ 0
where the inequality follows because the first term is positive due to property iii) and
the second is positive due to ϕL(µt)− 0.5 > |0.5− ϕR(µt)| and property ii). To see that
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ϕL(µt) − 0.5 > 0.5− ϕR(µt) when ϕR(µt) < 0.5, inserting the formulas from above
and rearranging yields
1
1+ (1− µt)piµ−1t
>
1
1+ (1− µt)−1piµt
which is true for µt > 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Part i) is trivial. To show part ii), define the random variable s˜t ∈ {m, n} whose two
realizations are “match” s˜t = m when equilibrium play prescribes at = st in a given
period and “non-match” n whenever at 6= st. In the partisan equilibrium, the transition
probabilities between these “states” are:
T =
 tmm tmn
tnm tnn
 =
 γ 1− γ
(1− pi)γ+ pi(1− γ) (1− pi)(1− γ) + piγ

where the element tij of the transition matrix T denotes the transition probability
from state i to state j. In the partisan equilibrium, a change in the implemented pol-
icy (i.e. at 6= at+1) only occurs if the implemented policy in period t was at 6= st
and failed. Hence the probability of a policy change between period t and t + 1
is Pr(s˜t = n)(1 − pi). In the efficient equilibrium a policy change occurs when-
ever the true state changes, i.e. with probability 1 − γ. By definition, the partisan
equilibrium involves more persistence in a given period t whenever the probability
of a change in policies between period t and t + 1 is lower than the probability of
change in the efficient equilibrium which is 1− γ. This condition is satisfied whenever
Pr(s˜t = n) (1− pi) ≤ 1− γ.
We proceed to show that for any initial belief and state, the long run probability of
having a non-match is small enough to satisfy this condition. The (generically unique)
stationary stationary distribution corresponds to the eigenvector which is associated
to the unit eigenvalue of T
′
. It is f¯
′
=
(−2piγ+γ+pi
1−2γpi+pi ,
1−γ
1−2γpi+pi
)
, where the first (second)
element denotes the stationary probability that a match (non-match) occurs. The long
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run probability that a non-match occurs is thus limt→∞ Pr(s˜t = n) = 1−γ1−2γpi+pi . Due to
γ < 1, we have
(1− pi) lim
t→∞ Pr(s˜t = n) =
(1− pi) (1− γ)
1− (2γ− 1)pi < (1− γ)
which completes the proof.
To show part c), recall that in the partisan equilibrium, an incumbent is not re-elected
only in the event of a political failure. From the proof of part b), this occurs with
probability Pr(s˜t = n)(1− pi), which is in the long run equal to
(1− pi) lim
t→∞ Pr(s˜t = n) =
(1− pi) (1− γ)
1− 2γpi + pi < (1− γ) <
1
2
where the last inequality follows from γ > 12 .
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Since e restricts the minimum probability for implementing the partisan policy, for all
e ∈ (0, 1), strategies and re-election probabilities in the partisan equilibrium are un-
changed. Moreover, neither voters’ nor office holders’ payoffs are affected. Thus, par-
tisan behavior continues to be an equilibrium under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2.
Turning to the most efficient equilibrium (or e-efficient equilibrium, indicated by the su-
perscript eE), recall that voters’ optimally vote as if they were myopic by Lemma A2.1.
Hence for any e > 0 the reelection probabilities are now
PeE(µ) =

1 if µ > 0.5
0.5 if µ = 0.5
0 else
and equal those of the partisan equilibrium. The evolution of beliefs in the non-
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partisan equilibrium is
µLt+1(at, µt) =
1− γ+ (2γ− 1)
µt
µt+(1−µt)epi ≡ ϕL,eE(µt) if at = lwas a success
1− γ if at = lfailed or at = r
.
The value for a left wing politician in the e-efficient equilibrium is VeE(µt) = 0 for
µt < 0.5 and
V¯eE(s) ≡
b + φ+ β
[
γV¯eE(l) + (1− γ)V¯eE(r)] if s = l
(1− e)b + φ+ epi [b + β (γV¯eE(r) + (1− γ)V¯eE(l))] if s = r,
for µt > 0.5 since L-type incumbents are not re-elected following the efficient choice of
at = r in state st = r.
Now suppose that the partisan equilibrium exists. Then, generically, (2.10) is satisfied
with strict inequality,
(1− pi)b < piβ[(1− γ)V¯P(l) + γV¯P(r)], (2.15)
where V¯P(l) > 0 and V¯P(r) > 0 denotes the values in the partisan equilibrium [Propo-
sition 2.2]. Because the reelection probabilities are the same in the e-efficient equilib-
rium as in the partisan equilibrium, a repeated deviation by playing at = l in states
st = r guarantees an expected payoff of V¯P(s). We want to show that whenever (2.15)
holds, then V¯P(s) > V¯eE(s), i.e. a repeated deviation is profitable. We use the same
contraction argument as in Lemma A2.1 of Appendix A2.1. According to this reason-
ing, it suffices to show that if V¯P(s) > V¯eE(s), s ∈ {l, r} then also
V¯P(r) > (1− e)b + φ+ epi
[
b + β
(
γV¯eE(r) + (1− γ)V¯eE(l)
)]
.
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To see that this inequality is indeed satisfied, note that
φ+ pi
[
b + β
(
γV¯P(r) + (1− γ)V¯P(l)
)]
> (1− e) (b + φ) + e
[
φ+ pi
[
b + β
(
γV¯P(r) + (1− γ)V¯P(l)
)]]
> (1− e) (b + φ) + e
[
φ+ pi
[
b + β
(
γV¯eE(r) + (1− γ)V¯eE(l)
)]]
where the first inequality comes from (2.15) and the second from the hypothesis
V¯P(s) > V¯eE(s).
Next, we show that whenever the parameters b, φ, β,pi are such that there is no partisan
equilibrium, then an e-efficient equilibrium exists. We prove this by showing the con-
verse, i.e. whenever there is no e-efficient equilibrium, then there exists the partisan
equilibrium. Whenever an e-efficient equilibrium cannot be enforced, then by the one
step deviation principle and the fact that enforceability in state r implies enforceability
in state l, a single deviation for µt > 0.5 and in state r must be profitable:
(1− pi)b < pi
[
b + β
(
γV¯eE(r) + (1− γ)V¯eE(l)
)]
(2.16)
We have to show that (2.16) implies that the partisan equilibrium can be enforced, i.e.
that (2.15) holds (which implies that the second enforcement condition for state l is
also satisfied). The same technique as above yields that (2.16) implies V¯P(s) > V¯eE(s),
s ∈ {l, r}. This together with (2.16) yields (2.15).
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Note that condition (2.14) is equivalent to VR(r) ≥ b + φ where we use the same nota-
tion as in the base model, i.e. VR(st) ≡ VR(µt, st) for µt > 0.5. We have to show that
this condition is satisfied if Assumption 2.2 holds.
At the same time, we show that Assumption 2.2 also implies VR(l) ≥ (1+β(1−γ))(b+φ)1−γβ .
Applying a contraction argument similar to Lemma A2.1, we have to show that when-
ever VR(r) ≥ b + φ, VR(l) ≥ (1+β(1−γ))(b+φ)1−γβ and Assumption 2.2, then the following
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two inequalities are satisfied:
b + φ+ β
[
γVR(l) + (1− γ)VR(r)
]
≥ (1+ β (1− γ)) (b + φ)
1− γβ
pib + φ+ qβpi
[
(1− γ)VR(l) + γVR(r)
]
+ (1− q) (1− pi) b ≥ b + φ
To see that the first inequality is true note that our hypothesis implies:
b + φ+ β
[
γVR(l) + (1− γ)VR(r)
]
≥ b + φ+ β
[
γ
(1+ β (1− γ)) (b + φ)
1− γβ + (1− γ) (b + φ)
]
=
(1+ β (1− γ)) (b + φ)
1− γβ
The second inequality is equivalent to pib + φ + βpi
[
(1− γ)VR(l) + γVR(r)
]
≥
b + φ. By our hypothesis, pib + φ + βpi
[
(1− γ)VR(l) + γVR(r)
]
≥ pib +
φ + βpi
[
(1− γ) (1+β(1−γ))(b+φ)1−γβ + γ (b + φ)
]
. Simplifying Assumption 2.2 yields
piβ
[
(1− γ) (1+β(1−γ))(b+φ)1−γβ + γ (b + φ)
]
≥ (1− pi) b. Putting both observations to-
gether confirms the second inequality.
Chapter 3
Contracting with Specialized Agents
3.1 Introduction
Specialization and its positive effects on productivity is one of the main reasons of
today’s prosperity. As the variety of special products and services gets larger, it be-
comes more and more difficult for a customer to figure out which best fits his needs. In
principle, specialized suppliers have a lot of expertise about their own and their com-
petitors’ products and therefore could help the customer in making the right choice.
More generally, Darby and Karni (1973) speak of credence goods whenever an expert
seller knows better than the customer which type of good or service suits the buyer’s
needs.1 Credence goods comprise for instance medical treatments, repair services or
the provision of complex goods. They enjoy increasing interest in the economic liter-
ature,2 which emphasizes in particular that the opportunity to earn profits by selling
their own service may induce sellers not to advise truthfully.
This chapter investigates optimal procurement schemes which account for the sellers’
incentives to exploit the informational asymmetries in credence good markets. In con-
trast to the literature on credence goods, that has concentrated on goods where the
1Note that in contrast to experience goods, it is prohibitively costly or impossible for customers to
evaluate credence qualities even after having purchased a credence good. See e.g. Darby and Karni
(1973).
2See e.g. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for a survey.
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seller typically sets the price, we focus on situations where the buyer can design and
commit to a procurement mechanism. This chapter builds on the observation that the
opportunity to earn profits by selling their own good may induce sellers to exaggerate
its adequacy. Therefore, we are interested in how the buyer has to optimally design the
procurement mechanism to extract the suitability information nevertheless.
A historic example serves to illustrate the issue.3 In 1968, Atlantic Richfield (ARCO)
successfully drilled for oil in the Prudhoe Bay area, Alaska. The problem soon became
how to ship the product to U.S. and global markets. Several solutions were offered.
For example, Boeing proposed tanker aircrafts, General Dynamics offered a line of
tanker submarines for travel beneath the Arctic ice cap, and another group proposed
extending the Alaska Railroad to Prudhoe Bay. Finally, the Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company was instructed to build the famous Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS),
which still is in use today.
This demonstrates that a single problem may be frequently solved by help of various
alternatives which may differ considerably.4 Sellers are often specialized only in a
subset of these alternatives. In our example, it is conceivable that potential suppliers
had already collected expertise with the products they offered, since these were also
used for other oil fields. On the other side, not knowing the exact properties of the
proposed alternatives made it difficult for ARCO to judge which of the products would
suit the geographical challenges best. In order to choose the best alternative, ARCO
had to extract this information from the potential sellers. Clearly, the importance of
this infrastructure merits to design a sophisticated procurement scheme and to commit
to its execution.
In our model, a principal has to decide from which of two specialized agents to buy a
good or service. Each seller offers a different version of the good. Only one of the alter-
natives is well suited and generates a higher payoff to the principal than the remaining
3See Naske and Slotnick (1987) for further details.
4As another example, consider a house owner who seeks to install either a gas, oil, wood or electricity
heating. Each heating has specific merits and drawbacks. For instance, electricity heatings are cheap to
install but cause high electricity costs, while oil is presently cheaper but requires expensive ovens. Hence
in terms of overall costs, electricity may be best suited for well isolated buildings while this might not
be true for ancient buildings with high energy wastage. While expert sellers presumably know for
which buildings their heating is especially well suited, a house owner typically does not know which
characteristics of his house speak in favor of one or the other type of heating.
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one. Each seller receives a private signal about the suitability of her alternative and
has private information concerning the cost of her good, which is either high or low.
Besides, each seller is protected by limited liability. The principal seeks to design a pro-
curement scheme that maximizes his expected payoff and induces the sellers to reveal
their two-dimensional private information truthfully.
Theoretically, contracts which condition on the customer’s payoff could induce the sell-
ers to give proper advice. However, there are practical reasons why the final payoff is
often not contractible. For example, additional unobservable stochastic factors or hid-
den actions of the buyer may influence the value of the purchased good.5 If the final
payoff is realized long after the trade occurs it may also be difficult to write contracts
depending on it. In addition, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) point out that the cus-
tomer’s payoff may be hard to verify. For these reasons, we assume that no contracts
can be written on the principal’s final payoff.
To isolate the effect of the sellers’ private suitability information, we first consider a
benchmark case where the principal, too, observes both sellers’ signals. Endowed with
this knowledge, it suffices to ensure that the sellers reveal their private cost informa-
tion. Since the principal generally buys more often from sellers with a good signal than
from those with a bad one, by standard results on adverse selection, higher rents have
to be conceded to sellers with a low cost and a good signal.
Suppose now the principal does not know the sellers’ signals, but still applies this
benchmark scheme. The better prospects to sell their good would induce low cost
sellers with a bad signal to exaggerate the suitability of their alternative. This suggests
that the buyer needs to remunerate sellers for revealing a bad signal.
When the principal lacks the information on suitability, the principal faces a trade-off
between maximizing the chances of buying the adequate good and economizing on
rents. Intuitively, if the principal puts more emphasis on a good match, and therefore
buys more often from sellers with a good signal, low cost sellers with a bad signal
could generate higher rents by exaggerating their signal. Thus a higher remuneration
5In our introductory example, each of the alternatives to connect the oil field bears some risk of failure
which depends on its adequacy. The event of a breakdown is then only a noisy signal of the product’s
suitability.
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for them is required to assure truth-telling. Because of this trade-off, the optimal pro-
curement scheme depends on the expected value of the sellers’ suitability information
as compared to the magnitude of cost uncertainty.
When choosing the superior alternative is of little importance, it may be optimal to
commit to trading inefficiently often with agents who report a bad match. This makes
it less tempting to exaggerate the suitability signal and therefore reduces the payments
required to assure truth-telling. In this case, it may be even optimal to commit to trad-
ing sometimes with an agent whose product is as expensive as the competitor’s but less
likely to be suited. After reinterpreting the transaction probabilities as the proportion
that each seller provides in a consortium of multiple sellers, this result may explain
why sometimes inferior sellers are invited to participate in tendered projects. For ex-
ample, we sometimes observe that in complex defense projects more sellers participate
than would be necessary.
The optimal scheme vastly differs if the superior alternative is sufficiently important.
Then the principal optimally gives priority to the adequacy of the good over the costs.
However, this requires conceding extremely high rents to the sellers: Buying mainly
from agents with a good signal requires to highly reward low cost sellers for reporting a
bad signal. In addition, the principal rarely buys from these sellers. This tempts sellers
with a bad signal to understate their costs in order to obtain the payments designed for
the low cost sellers. We show that because of this problem, rents have to be conceded
to all type of sellers. In order to implement a scheme where priority is given to the
adequacy signal, the principal needs to exploit the correlated signal structure and to
reward sellers whenever they agree on the adequate good.6 This result, which relies
on the correlation of the sellers’ signals, seems remarkable, since in adverse selection
problems the ex-ante participation constraint is usually binding at least for some type.7
A further result is that private information on adequacy makes it more likely that the
buyer does not buy from high cost sellers at all. The rationale is similar as before: When
the principal never trades with high cost sellers, then no concessions have to be made
to extract the private cost information. But when the sellers have no chance of earning
6The sellers’ limited liability prevents the principal from obtaining the information costlessly à la
Cremer and McLean (1988).
7See Rochet and Stole (2003).
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rents when being hired, then the incentives to exaggerate the suitability signal vanish.
Since trading with high cost sellers is generally more costly than in the benchmark case
mentioned before, it is optimal for a larger set of parameters to commit to barring high
cost sellers.
Our results may be fruitfully applied in situations where the principal is endowed
with commitment power. First, as already pointed out, we believe that in procurement
decisions of valuable goods, buyers may design and credibly commit to sophisticated
procurement schemes. Moreover, buyers may hire firms that are specialized on design-
ing and enforcing optimal procurement schemes.8 A second set of applications is the
design of laws and provisions that apply for credence good transactions. For example,
in the medical sector the process of identifying the optimal treatment is heavily regu-
lated. Our results can thus be applied for specifying the optimal remunerations and
the choice of the doctor. A further application is the design of rules for government
procurement.9
Related Literature
Our theory brings together the literature on credence goods and on optimal procurement
procedures.
Regarding the literature on credence goods, several authors have recently studied verti-
cally differentiated markets:10 Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Alger and Salanie (2004) and
Wolinsky (1993, 1995) assume that a customer either needs a cheap or a costly treat-
ment to solve a problem and only the expert seller can observe which one is needed.
Emons (1997, 2001) investigate the role of capacity constraints on the incentives to give
honest advice. As in this chapter, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) analyze a model
with horizontally differentiated treatments and there is exactly one proper treatment
which yields an extra payoff to the customer. However, they assume that finding out
8For example, the consultancy TWS-Partners (http://www.tws-system.com/index.html) is special-
ized in these services.
9For example, at the moment the question of how local government administrations should award
contracts to build up network infrastructure to telecommunication sellers after having been advised by
the these firms.
10 For a more detailed survey of inefficiencies that arise in credence goods markets, see Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006).
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the customer’s needs is costly and focus on the experts’ incentives to actually exert
investigative effort. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) assume that sellers of financial
products have superior information about which of two horizontally differentiated
products suits the customer’s needs. Unlike our model, sellers suffer a reputational
loss for selling a wrong product. While in our model each seller offers only one alter-
native, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) determine the number of products offered
by each seller endogenously.
Our main contribution to the credence goods literature lies in allowing buyers to de-
sign more sophisticated procurement schemes. All the papers cited so far suppose that
the sellers set prices and that buyers have little or no commitment power. While these
assumptions seem appropriate for rather simple services, we are interested in complex
and valuable goods that justify elaborate procurement methods. We also suppose that
only a small number of sellers is capable to deliver these complex services.
The literature on optimal procurement is inter alia concerned with the question of how
to take factors other than price into account in the procurement process. A seminal
contribution that also analyzes a pure adverse selection problem is Che (1993), who
investigates optimal auctions when sellers have private information regarding their
costs to produce quality. He assumes that the quality level is verifiable, so that the allo-
cation rule is contingent on the actual quality level provided by the winner. In contrast,
Manelli and Vincent (1995) consider optimal procurement schemes when sellers have
private information regarding their product’s quality which is not verifiable. Asker
and Cantillon (2010) analyze procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible,
but when sellers have two-dimensional private information regarding their fixed costs
and their marginal costs for quality. None of these papers investigates the trade-offs
that arise when sellers have private cost information and non-verifiable private infor-
mation regarding the suitability.11
This chapter also bears similarity to the literature on delegated expertise, where bet-
ter informed agents have to be induced to gather and to honestly report the desired
information. In Gromb and Martimort (2007), a principal faces two incompletely in-
11Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996) investigate the design of auctions when the winner inflicts
a privately known externality on the remaining bidders. In our setup, the winning bidder inflicts a
privately known externality on the principal who designs the auction.
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formed agents. As in this paper, Gromb and Martimort (2007) use a mechanism design
approach and allow payments that condition on both experts’ reports. Similarly, in
Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2007) local business managers have to be induced to
combine their private information with that of a functional manager so that the right
amount of standardization is implemented. In contrast to our model, both papers
combine a one-dimensional adverse selection problem of revealing private informa-
tion with one of moral hazard to induce agents to exert effort.
The methods employed to derive the optimal scheme draw on a further strand of litera-
ture. In our model sellers have two-dimensional private information (on costs and the
suitability) which requires methods developed in the literature on multidimensional
screening [e.g. Rochet and Stole (2003)] and multidimensional auctions [Armstrong
(2000)]. While Armstrong (2000) allows the dimensions of an agent’s type to be corre-
lated, in our setup the suitability across agents is correlated.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model and formally
define procurement schemes in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 derives the optimal mechanism
when the principal knows the sellers’ signals. Section 3.4 characterizes the distortions
that are evoked by the optimal schemes of our main setup. In Section 3.5 we discuss
which assumptions drive our results before Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
A risk neutral principal (or buyer, “he”) needs to procure one unit of an indivisible
good or service. There are two risk neutral agents (or sellers, “she”) indexed by i ∈
{1, 2} that may provide it. Each seller is specialized in a different version of the good.
We assume that exactly one of both alternatives suits the buyer’s needs.12 Each seller
is equally likely to offer the adequate alternative. The buyer does not know which
version is better suited. The variable χi ∈ {0, 1} captures the actual suitability with
χi = 1 indicating that seller i offers the superior alternative and χi = 0 representing
the inferior one. Buying a good yields the principal a base payoff of S ∈ R. The
12This assumption is thoroughly discussed in section 3.5.
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principal’s payoff further increases by η ∈ R+ if he chooses the superior alternative.
Thus, when seller i provides the good with probability qi and the principal pays m1 to
seller 1 and m2 to seller 2, his payoff is up = q1 (S + χ1η) + q2 (S + χ2η)−m1 −m2.13
Both agents possess two-dimensional private information: The first dimension con-
cerns the superiority of a seller’s alternative: Each agent receives a noisy signal
xi ∈ {0, 1} that indicates if her alternative is appropriate for the buyer. The good sig-
nal xi = 1 means that the alternative is likely to be well suited while a bad signal of
xi = 0 indicates that the offered alternative is likely to be inappropriate. The prob-
ability of obtaining a correct signal, does not depend on a good’s adequacy, that is
Pr(xi = χi|χi = 0) = Pr(xi = χi|χi = 1) ≡ 12 (1+ γ) where γ ∈ (0, 1] measures
the quality of the signal.14 Hence, the unconditional probabilities of obtaining a good
and a bad signal are α1 = α0 = 1/2, respectively. For γ → 0, the sellers’ signals are
uninformative whereas γ = 1 captures perfect signals.
Since exactly one of the alternatives is appropriate, the sellers’ signals are negatively
correlated. The signals (x1, x2) are consistent, if they are compatible with a true match
profile, that is if exactly one seller has a good signal: x1 6= x2. They are inconsistent
when both sellers have obtained the same signal: x1 = x2. Denote by αx1,x2 the joint
probability that agents 1 and 2 receive the signals x1 and x2, respectively. A profile of
consistent signals occurs more often than an inconsistent profile, since α1,0 = α0,1 =
1
4
(
1+ γ2
)
and α1,1 = α0,0 = 14
(
1− γ2).
The second dimension of an agent’s type refers to the cost of her alternative. A seller’s
alternative is either cheap with costs normalized to c = 0 or expensive with costs
c = δ: ci ∈ {c, c}. With probability αc ∈ (0, 1) a seller’s cost is low and with probability
αc = 1− αc it is high. Each seller’s cost is drawn independently of her signal and of
the competitor’s cost. When agent i sells her good with probability qi and receives the
payment mi, her payoff is mi − qici.
In summary, a seller’s type θi consists of her cost and her adequacy signal. Slightly
abusing notation, the type space is Θ = {c0, c1, c0, c1}. We will commonly use ci and
13Note that the principal may pay both sellers even though buying only one version of the good.
14We use γ instead of Pr(xi = χi|χi = 0) for convenience. It is easy to verify that γ equals the
correlation between a seller’s signal Xi and the true state χi.
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xi to refer to the cost and the signal of a seller with type θi. The ex-ante probability
that the sellers are of type θ1 and θ2 is αθ1,θ2 ≡ αc1αc2αx1,x2 . Similarly, αθi|xj refers to the
probability that firm i has type θi, conditional on firm j having obtained the signal xj.
An important assumption is that both sellers are protected by limited liability, which
means that the payment from the principal must at least cover the announced costs of
the good.15 Indeed, often legal restrictions prevent the principal from forcing the agent
to sell below the announced cost. Moreover, we require that payments do not depend
on the buyer’s final payoff.
Procurement schemes
The principal’s objective is to design a procurement mechanism to which he then com-
mits. This mechanism describes the available actions of the sellers and relates the out-
comes to the sellers’ actions. A version of the revelation principle ensures that we may
restrict attention to direct mechanisms, in which the principal simply asks the sellers to
announce their type.16
Without loss of generality, we focus on mechanisms that are anonymous, in the sense
that the outcome does not depend on an agent’s index.17 Since ex-ante both sellers
seem equally well suited to perform the task, it also seems reasonable that the buyer
treats both sellers alike.
The outcome encompasses the winning probability qi that agent i sells her good and
15This assumption rules out the application of the mechanism suggested by Cremer and McLean
(1988), which would render the sellers’ private information concerning the match worthless. It is closely
related to the “no-slavery” assumption which is imposed for example by Strausz (1997) and allows
the agent to walk away from any contract at a given time. The “no-slavery” assumption is stronger
than our assumption, since it may be optimal to deviate twice, e.g. to step back from a contract after
having reported too low costs. Both assumptions coincide if the adequacy is uncorrelated as analyzed
in section 3.5.
16We are interested in allocations that are truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(BNE). See e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Proposition 23.D.1.
17The notion of anonymous mechanisms is widely used in the auction and procurement literature.
See e.g. Armstrong (2000). Formally, let qi(θ1, θ2) and mi(θ1, θ2) denote the transaction probability of
seller i ∈ {1, 2} and the payment to seller i, respectively. A mechanism is anonymous if it satisfies
q1(θˆ, θ˜) = q2(θ˜, θˆ) ≡ q(θˆ, θ˜) and m1(θˆ, θ˜) = m2(θ˜, θˆ) ≡ m(θˆ, θ˜) ∀θˆ, θ˜ ∈ Θ. Optimal anonymous schemes
remain optimal in the broader class of all schemes, since our setup is ex-ante symmetric. Suppose an
asymmetric scheme S1 were optimal. By symmetry, the scheme S2, obtained from S1 by reversing the
roles of the sellers, is also optimal. But then, since the whole maximization problem described below is
linear in (q, r), the symmetric scheme S = 12 (S1 + S2) is also feasible and optimal.
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the monetary transfer. Since all participants are risk neutral, it is convenient to express
the outcome instead in terms of the agents’ winning probability qi and the expected
payoff (or rent) ri ≡ mi − qici after they have announced their private information and
before the good is transferred.18
The procurement scheme (q, r) thus maps the agents’ messages about their type,
(θˆ1, θˆ2), into the winning probabilities qi = qθˆi,θˆj and the rents ri = rθˆi,θˆj with i, j ∈ {1, 2}
and i 6= j.19 It is implementable if it satisfies the resource, incentive and participation
constraints, which are described below. Note that we allow seller i’s rent and her trans-
action probability to be contingent on both sellers’ announcements. Moreover, sellers
may receive positive payments even when not selling their good.20
The resource constraints capture that the principal needs at most one good:
qθi,θj + qθj,θi ≤ 1 ∀θi, θj ∈ Θ . (3.1)
In particular, if both sellers announce to be of the same type, then the restriction to
anonymous schemes implies that both sellers win with equal probability: qθi,θi ≤
1/2 ∀θi ∈ Θ. Note that the principal is allowed to abstain from buying a good.
The incentive constraints ensure that truth-telling is optimal for each seller, given that
the competitor acts truthfully. This requires
E
[
rθi,θj |θi
]
≥ E
[
rθˆi,θj + (cˆi − ci)qθˆi,θj |θi
]
∀θi, θˆi ∈ Θ , (3.2)
where E [·|θi] refers to the expectation over θj conditional on θi.
As the type space of a seller contains four elements, there are three incentive constraints
for every type and hence 12 incentive constraints in total. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
18As the sellers are risk neutral, defining that the rent does not depend on a seller actually selling the
good is without loss of generality.
19The monetary transfer is thus mi = rθˆi ,θˆj + cˆiqθˆi ,θˆj .
20This assumption seems realistic in procurement auctions for complex goods where only a small
number of sellers participate. Similarly, Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996) consider a model with
negative externalities where bidders sometimes pay even when not obtaining the good. However, in
many common auction formats, such as the English or Dutch auction, only the winner of the object may
obtain rents.
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Figure 3.1: Incentive constraints
incentive constraints.21 We refer to incentive constraints that prevent low (high) cost
sellers from announcing high (low) cost as downward (upward) incentive constraints
and those that prevent sellers from misreporting the fit-signal as horizontal incentive
constraints.
The limited liability constraints ensure that after any truthful announcement each seller
makes non-negative profits:22
rθi,θj ≥ 0, ∀θi, θj ∈ Θ (3.3)
The limited liability constraints also assure that the sellers are willing to participate in
the procurement process independent of their own type.
Finally, we express the buyer’s ex-ante expected payoff in terms of the variables intro-
duced above. Due to the symmetry, from an ex-ante point of view, the buyer’s expected
payoff Up is23
Up = 2E
[
qθ1,θ2piθ1,x2 − rθ1,θ2
]
(3.4)
where E[·] refers to the expectation over θ1 and θ2, piθi,xj ≡ S + pxi,xjη − ci is the gross
surplus and pxi,xj ≡ Pr(χi = 1|xi, xj) denotes the probability that a firm provides the
superior approach. The gross surplus comprises the expected principal’s payoff of the
good minus the costs. The probability of providing the superior approach increases in
the own signal and decreases in that of the rival. Applying Bayes rule yields p1,0 =
(1+γ)2
2(1+γ2) > p1,1 = 1/2 = p0,0 >
(1−γ)2
2(1+γ2) = p0,1. Hence, the gross surplus depends on
both competitors’ signals and can be ordered as follows: pic1,0 > pic1,1 = pic0,0 > pic0,1,
21Each dashed arrow represents one constraint that may or may not bind.
22Demougin and Garvie (1991) propose this formulation in a similar adverse selection setting as an
alternative to requiring that the transfer mi be non-negative. See also Laffont and Martimort (2002),
Chapter 3.6.
23Symmetry implies that E
[
qθ2,θ1piθ2,x1 − rθ2,θ1
]
= E
[
qθ1,θ2piθ1,x2 − rθ1,θ2
]
.
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c ∈ {c, c}. An implementable scheme is optimal if it maximizes the principal’s expected
payoff among all implementable schemes.
The first best allocation qFB maximizes the expected surplus 2E
[
qθ1,θ2piθ1,x2
]
subject to
the resource constraints (3.1). By inspection of equation (3.4), the first best allocation
entails that the principal buys the good from the seller with the highest gross surplus
provided it is positive.24 If both signals are consistent, but the seller that is likely to
provide the adequate good has higher costs than her rival, then the efficient choice
depends on the ordering of pic0,1 and pic1,0: When the cost difference is small compared
to the importance of the right alternative, i.e. δη <
2γ
(1+γ2) , then it is efficient to give
priority to the high cost firm which is more likely to suit the principal’s needs and vice
versa.
3.3 Benchmark: Buyer Knows Sellers’ Signals
To isolate the effect of the sellers’ private suitability information on the optimal pro-
curement scheme, as a benchmark we assume in this section that the buyer observes
the sellers’ adequacy signals. Still, all players have noisy information regarding the
match and each seller does not observe her rival’s type.
In this benchmark situation, the buyer only needs to elicit the sellers’ private cost in-
formation. Figure 3.2 depicts the following remaining incentive constraints:25
E
[
rcxi,θj |θi
]
≥ E
[
rcxi,θj + δqcxi,θj |θi
]
∀xi ∈ {0, 1} , (3.5)
E
[
rcxi,θj |θi
]
≥ E
[
rcxi,θj − δqcxi,θj |θi
]
∀xi ∈ {0, 1} . (3.6)
As the asymmetric information has been reduced to a single dimension, we can derive
the benchmark scheme using standard techniques. For the moment, let us ignore the
upward incentive constraints and assume that the downward constraints (3.5) bind.
24Formally, qFBθi ,θj = 1 if piθi ,xj > max
{
0,piθj ,xi
}
and qFBθi ,θj = 0 if piθi ,xj < max
{
0,piθj ,xi
}
.
25Solid (dotted) lines represent constraints that are binding (slack).
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Figure 3.2: Benchmark incentive constraints
These constraints require that the expected minimum rent of a low cost seller with
signal xi be proportional to the probability that the principal buys from a high cost
seller with the same match signal. In order to account for the induced rents, we define
the virtual value
ψBMθi,xj =
 piθi,xj if ci = c ,piθi,xj − δαcαc if ci = c .
Since the adjustment does not depend on the allocation of the task, the optimal pro-
curement scheme obtains by maximizing “pointwise” as follows:
Lemma 3.1. The optimal procurement scheme qBM solves maxq Eθi,θj
[
qθi,θjψ
BM
θi,xj
]
subject to
the resource constraints (3.1). High cost sellers do not obtain any rents and the expected payoff
of low cost sellers is E[rcxi,θj |θi = cxi] = δE[qBMcxi,θj |θi = cxi].
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
Compared to the first best allocation, there arises no distortion at the top for c1 sell-
ers, since the principal buys from them whenever possible. If pic1,0 > pic0,1 > 0 and
ψBMc1,0 < ψ
BM
c0,1, then the task is awarded to c0 sellers too often compared to the first best.
Similarly, there may be too little trade with high cost sellers compared to the first best.
The distortions only arise from the sellers’ private information about their cost. In
particular, if two sellers announce the same cost, the buyer never chooses a seller that
is unlikely to match the principal’s needs. This is because the buyer does not have to
concede rents to acquire information regarding the suitability.
Let us now turn to some properties of optimal benchmark schemes that we later com-
pare to those of the main setup. For future reference, we introduce the following partial
order: Type θ ∈ Θ dominates type θ˜ ∈ Θ whenever type θ is “better” than θ˜ in one di-
mension and not worse in the remaining dimension.26 Then, we may conclude:
26Formally, consider the linear order b to refer to “better” realizations: regarding costs c b c and
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Corollary 3.1. Any optimal scheme of the benchmark setup has the following properties:
i) If a seller’s announced type is dominated by her competitor’s report, then she never wins.
ii) The principal optimally buys from sellers with a good signal more often than from those
with a bad signal: E
[
qci1,θj |θi = ci1
]
> E
[
qci0,θj |θi = ci0
]
, ci ∈ {c, c}.
Since the buyer optimally chooses high cost sellers with a good match more often than
those with a bad signal, c1 sellers necessarily obtain higher rents than c0 sellers. Pre-
cisely this rent differential creates problems when the buyer does not know which
version is best. As we see in the next section, this may force the buyer to sometimes
trade with high cost sellers even when they are unlikely to offer the right alternative.
3.4 Optimal Procurement Schemes
If the buyer does not know the match signal, the sellers may misreport their type not
only with respect to costs but also concerning the suitability of their good.27 Dispos-
ing of less information than in the benchmark setup, the buyer will be able to extract
weakly less surplus than in the benchmark setup. As argued in the introduction, rents
that are paid in order to elicit costs make it more difficult to induce sellers to reveal
their suitability information truthfully. Thus, in order to exclude uninteresting cases
where a buyer would never hire high cost sellers even if she knew the sellers’ match
signals, we assume for the rest of the chapter that pic1,0 > δ
αc
αc
.
Since both the surplus and the set of transaction probabilities is compact, we know
that profit maximizing schemes always exist.28 According to the following lemma, the
most effective way to elicit the information on suitability is to concede rents only if
both sellers report consistent signals.29
Lemma 3.2. There always exists an optimal scheme that entails zero rents whenever the re-
regarding signals, 1 b 0. Then, θ dominates θ˜ if c b c˜ and x b x˜ with at least one relation being strict.
For example, c0 dominates c0 but not c1.
27A seller can either misrepresent her cost or her match signal or both.
28Clearly, the buyer can guarantee an expected profit of at least 0. The set of (non-negative) rent
payments that result in non-negative expected profits is also compact.
29Conceding rents only in case of consistent reports is strictly optimal in case horizontal or diagonal
incentive constraints are binding.
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ported signals are inconsistent: rθi,θj = 0 if xi + xj 6= 1.
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
Intuitively, if a seller misreports her suitability signal while the rival reports truthfully,
then it is likely that the announced signals will be inconsistent due to their correlation.
Paying no rents in this case thus reduces the incentives to misrepresent the suitability
signal. Following Lemma 3.2 we can restrict attention to schemes that involve positive
rents only when consistent suitability signals are announced. Since all players are risk
neutral, we may summarize any optimal scheme by the expected rents Rθi ≡ E[rθi,θ˜j |θi]
that a seller of type θi obtains.30
The key difficulty of multidimensional adverse selection models lies in identifying the
set of constraints that are binding at the optimum together with the associated partition
of the parameter space.31 While our discrete type space allows us to explicitly solve for
optimal allocations, there are numerous cases that may distract from the economically
relevant insights. Thus, we defer a full description to Appendix A3.2 and focus here
instead on important properties. The following Proposition identifies three classes of
solutions:
Proposition 3.1. Optimal procurement schemes can be grouped into three classes according
to the binding incentive constraints as shown in Figure 3.3.32 The sellers’ expected rents are
determined by equations (3.7)-(3.10).
30Due to risk neutrality, the expected rent Rθi ≡ E[rθi ,θ˜j |θi] is a sufficient statistic for the payoff of all
players with respect to the rent payments r(·) obtained for consistent reports.
31See e.g. Armstrong and Rochet (1999), Armstrong 2000, Rochet and Stole 2003.
32A binding constraint means that the associated Lagrange multiplier is positive. In some cases the mul-
tipliers are not unique. However, for all parameter values, there is a set of multipliers that corresponds
to one of the classes shown in Figure 3.3. Additional incentive constraints may hold with equality, but
they are not binding in the sense that ignoring them does not change the solution.
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R∗c0 = max
0, δ(1+ γ2)γ2 ∑
θj∈Θj
αc0,θj
[
q∗c1,θj − q∗c0,θj
] (3.7)
R∗c1 =
1− γ2
1+ γ2
R∗c0 (3.8)
R∗c0 = ∑
θj∈Θj
δαθj|0q
∗
c1,θj +
1− γ2
1+ γ2
R∗c1 (3.9)
R∗c1 = ∑
θj∈Θj
δαθj|1q
∗
c1,θj + R
∗
c1 (3.10)
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
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Figure 3.3: Binding incentive constraints of optimal procurement schemes
Not knowing any information about adequacy forces the buyer to ensure that the sell-
ers have no incentives to exaggerate their suitability signal.33 In the benchmark setup,
the buyer procures from high cost sellers with a good signal more often than from
those with a bad signal since a seller’s gross profit pi increases in the own signal and
decreases in that of the rival. As a higher probability of winning also implies higher
rents, low cost sellers with a bad signal strictly prefer to announce type c1 than c0.
Thus, in order to maintain the same transaction rule as in an optimal scheme of the
benchmark setup, the principal would need to concede higher rents especially to c0
sellers. Starting from an optimal scheme of the benchmark setup, the principal may
save rents when committing to buying more often from c0 sellers and less often from
c1 sellers. Indeed, since low cost sellers strictly prefer to imitate a c1 agent, slightly
increasing the payoffs of low cost sellers when pretending to be of type c0 does not
33It is easy to verify that optimal procurement schemes of the benchmark setup violate the (c0→ c1)
constraint for all admissible parameter values.
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necessitate higher rents. This illustrates the trade-off between buying more often the
adequate good and economizing on rents.
This trade-off is formally embodied in the result that the diagonal incentive constraint
(c0 → c1) binds in any optimal scheme.34 At first sight, it seems surprising that the
horizontal constraints (c0→ c1) and (c0→ c1) do not bind. Intuitively, (c0→ c1) does
not bind since a high cost seller cannot earn more rents by exaggerating the adequacy
of the own good in order to trade more often. The reason why a c0 seller prefers to
pretend to be c1 rather than c1 at the optimum is less obvious: Clearly, the principal
has to concede rents to c1 sellers because of their private cost information. However,
the principal optimally grants these rents only in case of consistent reports according to
Lemma 3.2, which makes it is unlikely that seller c0 will earn rents after misreporting
her signal. In contrast, if the principal buys the good after inconsistent reports, then it
is likely that seller c0 obtains rents from selling the good after announcing to be of type
c1. Therefore, at the optimum, if the diagonal incentive constraint (c0 → c1) holds,
sellers have no incentive to exaggerate their signal.
According to Proposition 3.1, optimal schemes can be grouped into three classes of
solutions that differ in the set of binding incentive constraints. The solution classes
summarize how much weight the principal optimally puts on the suitability signals.
Figure 3.4 qualitatively summarizes for which parameter values these classes arise.
If the incremental value of the superior alternative or the base payoff is low (i.e.
αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {0,pic0,1}) − δαc < 0), then optimal schemes belong to class I.35 In
this class, c0 sellers are hired relatively often so that c0 sellers find it equally tempting
to either announce type c0 or c1. Intuitively, since the buyer has to concede enough
rents to sellers so as to deter them from reporting any other type, this balanced allo-
cation allows him to save on rents. Indeed, procuring more often from c1 sellers at
the detriment of c0 sellers would break the indifference and increase the induced rent
payments to all low cost sellers. No upward constraints are binding and no rents have
to be conceded to high cost sellers, since schemes of this class entail c0 sellers to be
hired often enough. In particular, the buyer prefers to trade with a low cost seller if
34In addition, the vertical incentive constraint (c1 → c1) binds in any optimal scheme, for the same
reason as in the benchmark case.
35The boundaries of the solution classes are proved in Appendix A3.1.
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Figure 3.4: Solution classes
one agent announces c0 and the second agent reports c1. Indeed, any solution of this
class satisfies ∑θj∈Θj αθj|0
[
qc1,θj − qc0,θj
]
< 0, which implies that high cost sellers obtain
zero rents according to equations (3.7) and (3.8).
Solutions of class II obtain if the suitability is of intermediate importance, that is when-
ever αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {pic0,1, 0}) − δαc > 0, and αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
) − δαc < 0. In
schemes of this class, high cost agents that announce a good signal sell their good more
often than those with a bad signal. Low cost sellers therefore find it more tempting to
pretend to be of type c1 rather than c0 as illustrated in Figure 3.3(b). Accordingly,
buying from c1 sellers is expensive at the margin, since this necessitates further rent
payments both to c1 and to c0 sellers. By the same reasoning as above no rents have to
be conceded to high cost sellers.
The third class obtains if the appropriate alternative is important, i.e. whenever
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 −max
{
pic0,1, 0
}) − δαc > 0. In this case, the principal would like to put
a high weight on the suitability signals. However, as the buyer further increases the
chances that c1 agents win at the detriment of c0 sellers, the upward incentive con-
straints (c0 → c0) and (c1 → c0) start to bind as shown in Figure 3.3(c). There are
two subclasses: If the right alternative is not extremely important, or the base surplus
is relatively low,36 then the buyer commits to an allocation that assures that c0 agents
36Formally, this subclass obtains if pic1,0− δ
((
α0|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
+
αc
αc
)
−max
{
pic0,1 + δ
(
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
; 0
}
< 0.
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win often enough, that is ∑θj∈Θj αθj|0
[
qc1,θj − qc0,θj
]
= 0. According to equations (3.7)
and (3.8) such an allocation avoids that rents have have to be conceded to high cost
sellers. If the adequacy is extremely important and the base surplus is high enough,37
the principal optimally buys from the seller that is likely to offer the superior alterna-
tive whenever two consistent signals are announced. Putting so much weight on the
suitability signal means that c0 agents do not often sell their good but still have to ob-
tain high rents to ensure truth-telling. This makes it attractive for high cost sellers to
pretend being of type c0. Thus, positive rents also have to be conceded to high cost
sellers, which necessitates even higher rents for low cost sellers. This circular character
of binding incentive constraints as shown in Figure 3.3(c) means that buying from c1
sellers is extremely costly at the margin. Optimal schemes of this kind heavily rely on
the correlation between the signals: Since misreporting the suitability signal is likely
to produce a profile of inconsistent signals and because the sellers obtain positive rents
only when reporting consistent signals, truthful revelation may be ensured if the rents
are high enough.38 Therefore, as the signals’ precision and thus their correlation in-
crease, implementing a given optimal transaction scheme q∗ requires to concede less
rents to high cost sellers. Compared to the literature on adverse selection, where opti-
mal contracts usually entail that at least some agents cannot improve on their outside
option, our result that all types may obtain a strictly positive rent seems remarkable.
The discussion thus far suggests that adverse selection with respect to the adequacy
induces the principal to trade less often with sellers that announce a good signal and
instead to buy more often from sellers that have reported a bad signal. Indeed, the
following proposition confirms this important result.
Proposition 3.2. Compared to the benchmark setup, optimal transaction probabilities are
generically
i) weakly lower for high cost sellers that report a good suitability signal: q∗c1,θj ≤ qBMc1,θj ∀θj,
ii) weakly higher for high cost sellers that report a bad suitability signal: q∗c0,θj ≥ qBMc0,θj ∀θj,
iii) weakly higher for low cost sellers that report a bad suitability signal: q∗c0,θj ≥ qBMc0,θj ∀θj
iv) and unchanged for low cost sellers that report a good suitability signal q∗c1,θj = q
BM
c1,θj
∀θj.
37Formally, this subclass obtains if pic1,0− δ
((
α0|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
+
αc
αc
)
−max
{
pic0,1 + δ
(
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
; 0
}
> 0.
38The correlation between signals makes it possible to implement allocations even though there are
closed paths that violate condition (3.1) in Rochet and Stole (2003).
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Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
Proposition 3.2 relies on the binding incentive constraints as shown in Figure 3.3. As
already discussed, buying from c1 sellers more often than from c0 sellers necessitates
higher rents compared to a more balanced allocation. Moreover, trading sufficiently
often with low cost sellers with a bad signal helps to mitigate the circularity problem
mentioned above. Hence, compared to the benchmark setup where these considera-
tions are not relevant, the product is less often procured from high cost sellers with a
good signal.
Regarding c1 and c0 sellers, the additional distortions caused by the desire to elicit the
suitability signals have the same direction as those caused by the sellers’ private cost
information in the benchmark setup. Compared to the socially optimal allocation, the
winning probabilities of c1 sellers are therefore clearly distorted downwards and those
of c0 sellers are distorted upwards. The transaction probabilities of c1 sellers are not
distorted, since the buyer trades with these sellers as often as possible.
Since there is more trade with c0 sellers than in the benchmark setup according to
Proposition 3.2, is it possible that these sellers are hired inefficiently often? This pos-
sibility seems surprising at first glance since the private cost information induces the
buyer to distort the transaction probabilities of high cost sellers downwards as dis-
cussed in section 3.3. The next corollary identifies conditions where this is indeed the
case:
Corollary 3.2. Suppose the base surplus is sufficiently large, namely S > δαc −
(2γ3+γ2+1)η
(γ2+1)
and the superior alternative is sufficiently unimportant, that is ηδ <
αc
αcγ
. If both sellers an-
nounce a high cost and one seller is less likely to provide the superior alternative, the prin-
cipal buys with a positive probability from the agent whose type is dominated by the rival’s:
q∗c0,c1 > 0.
Proof. Follows directly from Solution I,a and Solution II,b of Appendix A3.2.
Corollary 3.2 examines a situation where the importance of the superior alternative
is small compared to the cost uncertainty. In order to economize on rents, the buyer
commits to trading sometimes with a c0 seller even though the competitor is more
CHAPTER 3. Contracting with Specialized Agents 116
likely to deliver the superior alternative at the same cost. Clearly this choice is not
socially optimal, since the gross surplus of a dominated type lies always below that
of her competitor. Moreover, this differs from the solution of the benchmark setup,
where the principal never buys from dominated sellers even when η becomes very
small. In Appendix A3.2 we show that if the base payoff is high enough, then it even
becomes optimal for the buyer to commit to ignoring the suitability signals whenever
both sellers announce high costs, that is q∗c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 1/2. It is readily verified that in
this case, the total expected rent conceded to the sellers is the same as in the benchmark
setup.
Now we turn to another polar case where the importance of the superior alternative is
relatively high compared to the cost uncertainty. In this situation, rents that the sellers
could earn in the benchmark setup are relatively small compared to the incremental
value of the superior alternative. Therefore, we expect that the principal gives priority
to buy from the best suited seller, even though this necessitates high rents in order to
elicit the private suitability information:
Corollary 3.3. Suppose the base payoff and the incremental value of the superior alternative are
sufficiently high: S ≥ 12
[
(1+2αcγ2−γ2)(1+γ2)δ
γ2αc(1−γ2) − η
]
+ δ and ηδ >
(1+γ2)2
4γ3αcαc
− (1+γ2)2γ . Then the
optimal winning probabilities coincide with the benchmark setup (q∗θi,θj = q
BM
θi,θj
) and whenever
one seller is likely to offer the superior alternative, she is selected to deliver the good: q∗ci1,cj0 =
1 ∀ci, cj. Positive rents have to be paid to all sellers: R∗θi > 0 ∀θi ∈ Θ.
Proof. Follows directly from Solution III,d of Appendix A3.2 and from Lemma 3.1.
While Corollary 3.3 presents a situation where asymmetric information regarding the
adequacy does not affect the allocation of the task, the buyer has to concede much
higher rents than in the benchmark setting in order to elicit the private information.
Corollary 3.3 is also useful to illustrate that the private information about suitability
is only valuable as long as there is cost uncertainty. As the degree of cost uncertainty
diminishes (δ → 0), the rents R∗θi for all types θi also vanish since equations (3.10)-
(3.7) are proportional to δ. Clearly, when the rent payments tend to zero, the principal
optimally implements the efficient allocation. So in our model private suitability infor-
mation may be socially harmful only to the degree that firms also possess private cost
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information.
Exclusion of high cost sellers
This section serves to analyze how private information concerning the right alternative
may induce the buyer to exclude high cost sellers. The following proposition aims at
situations where the surplus created by high cost sellers is low compared to the cost
uncertainty.
Proposition 3.3. The set of parameters that leads to a complete exclusion of high cost sellers
(i.e. q∗cxi,θj = 0 ∀xi ∈ {0, 1} , θj ∈ Θ) is strictly larger than in the benchmark setup.
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
Completely barring high cost sellers allows the buyer to extract the sellers’ information
regarding the suitability at no cost. Indeed, if the principal never buys from high cost
sellers, then low cost agents cannot earn rents by misrepresenting their cost. Therefore,
sellers have no incentive to improve their chances of selling their product by announc-
ing a good suitability signal. By committing to not buying from high cost sellers, the
principal may thus extract the entire surplus, as in the benchmark setup. In contrast,
any optimal allocation of the benchmark setup in which the principal sometimes buys
from high cost sellers requires higher rents when the principal also has to elicit the ad-
equacy signals. Hence, not buying from any high cost seller is optimal for a larger set
of parameters. Excessive exclusion as pointed out by Proposition 3.3 is always socially
inefficient, since the transaction probabilities for high cost sellers are already distorted
downwards in the benchmark setup.
As an example, suppose that pic1,0 >
δαc
αc
and pic0,0 < 0. Then the optimal scheme of the
benchmark setup entails qBMc1,c0 = 1 and q
BM
c0,c0 = 0. Suppose now that the principal does
not know the suitability signals. If additionally pic1,0 <
δαc
αc
(
1+ 1−γ
2
1+γ2
)
, then the gross
surplus pic1,0 does not warrant the higher expected rents that have to be conceded in
order to elicit the suitability information. Since pic0,0 < 0 and therefore pic1,1 < 0, any
optimal scheme excludes high cost sellers.
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Not buying any good after inconsistent reports
Another possibility to economize on rents is not to trade when both sellers claim
to provide the superior alternative at high costs. In the benchmark setup, if the
buyer observes that both sellers obtain a good signal, then the only consequence is
that the belief regarding the sellers’ adequacy remains unchanged. When the buyer
has to elicit the suitability information, buying from high cost sellers when both sell-
ers announce to be well suited creates an attractive opportunity for c0 sellers to earn
rents. Formally, we know from Proposition 3.1 that the diagonal incentive constraint
(c0 → c1) always binds at the optimum. Similar to Section 3.3, we may define the
virtual value that accounts for the expected rents needed to assure truthful revela-
tion. The virtual value of a c1 seller when both sellers make the same announcement
is ψ∗c1,1 = pic1,1 − δαcαc
(
1+ λ∗c0→c1
α1|0
α1|1
)
where λ∗c0→c1 is the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the (c0 → c1) constraint.39 The term α1|0α1|1 =
1+γ2
1−γ2 reflects that the reports
are more likely to be inconsistent if one seller exaggerates her signal than if both re-
port sincerely. As the signals’ precision γ augments, the afore-mentioned likelihood
ratio increases, which suggests that trading with c1 sellers after an inconsistent report
becomes even more costly. The next proposition establishes that λ∗c0→c1 remains suffi-
ciently high when the signals are very precise, so that it never pays to hire a high cost
seller when both competitors claim to be well suited.40
Proposition 3.4. If the suitability signals are precise enough, then the buyer optimally commits
to not buying any product whenever both sellers announce high costs and a good signal: There
exists a γ(η, αc, δ) < 1 so that γ ≥ γ(η, αc, δ) implies q∗c1,c1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
The virtual value ψ∗c1,1 of a c1 seller when both competitors claim to sell well suited
products is positive whenever the gross surplus pic1,1 outweighs the additional ex-
pected rents that have to be conceded. It can be shown that along the curve of pa-
rameters where this virtual profit is zero, the multiplier λ∗c0→c1 increases as choosing
39Note that in contrast to the benchmark case, the Lagrange multipliers now depend on the solution.
40Note however, that if the sellers’ signals are not very precise, i.e. for γ < 1/
√
3, then q∗c1,c1 may
increase in γ. This may only occur if rents are paid to all sellers since in this case λ∗c0→c1 =
1+γ2
2βγ2 may be
more elastic than 1+γ
2
1−γ2 with respect to γ.
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the superior alternative becomes more important. Therefore, the required gross sur-
plus pic1,1 to make it worthwhile to trade with an c1 seller after an inconsistent report
increases in η. Since the required gross surplus is constant in the benchmark setup,
we can infer that concerning q∗c1,c1, the distortion from having to elicit the suitability
information increases as buying the appropriate alternative becomes more important.
3.5 Discussion
In this section we revisit some of the modeling assumptions and discuss alternatives.
Exactly one seller provides the appropriate alternative
Thus far, we have supposed that exactly one seller provides an adequate alternative
which seems plausible in a number of situations and is commonly assumed in the lit-
erature.41 Now we examine the optimal procurement scheme under the alternative
assumption that the suitability of both alternatives is not correlated at all. We will
see that the results are qualitatively robust up to the difference that the set of imple-
mentable allocations becomes constrained and that high cost sellers always obtain zero
rents.
We assume that each sellers’ alternative suits the principal’s needs with probability
α1, independent of the competitor’s adequacy.42 Since there is no correlation between
sellers any more, we can assume without loss of generality that the agents are perfectly
informed about the suitability of their products. The gross surplus depends now solely
on the seller’s type so that piθi ≡ S− ci + xiη. The incentive constraints simplify to
41Our reasoning does not rely on perfect correlation and goes through if there is (negative) correlation
at all. Assuming negative correlation seems plausible whenever a rare event triggers the need of some
service. For example, falling ill is a rather rare event. Conditional on being sick, it is very unlikely to
have two diseases at the same time. Suppose now there are only two diseases, which can be cured by
different treatments. Conditional on being sick, the event of needing one treatment and the event of
needing the other treatment are highly negatively correlated.
Regarding further literature, for example Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) also assume that ex-
actly one alternative matches each customer’s needs. Spacial models of product differentiation (See e.g.
Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992), Chapter 4) are based on a similar idea.
42Thus, sometimes both alternatives may be adequate and sometimes none.
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Rθi ≥ Rθˆi + (cˆi − ci)Qθˆi ∀θi, θˆi ∈ Θ , (3.11)
where Qθˆi ≡ E
[
qθˆi,θj
]
is the probability of selling the item and Rθˆi ≡ E
[
rθˆi,θj
]
is the
expected rent conditional on reporting type θˆi. Due to the risk-neutrality of all players,
the behavior of the sellers now depends exclusively on the expected probabilities Qθˆi
and on the expected rents Rθˆi .
43 Therefore we may summarize any scheme by these
two variables. Since the principal cannot exploit the correlation of the signals any
more, the set of implementable schemes is now restricted as follows:
Lemma 3.3. Any implementable scheme entails Qcx ≤ Qcy ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Adding up the incentive constraints (cx → cy), (cy → cy) and (cy → cx) yields
the result.
Lemma 3.3 points out a big difference compared to Section 3.4: The principal cannot
implement schemes with Qc1 > Qc0 any more. Clearly, as the adequacy becomes more
important (η high), the difference pic1 − pic0 increases, suggesting that the principal
would prefer to buy from c1 sellers rather than from c0 ones. In this case, the restriction
stated by Lemma 3.3 becomes relevant.
In order to concisely characterize the optimal procurement schemes, we introduce the
linear order defined as follows: If θ˜  θ, then whenever seller i reports θ˜ while seller
j announces θ and the principal buys at all, he buys from seller i, that is qU∗
θ,θ˜
= 0.44
Similarly, θ˜ ∼ θ means that whenever seller i reports θ˜ while seller j announces θ
and the principal buys at all, then he buys from both sellers with equal probability.
Note that once the types from which the principal does not buy are fixed, each order
uniquely pins down the expected probabilities Q. Similar to Proposition 3.1, we get:
Proposition 3.5. The optimal procurement schemes QU∗ can be grouped into three classes
according to the binding incentive constraints as shown in Figure 3.3. In solution class I, II
and III, the principal buys according to the priority c1  c0  c1 ∼ c0, c1  c0  c1  c0
and c1  c0 ∼ c1  c0, respectively. The sellers’ expected rents are
43 In particular, there is no point in rewarding consistent reports.
44The subscript U∗ denotes an optimal value of this setup.
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RU∗c1 = R
U∗
c0 = δQ
U∗
c1 , (3.12)
RU∗c1 = R
U∗
c0 = 0 . (3.13)
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
In the proof of Proposition 3.5 we completely characterize the optimal procurement
schemes and the boundaries of the solution classes.
The economic intuition of the optimal procurement schemes remains basically un-
changed. When the importance of choosing an appropriate good is low (class I), the
principal commits to ignore the adequacy signal of high cost sellers. For intermediate
values of η (class II), he gives priority to the sellers’ costs and buys from a seller with a
good signal in case both sellers announce the same costs. If the principal values a well
suited good much more than an inappropriate one (class III), he gives as much priority
to the signal as is implementable.
There are two main differences compared to Proposition 3.1. First, the virtual value
ψU∗θi that accounts for the induced rents of buying from a seller with type θi does not
depend on the competitor’s announcement any more. This reduces the number of
different optimal schemes compared to section 3.4.45 Second, as already pointed out
by Lemma 3.3, allocations that give priority to the suitability signal are not imple-
mentable any more. High cost sellers never obtain rents, since precisely the allocations
that would have required to concede strictly positive rents to high cost agents in the
setup with correlated signals are not implementable any more.
Discrete type space
Assuming that the actual costs and the signals are drawn from a 2-by-2 discrete type
space is a strong simplifying assumption and a concession to technical difficulties
in multidimensional environments. Unfortunately, this assumption leads to optimal
45For example, if qU∗θi ,θj > 0 for θi 6= θj, then generically also qU∗θi ,θi > 0. Solution I,b of the main model,
presented in Appendix A3.2, violates this property.
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schemes that are discontinuous in the underlying parameters and therefore difficult to
present. This problem was also encountered in related work by Armstrong and Rochet
(1999), Armstrong (2000) or Asker and Cantillon (2010).
Armstrong (2000) points out that there is a lack of general solution techniques for gen-
eral distributions of values. He presumes that beyond a discrete type space probably
“numerical simulations (...) will provide the the most tractable method of generating
further insights” [Armstrong (2000)]. As a robustness check, it would be certainly use-
ful to apply numerical simulations on a version of our model with continuous types.46
We thus see our model as a first step to highlight new trade-offs that may arise in a
setting of multidimensional private information.
Collusion
One issue which we have not addressed so far is collusion among the sellers. An im-
portant element of the discussed optimal procurement schemes is that rents are only
paid in case the sellers report consistent signals. If the sellers observe inconsistent
signals and they can credibly communicate this information, then they can clearly im-
prove on their payoff if one seller misrepresents her signal. In that case, the second
seller does not have an incentive to further deviate with respect to the suitability sig-
nal, as this would again produce an inconsistent profile of signals. This suggests that
the optimal schemes are likely to be vulnerable to collusion even if the sellers cannot
commit to collusive reports among themselves. Therefore, this issue should be inves-
tigated in future research.
46Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996) examine a related model with buyers that may differ both
in their valuation as well as in the externality they impose on others. They assume that both the valu-
ation and the externality is continuously distributed but uncorrelated across bidders. In this setup, the
expected winning probability conditional on a bidder’s type must be constant in the externality. Both
the adequacy in our model as well as the externality in Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996) does not
enter in the bidder’s utility. Hence, we reckon that in a version of our model with uncorrelated adequacy
and continuously distributed costs, any feasible mechanism exhibits a constant probability of trade in
the sellers’ adequacy. Yet, we believe that if the costs are continuously distributed and the adequacy is
negatively correlated as in our base model, the probability of trade need not be constant in the sellers’
adequacy.
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Value of commitment
The ability to commit is particularly valuable for the principal because of the sellers’
private suitability information. If an outcome of the procurement mechanism is ex-
post inefficient, the buyer has to resist the temptation to renegotiate.47 To see that
uncertainty concerning the adequacy increases the ex-post inefficiency of the optimal
mechanism, consider first the case where both sellers provide goods that are equally
suited and whose costs are drawn from the same distribution. In this case, the princi-
pal optimally buys from the seller with the highest positive virtual value as defined in
section 3.3. Provided that buying from some seller is always optimal, the mechanism
is ex-post efficient since the principal always procures from the seller with the lowest
costs. If the goods differ in their adequacy, but the principal knows the sellers’ signals
as in our benchmark setup, then the principal may inefficiently commit to buying from
low cost sellers with a bad signal rather than from high cost sellers with a good sig-
nal. If the principal does not know the sellers’ signals, then there is a further tendency
to commit to buying inefficiently often from sellers with a bad signal as discussed in
section 3.4. As the allocation of the goods becomes less efficient, the private adequacy
information makes commitment more valuable since there is more temptation to rene-
gotiate.
Only potential sellers know the adequacy of their goods
So far, we have assumed that only potential sellers are informed about the principal’s
needs. If the costs to diagnose the customer’s needs and to acquire the knowledge
of the alternative products are low compared to the cost uncertainty, then it may be
advantageous to consult a third party expert who does not benefit from selling the
credence good on which he gives advice. Indeed, in practice, we often observe that
experts that advise the buyer are not allowed to serve additionally as suppliers. Our
model can be easily extended to account for the possibility to resort to third party
experts. Suppose there is an expert that may incur a verifiable diagnosis cost of cD in
order to learn the adequacy signals of both sellers. The principal may make a take-it-
47See e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2002), sections 2.13 and 9.4 for a survey.
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or-leave-it offer and propose a wage for finding out the adequacy signals (which will
be cD). Denote the principal’s expected maximized payoff of the benchmark and the
main setup by UBM∗p and U∗p , respectively. Then it is optimal to hire an expert if the
diagnosis cost is sufficiently small, that is cD < UBM∗p −U∗p .
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that rents which arise due to cost uncertainty may induce special-
ized sellers to excessively recommend the alternative they are specialized in. Adverse
incentives of sellers to exaggerate the adequacy of their services may be mitigated by
rewarding them for admitting a bad signal or by committing to taking their recom-
mendations less into account than would be efficient. If the principal’s payoff of the
alternative versions does not differ too much, the need to concede additional informa-
tion rents has negative effects on the allocative efficiency.
We conclude our study with an example of how our results can be applied. Before hir-
ing management consultancies, it is common practice that clients invite various com-
petitors to present suggestions how to proceed. After the suggestions are made, the
client awards one consultancy with the project. In hope to acquire a profitable project,
consultancies often accept to carry out the introductory screening at low fares. But ex-
actly this practice exacerbates the adverse incentives of the consultancies to advocate
the own suggestion against better judgment. If the buyer deems the proper alternative
to be crucial, our results suggest that he should offer a remuneration in case the project
is finally not awarded to a consultancy.
In this chapter we have focused on optimal mechanisms that the buyer may design in
order to extract the sellers’ adequacy information in the presence of cost uncertainty. In
further research, it might be promising to analyze cost uncertainty in a credence goods
market equilibrium framework.
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A3.1 Appendix - Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Ignore the upward constraints (3.6) for the moment. In any optimal scheme the down-
ward constraints (3.5) must hold with equality since otherwise the expected payoff of
the principal could be increased by reducing the rents of low cost sellers accordingly.
For the same reason, rcxi,θj = 0 for all xi, θj. Combining this with the binding incentive
constraints (3.5) yields the expected rents of low cost firms. Inserting (3.5) with equal-
ity into (3.4) and rearranging yields Up = 2E
[
qθi,θjψ
BM
θi,xj
]
. From picxi,xj = picxi,xj + δ
follows qBMcxi,θj ≥ qBMcxi,θj . This inequality together with (3.5) holding with equality imply
that the upward constraints (3.6) are indeed satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
It suffices to show that for any implementable scheme (q, r) that leads to the expected
payoff Up, there is an alternative scheme (q, r˜) with the same transaction probabilities
q and r˜θi,θj = 0 whenever xi + xj 6= 1 that yields the same payoff.
Suppose (q, r) is a feasible scheme with rcixi,cjxj 6= 0 and xi + xj 6= 1 for some
(xi, xj) . Define the alternative rent scheme r˜ as follows:
αci1,c0r˜ci1,c0 = ∑
θj∈Θi
(
αci1,θjrci1,θj
)
∀ci ∈ {c, c} ,
r˜ci1,θj = 0 ∀ θj 6= c0,
αci0,c1r˜ci0,c1 = ∑
θj∈Θi
(
αci0,θjrci0,θj
)
∀ci ∈ {c, c} ,
r˜ci0,θj = 0 ∀ θj 6= c1 .
Since all incentive constraints are satisfied under the original scheme, we have
E
[
rθi,θj |θi
]
≥ E
[
rθˆi,θj + (cˆi − ci)qθˆi,θj |θi
]
∀θi, θˆi ∈ Θ .
By construction, if the agent truthfully reports her signal (xˆi = xi), then E
[
r˜θˆi,θj |θi
]
=
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E
[
rθˆi,θj |θi
]
. If instead cˆi ∈ {c, c}, xi = 0 and xˆi = 1, then
∑
θj∈Θi
αθj|0rcˆi1,θj ≥
α0|0
α0|1
∑
θj∈Θi
αθj|1rcˆi1,θj = αc0|0r˜cˆi1,c0
where the inequality comes from αθj|0 ≥
α0|0
α0|1
αθj|1, ∀θj ∈ Θ. Therefore,
E
[
r˜cˆi1i,θj |θi = ci0
]
≤ E
[
rcˆi1,θj |θi = ci0
]
. By the same reasoning, E
[
r˜cˆi0i,θj |θi = ci1
]
≤
E
[
rcˆi0,θj |θi = ci1
]
. Hence, the expected rents when misreporting the signal are weakly
lower, which ensures that the incentive constraints are still satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We first solve a relaxed problem where we ignore some incentive constraints and then
show that these constraints are satisfied at the optimum. The claim of the proposition is
directly implied by Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.7 which are established in what follows.
Consider the following relaxed problem R where we ignore all constraints except
(c1 → c1), (c0 → c1), (c0 → c0), (c1 → c0) and (c0 → c0) and express the prob-
lem in terms of expected rents Rθi under the assumption that rents are only positive
for consistent reports as implied by Lemma 3.2. The relaxed problemR is
max
q,R
∑
θ1
αθ1
[[
∑
θ2
αθ2|θ1piθ1,x2qθ1,θ2
]
− Rθ1
]
s.t.
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αc1
 ∑
θj∈Θ
(
δαθj|1qc1,θj
)
+ Rc1 − Rc1
 ≤ 0 (c1→ c1)
αc0
 ∑
θj∈Θ
(
δαθj|0qc1,θj
)
+ ϕRc1 − Rc0
 ≤ 0 (c0→ c1)
αc0
 ∑
θj∈Θ
(
δαθj|0qc0,θj
)
+ Rc0 − Rc0
 ≤ 0 (c0→ c0)
αc1 [ϕRc0 − Rc1] ≤ 0 (c1→ c0)
αc0
Rc0 − Rc0 − ∑
θj∈Θ
(
δαθj|0qc0,θj
) ≤ 0 (c0→ c0)
where ϕ ≡ α0|0α1|0 =
α1|1
α1|0
.
Lemma 3.4. The schemes given by Appendix A3.2 and (3.7)-(3.10) solve the problemR when
pic1,0 − δ αcαc > 0. The solutions are generically unique.
Proof. Define ψ∗c1,xj ≡ pic1,xj − δ
αc
αc
λ∗c1→c1 − δ
αc0|xj
αc1|xj
λ∗c0→c1, ψ
∗
c0,xj ≡ pic0,xj − δ
αc
αc
λ∗c0→c0
ψ∗c1,xj = pic1,xj and ψ
∗
c0,xj = pic0,xj + δ
αc
αc
λ∗c0→c0 for xj ∈ {0, 1}, where λ∗θ→θˆ is the
Lagrange multiplier (or dual variable) of the incentive constraint (θ → θˆ). Fix
λ∗c1→c1 = 1 which assures that the FOC for Rc1 ≥ 0, is satisfied. After eliminating
the dual variables for the resource constraints, the first order conditions for qθi,θj = 0,
qθi,θj ∈ (0, 1) and qθi,θj = 1 with θi 6= θj can be written as ψ∗θi,xj −max
{
0,ψ∗θj,xi
}
≤ 0,
ψ∗θi,xj −max
{
0,ψ∗θj,xi
}
= 0 and ψ∗θi,xj −max
{
0,ψ∗θj,xi
}
≥ 0, respectively. Similarly,
the first order conditions for qθi,θi = 0, qθi,θi ∈ (0, 1/2) and qθi,θi = 1/2 boil down to
ψ∗θi,xi ≤ 0, ψ∗θi,xi = 0 and ψ∗θi,xi ≥ 0, respectively. Since both the constraints and the
objective function are linear, the FOCs are sufficient for an global maximum by the Op-
timality Condition Theorem [Luenberger and Ye (2008, p. 45)]. Moreover, by the same
Theorem, a solution entails a strict maximum in the interior of the boundaries given
below.
By the definition above and the property of pi, generally ψ∗c0,0 > ψ∗c0,1, ψ
∗
c1,0 > ψ
∗
c1,1,
ψ∗cx,x > ψ∗cx,x, x ∈ {0, 1} and ψ∗c1,0 > ψ∗c,1. The first order conditions thus imply q∗c1,c1 =
q∗c0,c0 = q∗c0,c1 = 0. Moreover, the FOCs imply that q
∗
c1,c1 = 1/2 and q
∗
c1,c1 = 1 if pic1,1 > 0
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and q∗c1,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 = 0 if pic1,1 < 0.
Case 1: Solve the problem for αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {pic0,1, 0})− δαc ≤ 0. Note that pic1,0−
δ
αc
αc
> 0 and αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {pic0,1, 0})− δαc ≤ 0 imply pic0,1 > 0.
Define λ∗c1→c0 = 0, λ
∗
c0→c0 = 0, λ∗c0→c1 = min
{
αc1,0
(
pic1,0−δ αcαc
)
δαc0,0
; (pic1,0 − pic0,1) αc1,0δαc
}
and
λ∗c0→c0 = 1− λ∗c0→c1 which guarantees that ψ∗c1,0 ≥ ψ∗c0,1 with equality if ψ∗c1,0 ≥ 0. Note
that λ∗c0→c1 ∈ [0, 1] due to pic1,0 − δ αcαc > 0 and αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {pic0,1, 0})− δαc ≤ 0.
By the properties of pi we have the following order: ψ∗c1,0 > ψ
∗
c1,1 = ψ
∗
c0,0 > ψ
∗
c0,1.
Besides, pic0,1 > 0 implies ψ∗c0,1 > 0. By construction ψ
∗
c1,0 > 0 implies that ψ
∗
c1,0 =
ψ∗c0,1 < pic0,1 < ψ
∗
c1,0. So we have ψ
∗
c0,1 > ψ
∗
c1,0 ≥ ψ∗c0,1. Thus necessarily q∗c0,c1 = q∗c1,c0 =
q∗c1,c0 = q
∗
cx,cx = 1, q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 0 and q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = 1/2.
By complementary slackness, λ∗c0→cxi > 0 for xi ∈ {0, 1} requires that (c0 → c1) and
(c0→ c1) hold with equality. Subtracting (c0 → c1) from (c0→ c1) and simplifying
yields α0,0
[
q∗c1,c0 − q∗c0,c0
]
+ α1,0
[
q∗c1,c1 − q∗c0,c1
]
= 0.
Consider first the sub-case ψ∗c0,c1 ≤ 0: Then by the considerations above, ψ∗c1,c0 = 0 and
ψ∗c1,c1 ≤ 0 so that the FOCs for q∗c1,c1 = q∗c0,c1 = 0 are satisfied. If additionally ψ∗c0,c0 < 0
, then also q∗c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c0 = 0; if instead ψ
∗
c0,c0 ≥ 0, then q∗c1,c0 = q∗c0,c0 = 1/2 satisfies the
associated FOCs, which corresponds to Solution I, c in Appendix A3.2.
Consider now ψ∗c0,c1 ≥ 0, which implies ψ∗c0,c0 > ψ∗c0,c1 = ψ∗c1,c0 > ψ∗c1,c1. Together with
q∗c1,c0 + q
∗
c0,c1 ≤ 1 this pins down the transaction probabilities q∗c1,c0, q∗c0,c1, q∗c1,c1 and
q∗c0,c0 = 1/2 for Solutions I, a (ψ∗c1,c1 > 0 implies q
∗
c1,c1 = 1/2) and I, b (ψ
∗
c1,c1 < 0 implies
q∗c1,c1 = 0).
It is readily verified that for these allocations and for the rents given by (3.7)-(3.10) the
incentive constraints (c1 → c1), (c0 → c1) and (c0 → c0) hold with equality so that
we may indeed use positive multipliers. Since R∗c1 = R
∗
c0 = 0, (c1 → c0) holds with
equality (but does not bind since λ∗c1→c0 = 0). Moreover, it is readily verified that the
solution satisfies (c0→ c0).
Case 2: Solve the problem when αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {pic0,1, 0}) − δαc ≥ 0 and
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δαc ≤ 0 holds. Note that subtracting the second condition from
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0 yields pic0,1 ≥ 0 which implies ψ∗c0,1 ≥ 0.
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Define λ∗c0→c0 = 0, λ∗c0→c1 = 1, λ
∗
c1→c0 = 0 and λ
∗
c0→c0 = 0 which implies ψ∗c0,1 = pic0,1
and ψ∗c1,0 = (pic1,0) − δαcαc1|0 ≥ max
{
ψ∗c0,1, 0
}
. By the properties of pi and the defini-
tion of ψ∗, we also have the following order: ψ∗c1,0 > ψ
∗
c1,1 = ψ
∗
c0,0 > ψ
∗
c0,1 ≥ 0.
Thus the FOCs for q∗c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
cx,cx = 1, q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = 1/2,
q∗c0,c1 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 0 are satisfied.
If ψ∗c1,1 = αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc ≥ 0, then ψ∗c0,0 > ψ∗c1,1 ≥ 0 so that the FOCs for q∗c1,c1 =
q∗c0,c0 = 1/2 hold. This corresponds to Solution I I, a in Appendix A3.2.
If ψ∗c1,1 ≤ 0 and , then the FOC for q∗c1,c1 = 0 holds. If pic0,0 ≥ 0 and pic0,0 ≤ 0, then the
FOC for q∗c0,c0 = 1/2 and q∗c0,c0 = 0, respectively, holds. This is Solution I I, b.
It is readily verified that for these allocations and for the rents uniquely given by (3.7)-
(3.10) , the incentive constraints (c1 → c1) and (c0 → c1) hold with equality and that
the remaining constraints (c0→ c0), (c0→ c0) and (c1→ c0) are satisfied.
Case 3: Solve the problem for αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
) − δαc ≥ 0, αc0|0pic0,1 + αc1|0pic1,0 −
δαc ≥ 0 and pic1,0 − pic0,1 − δ
((
α0|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
+
αc
αc
+
(
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
))
≤ 0. Define
λ∗c0→c1 = 1 +
αc1|0(pic1,0−pic0,1)−δαc
δ(αc1|0+αc0|0)
, λ∗c0→c0 = 0, λ∗c0→c0 =
αc
αc
(
λ∗c0→c1 − 1
)
≥ 0 and
λ∗c1→c0 = max
{(
λ∗c0→c0 − 1
)
α0|1
α1|1
, 0
}
. These multipliers are constructed to assure
that ψ∗c0,1 = ψ
∗
c1,0 which implies ψ
∗
c1,0 > ψ
∗
c0,1. Inserting these multipliers yields
ψ∗c0,1 =
αc0|0pic0,1+αc1|0pic1,0−δαc
(αc1|0+αc0|0)
so that ψ∗c1,0 = pic1,0 > ψ
∗
c0,1. Moreover, the condition
αc0|0pic0,1 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0 implies ψ∗c0,1 ≥ 0 and therefore ψ∗c0,0 > 0. Thus, the
FOCs for q∗c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = 1, = 1/2 and q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 0 are satisfied.
If ψ∗c1,1 = αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc −
αc0|1[αc1|0(pic1,0−pic0,1)−δαc]
αc0|1+αc0|0
≥ 0, then ψ∗c0,0 > 0 and ψ∗c1,1 > 0.
Thus the FOCs for q∗c0,c0 = q∗c1,c1 = 1 and q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 =
q∗c0,c0 = 1/2 hold. Using these values, it is readily verified that the incentive constraints
(c1→ c1), (c0→ c1) and (c0→ c0) are satisfied with equality (Solution I I I, a).
If ψ∗c1,1 ≤ 0, then the FOC for q∗c1,c1 = 0, q∗c0,c1 =
0.5αc0|0
αc1|0+αc0|0
and q∗c1,c0 =
αc1|0+0.5αc0|0
αc1|0+αc0|0
hold.
Moreover, q∗c0,c0 = 1/2 if pic0,c0 > 0 and q∗c0,c0 = 0 if pic0,c0 < 0 satisfies the FOC for q∗c0,c0.
Using the values of q∗c0,θj and q
∗
c1,θj
, it is easy to confirm that the incentive constraints
(c1 → c1), (c0 → c1) and (c0 → c0) are satisfied with equality, independent of q∗c0,c0,
q∗c1,c1 and q
∗
c1,c1 (Solution I I I, b).
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Turning to the rents, the FOC for Rc0 ≥ 0, which is λ∗c0→c0 = αcαc
(
λ∗c0→c1 − 1
)
,
is satisfied by construction. The FOC for Rc0 = 0,
(
λ∗c0→c0 − 1
)
α0|1
α1|1
≤
λ∗c1→c0 holds by construction of λ
∗
c1→c0. Finally, the condition pic1,0 − pic0,1 −
δ
((
α0|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
+
αc
αc
+
(
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
))
≤ 0 assures that λ∗c0→c1 ≤
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 . Rewriting the
FOC for Rc1 = 0, αc0,c0λ∗c0→c1 + αc1,c0 + αc1,c0 ≥ αc1,c0λ∗c1→c0, and using the definitions
of λ∗c0→c1, λ
∗
c0→c0 shows that this inequality holds for λ∗c0→c1 ≤
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 .
Case 4: Solve the problem for αc0|0pic0,1 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0, αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0 and
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δ
(
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
αc0|0 ≤ 0. Define λ∗c0→c1 = 1 +
αc1|0pic1,0−δαc
δαc0|0
, λ∗c0→c0 =
0, λ∗c0→c0 =
αc
αc
(
λ∗c0→c1 − 1
)
≥ 0 and λ∗c1→c0 = max
{(
λ∗c0→c0 − 1
)
α0|1
α1|1
, 0
}
. λ∗c0→c1 is
constructed such that ψ∗c1,0 = 0 which implies ψ
∗
c1,1 < 0. Moreover, these multipliers
together with the condition αc0|0pic0,1 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0 imply ψ∗c0,1 ≤ 0.
Consider the sub-case αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0. Inserting the multipliers into
ψ∗c0,0 = pic0,0 + δ
αc
αc
λ∗c0→c0 and using the condition αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0− δαc ≥ 0 yields
ψ∗c0,0 ≥ 0 which implies ψ∗c1,0 > 0. Thus, the FOCs for q∗c1,c0 = q∗c1,c0 = q∗c0,c0 = q∗c1,c0 =
1, q∗c0,c0 = q∗c1,c0 = 1/2 and q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 0 are satisfied. Using the
values of q∗c0,θj and q
∗
c1,θj
, it is easy to confirm that the incentive constraints (c1 → c1),
(c0 → c1), (c1 → c0) and (c0 → c0) are satisfied with equality, independent of q∗c1,θj
(This is the configuration of Solution I I I, c in Appendix A3.2).
Consider the sub-case αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0. Inserting the multipliers into
ψ∗c0,0 = pic0,0 + δ
αc
αc
λ∗c0→c0 and using the condition αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0− δαc ≤ 0 yields
ψ∗c0,0 ≤ 0 The condition αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0 implies ψ∗c1,0 > 0. Thus, the FOCs for
q∗c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = 1, and q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 =
0 are satisfied. Since q∗cxi,θj = 0 ∀xi, θj,the incentive constraints (c1 → c1), (c0 → c1),
(c1→ c0) and (c0→ c0) are trivially satisfied with equality.
Turing to the rents, the FOC for Rc0 ≥ 0, which is λ∗c0→c0 = αcαc
(
λ∗c0→c1 − 1
)
, is satisfied
by construction. The FOC for Rc0 = 0,
(
λ∗c0→c0 − 1
)
α0|1
α1|1
≤ λ∗c1→c0 holds by construc-
tion of λ∗c1→c0. Finally, the condition αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δ
(
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
αc0|0 ≤ 0 assures
that λ∗c0→c1 ≤
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 . Rewriting the FOC for Rc1 = 0, αc0,c0λ
∗
c0→c1 + αc1,c0 + αc1,c0 ≥
αc1,c0λ
∗
c1→c0, and using the definitions of λ
∗
c0→c1, λ
∗
c0→c0 shows that this inequality holds
for λ∗c0→c1 ≤
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 .
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Case 5: Solve the problem for pic1,0 − δ
((
α0|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
+
αc
αc
)
−
max
{
pic0,1 + δ
(
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
; 0
}
> 0. Define λ∗c0→c0 = 0, λ∗c0→c0 =
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 ,
λ∗c0→c1 =
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 and λ
∗
c1→c0 =
α0|1
α1|1
(
λ∗c0→c0 − 1
)
. Note that these
are the unique multipliers that solve the system of FOCs associated with
Rc0 > 0, Rc1 > 0 and Rc0 > 0. Using these multipliers, the condition
pic1,0 − δ
((
α0|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
+
αc
αc
)
− max
{
pic0,1 + δ
(
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
; 0
}
> 0 is equivalent
to ψ∗c1,0 ≥ ψ∗c0,1 and ψ∗c1,0 ≥ 0.
Consider the sub-case αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc1|0 − δαc0|0λ∗c0→c1 ≥ 0. The condition of this sub-
case is equivalent to ψ∗c1,1 ≥ 0 and implies ψ∗c0,0 > 0, ψ∗c0,0 > 0, ψ∗c1,1 > 0, ψ∗c1,0 > 0
and ψ∗c1,0 > 0. Thus, the FOCs for q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = 1,
q∗c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = 1/2, q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 0 are satisfied. Moreover,
using the rents (3.7)-(3.10), it is easy to verify that the incentive constraints (c1 → c1),
(c0→ c1), (c0→ c0) and (c1→ c0) hold with equality (Solution I I I, d).
Consider the sub-case αc1|1pic1,1− δαc1|0− δαc0|0λ∗c0→c1 ≤ 0 and αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0−
δαc ≥ 0. The first, the second and the third condition implies ψ∗c1,1 ≤ 0, ψ∗c1,0 ≥ 0 and
ψ∗c0,0 ≥ 0, respectively. Thus, the FOCs for q∗c1,c0 = q∗c1,c0 = q∗c0,c0 = q∗c1,c0 = q∗c1,c0 = 1,
q∗c0,c0 = 1/2, q∗c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 = 0 are satisfied. Moreover, q
∗
c0,c0 = 1/2 if
pic0,c0 > 0 and q∗c0,c0 = 0 if pic0,c0 < 0 satisfies the FOC for q∗c0,c0. Using the rents (3.7)-
(3.10), it is easy to verify that the incentive constraints (c1→ c1), (c0→ c1), (c0→ c0)
and (c1→ c0) hold with equality, independent of q∗c0,c0, q∗c1,c1, q∗c1,c1 (Solution I I I, e).
Consider the sub-case αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0. The first and the second con-
dition condition implies ψ∗c1,0 ≥ 0 and ψ∗c0,0 ≤ 0, respectively. This implies ψ∗c1,0 > 0,
ψ∗c1,1 < 0, ψ
∗
c0,0 < 0 and ψ
∗
c1,1. Thus, the FOCs for q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = q
∗
c1,c0 = 1,
q∗c1,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = q
∗
c0,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c0 = 0 are satisfied.
Using the rents (3.7)-(3.10), it is easy to verify that the incentive constraints (c1→ c1),
(c0→ c1), (c0→ c0) and (c1→ c0) hold with equality (Solution I I I, f ).
We further need the next two auxiliary Lemmas:
Lemma 3.5. Consider the relaxed problem where all incentive constraints except (c0 → c0),
(c0 → c1) and (c1 → c1), (c1 → c0) are ignored. If pic1,0 − δ αcαc > 0 and (c1 → c0) holds
with equality, then in any solution q
∗
c1,c0 +
αc
αc
q∗c1,c0 − q∗c0,c0 ≥ 0.
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Proof. Subtracting the incentive constraints (c0 → c0) from (c0 → c1), using that
(c0→ c1) holds with equality due to Lemma 3.6, αc1,c0 = αcαc αc1,c0, and q∗c0,c0 = q∗c1,c1 =
q∗c0,c1 = 0, yields αc0|0
[
q∗c1,c0 +
αc
αc
q∗c1,c0 − q∗c0,c0
]
+ αc1|0
[
q∗c1,c1 − q∗c0,c1
]
+ ϕR∗c1− R∗c0 ≥ 0.
Since (c1→ c0) holds with equality, ϕR∗c1 − R∗c0 =
(
ϕ2 − 1) R∗c0 < 0. Therefore,
αc0|0
[
q∗c1,c0 +
αc
αc
q∗c1,c0 − q∗c0,c0
]
+ αc1|0
[
q∗c1,c1 − q∗c0,c1
] ≥ 0 . (3.14)
Suppose to the contrary that q∗c1,c0 +
αc
αc
q∗c1,c0 − q∗c0,c0 < 0. Then (3.14) implies q∗c1,c1 −
q∗c0,c1 > 0, which in turn implies q
∗
c0,c1 < q
∗
c1,c1 ≤ 0.5. Similarly, q∗c1,c0 + αcαc q∗c1,c0 −
q∗c0,c0 < 0 implies that q∗c1,c0 < q
∗
c0,c0 ≤ 0.5. Hence, q∗c1,c0 + q∗c0,c1 < 1 so that the dual
variable associated with the resource constraint of q∗c1,c0 necessarily satisfies µ
∗
L1,L0 = 0.
Thus, the necessary FOC for q∗c1,c0 < 1 is piL1,0 ≤ δ( αcαc + λ∗H0→L1
αc0|0
αc1|0
). This implies
piL1,1 < δ(
αc
αc
+ λ∗H0→L1
αc0|1
αc1|1
) which implies q∗c1,c1 = 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 3.6. If the constraints (c1 → c1) and (c0 → c1) hold with equality, then the con-
straints (c1→ c0) and (c0→ c1) are necessarily satisfied.
Proof. Since the constraints (c1 → c1) and (c0 → c1) hold with equality and by
Lemma 3.2, we have
Rc1 = ∑
θj∈Θ
δαθj|1qc1,θj + Rc1
Rc0 = ∑
θj∈Θ
δαθj|0qc1,θj + ϕRc1
with ϕ ≡ 1−γ21+γ2 < 1. To see that (c0 → c1) holds, note that Rc0 ≥ ϕRc1 =
∑θj∈Θ δϕαθj|1qc1,θj + ϕRc1 since αθj|0 ≥ ϕαθj|1. Similarly, for (c1 → c0), note that
Rc1 ≥ ϕRc0 = ∑θj∈Θj δϕαθj|0qc1,θj + ϕ2Rc1 since αθj|1 ≥ ϕαθj|0 ,∀θj ∈ Θ.
Lemma 3.7. For pic1,0 − δ αcαc > 0, any generic solution of the relaxed problem the problem R
satisfies the remaining incentive constraints (3.2).
Proof. We consider each of the remaining constraints in turn.
- Constraints (c1→ c0) and (c0→ c1) are satisfied due to Lemma 3.6.
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- Constraint (c1 → c0): By Lemma 3.4, in any solution condition (c1 → c0) holds
with equality which is equivalent to Rc1 = ϕRc0. Hence, we have to show that
∑θj∈Θ αθj|1
(
qc1,θj − qc0,θj
)
≥ 0, which obtains after subtracting (c1 → c0) from
(c1 → c1) and using that the latter constraint holds with equality as well as
Rc1 = ϕRc0. Subtracting (c0 → c0) from (c0 → c1) which holds with equal-
ity and using Rc1 = ϕRc0 yields ∑θj∈Θi αθj|0
(
qc1,θj − qc0,θj
)
+
(
ϕ2 − 1) Rc0 ≥ 0
which implies ∑θj∈Θ αθj|0
(
qc1,θj − qc0,θj
)
≥ 0. Since α0|1 > α0|0, claim follows if
αc0|0
(
qc1,c0 − qc0,c0
)
+ αc0|0 (qc1,c0 − qc0,c0) ≥ 0. Since in any solution q∗c0,c0 = 0 by
the associated FOC, this boils down to αc0|0
(
qc1,c0 +
αc
αc
qc1,c0 − qc0,c0
)
≥ 0 which
is true according to Lemma 3.5.
- Constraint (c1→ c1): From ψ∗c1,xj > ψ∗c1,xj follows q∗c1,θj > q∗c1,θj by the FOC. Since
(c1→ c1) holds with equality, the result follows.
- Constraint (c1→ c0): We have
Rc1 ≥ ϕRc0 ≥ ϕ
Rc0 − δ ∑
θj∈Θ
αθj|0qc0,θj
 ≥ ϕRc0 − δ ∑
θj∈Θ
αθj|1qc0,θj
where the first inequality is constraint (c1 → c0), the second is constraint (c0 →
c0) and the third inequality holds because
α1|1
α0|1
αθj|0 ≤ αθj|1 ∀θj ∈ Θ.
- Constraint (c0→ c1): Since constraint (c1→ c0) holds with equality Rc1 = ϕRc0
which implies ϕRc1 ≤ Rc0.
- Constraint (c0→ c1): We have
Rc0 ≥ ϕRc1 ≥ ϕ
Rc1 − δ ∑
θj∈Θi
αθj|1qc1,θj
 ≥ ϕRc1 − δ ∑
θj∈Θi
αθj|0qc1,θj
where the first inequality comes from (c0→ c1), the second from (c1→ c1) and
the last inequality holds because
α0|0
α1|0
αθj|1 ≤ αθj|0 ∀θj ∈ Θ.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Define ψ∗cxi,xj ≡ picxi,xj − δ
αc1,xj
αcxi ,xj
λ∗c1→cxi − δ
αc0,xj
αcxi ,xj
λ∗c0→cxi , xi, xj ∈ {0, 1}, ψ∗c1,xj = pic1,xj
and ψ∗c0,xj = pic0,xj + δ
αc
αc
λ∗c0→c0. By Proposition 3.1, we can always set λ∗c1→c1 = 1
and λ∗c1→c0 = 0. Since (c0 → c1) binds in any optimal scheme, λ∗c0→c1 > 0. This
implies ψ∗c1,xj < ψ
BM
c1,xj
, ψ∗c0,xj > ψ
BM
c0,xj
, ψ∗c0,xj ≥ ψBMc0,xj and ψ∗c1,xj = ψBMc1,xj . The optimal
scheme solves maxq E
[
qθi,θjψ
∗
θi,xj
]
subject to (3.1). Part i) therefore follows. Part ii)
and iii) follow since generally ψBMc0,0 < ψ
BM
c0,0 and ψ
∗
c0,0 < ψ
∗
c0,0. Part iv) follows since
ψBMc1,xj > ψ
BM
θj,1
and ψ∗c1,xj > ψ
∗
θj,1
∀θj ∈ {c0, c1, c0}.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
From Lemma 3.1, ψBMc1,0 = pic1,0− δ αcαc > 0 implies that qBMc1,c0 = 1. By Lemma 3.4, q∗cxi,θj =
0 ∀xi ∈ {0, 1} , θj ∈ Θ either if αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc < 0 and αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc < 0
or if αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc < 0 and αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δ
(
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
αc0|0 ≤ 0.
Thus, for example when pic1,0 ∈
(
δ
αc
αc
, δ αcαc1|0
)
and pic0,0 < 0, qBMc1,c0 = 1 while q
∗
cxi,θj
=
0 ∀xi ∈ {0, 1} , θj ∈ Θ.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
We show that for any class of solution k ∈ {I, I I, I I I}, there is some finite thresh-
old γk < 1 such that q
∗
c1,c1 = 0 for γ > γk. By Proposition 3.1, a sufficient con-
dition for q∗c1,c1 = 0 is pic1,c1 −
(
1+ λ∗c0→c1
1+γ2
1−γ2
)
δαc
αc
< 0 where the Lagrange multi-
plier λ∗c0→c1 depends on the solution. Rewriting this condition yields λ
∗
c0→c1
1+γ2
1−γ2 >
αc
δαc
(
S + η2 − δ
)− 1 where the right hand side is independent of γ. The first order con-
ditions for q∗c1,c1 and q
∗
c1,c0 imply that whenever q
∗
c1,c0 + q
∗
c0,c1 < 1, then necessarily
q∗c1,c1 = 0. Hence it suffices to consider solutions with q
∗
c1,c0 + q
∗
c0,c1 = 1 and show that
the sufficient condition for q∗c1,c1 = 0 holds for γ > γk. We consider each solution class
in turn.
Class I: By Proposition 3.1, any solution with q∗c1,c0 + q
∗
c0,c1 = 1 requires that λ
∗
c0→c1 =
αcγη
2δαc . Clearly, λ
∗
c0→c1
(
1+γ2
1−γ2
)
increases in γ and limγ→1
(
λ∗c0→c1
(
1+γ2
1−γ2
))
= ∞ so that a
γI < 1 exists as required.
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Class II: Any solution of this class has λ∗c0→c1 = 1 so that γI I < 1 exists.
Class III: By Proposition 3.1, in this class the constraint (c0 → c0) has to bind and
(c0→ c0) does not so that λ∗c0→c1 > 1. Since limγ→1
(
1+γ2
1−γ2
)
= ∞, there exists γI I I < 1.
Define γ = max {γI ,γI I ,γI I I} and the claim is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
We first solve for the solution of a reduced problem and then show that the remaining
constraints are satisfied.
Step 1: Consider the problem of maxq,r Up = maxq,r 2E
[
qθ1,θ2piθ1 − rθ1,θ2
]
subject
to the resource constraints (3.1), the incentive constraints (c1 → c1), (c0 → c1),
(c0 → c0) and the implementability constraint Qc0 − Qc1 ≥ 0. Since the objective
function and the constraints are linear in the choice variables (q, r), the local opti-
mality conditions are sufficient for global optimality. We may incorporate the incen-
tive and the implementability constraints by defining ψc1 ≡ pic1, ψc0 ≡ pic0 + ταc0 ,
ψc1 ≡ pic1 − δ
(
αc
αc
+
αc0
αc1
λc0→c1
)
− ταc1 and pic0 − δ
αc0
αc0
λc0→c0 where λθi→θˆi is the La-
grange multiplier for the incentive constraint (θi → θˆi) and τ is the multiplier for
Qc0−Qc1 ≥ 0. The necessary and sufficient first order conditions for qθi,θj > 0 are then
ψθi ≥ max
{
0,ψθj
}
where the Lagrange multipliers have to satisfy τ ≥ 0 and λc0→c1 ≥ 0, λc0→c0 ≥ 0 with
a strict inequality only if the respective constraint holds with equality, and additionally
λc0→c1 + λc0→c0 = 1. We will now derive the solutions (where we treat all solutions
r, r˜ with E
[
rθi,θj
]
= E
[
r˜θi,θj
]
= Rθi as one equivalence class) for different parameter
values.
For αc1η ≤ δαc (class I), consider λc0→c1 = ηαc1δαc , λc0→c0 = 1− λc0→c1 and τ = 0. Then
it is readily verified that ψc0 = ψc1 ≤ S− δ < ψc0 < ψc1. Therefore, choosing the seller
according to the priority c1  c0  c1 ∼ c0 and setting qθi,θj > 0 only if ψθi ≥ 0 satisfies
the first order conditions. Moreover, the necessary condition Qc1 = Qc0 for λc0→c1 > 0
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and λc0→c1 > 0 holds.
For δαc < αc1η ≤ δ (αc + αc1) (class II), consider λc0→c1 = 1, λc0→c0 = 0 and τ = 0
which implies ψc0 < ψc1 ≤ ψc0 < ψc1. Therefore, choosing the seller according to the
priority c1  c0  c1  c0 and setting qθi,θj > 0 only if ψθi ≥ 0 satisfies the first order
conditions.
For αc1η > δ (αc + αc1) (class III), consider λc0→c1 = 1, λc0→c0 = 0 and τ =[
η − δ− δ αcαc1
]
(αc1 + αc0) which implies ψc0 < ψc1 = ψc0 < ψc1. Therefore, choos-
ing the seller according to the priority c1  c0 ∼ c1  c0 and setting qθi,θj > 0
only if ψθi ≥ 0 satisfies the first order conditions. Moreover, the necessary condition
Qc1 = Qc0 for τ > 0 holds.
Step 2: Verify that the remaining constraints are satisfied: Note that Rc1 = Rc0 = 0 and
Rc1 = Rc0 = δQc1. Therefore, all horizontal ICs are satisfied. In addition, Qc1 > Qc0 ≥
Qc1 ≥ Qc0 so that all remaining incentive constraints are also satisfied.
A3.2 Appendix - Optimal Procurement Schemes
All optimal procurement schemes involve q∗c0,c0 = q∗c0,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c0,c1 = 0, q
∗
c1,c0 =
q∗c1,c0 = 1, q
∗
c1,c1 = 1/2 and q
∗
c1,c1 = 1 if pic1,1 > 0 and q
∗
c1,c1 = q
∗
c1,c1 = 0 if pic1,1 <
0. Define λFRc0→c0 =
αc1|1+αc1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 and λ
FR
c0→c1 =
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1 . The following table contains
all solutions where high cost the principal sometimes buys from high cost sellers (i.e.
∃x ∈ X, θj ∈ Θ, s.t. q∗cx,θj > 0) and presents the remaining 8 employment probabilities
along with the necessary and sufficient conditions for the cases to obtain. If αc0|0pic0,0 +
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc < 0 and αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc < 0 or if αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc < 0 and
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δ
(
α1|0
αc1|0−αc1|1
)
αc0|0 ≤ 0, then q∗cxi,θj = 0 ∀xi ∈ {0, 1} , θj ∈ Θ.
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Solution qc0,c0 qc0,c1 qc0,c0 qc1,c0 qc1,c1 qc1,c0 qc0,c1 qc0,c0
Conditions
I,a 0.5 1 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
αc1|0 (pic1,0 − pic0,1)− δαc ≤ 0,
αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc − α0|1
[
αc1|0 (pic1,0 − pic0,1)− δαc
]
≥ 0
I,b 0.5 1 1 0 0
αc0,c0+2αc0,c1
2(αc0,c0+αc0,c1)
αc0,c0
2(αc0,c0+αc0,c1)
0.5
αc1|0 (pic1,0 − pic0,1)− δαc ≤ 0,
αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc − α0|1
[
αc1|0 (pic1,0 − pic0,1)− δαc
]
≤ 0,
αc1|0pic1,0 + αc0|0pic0,1 − δαc ≥ 0
I,c 0.5 1 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0,
αc1|0pic1,0 + αc0|0pic0,1 − δαc ≤ 0,
αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0
II,a 0.5 1 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5
αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {0,pic0,1})− δαc ≥ 0, αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc ≥ 0,
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δαc ≤ 0
II,b 0.5 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.5 or 0
αc1|0 (pic1,0 −max {0,pic0,1})− δαc ≥ 0, αc1|1pic1|1 − δαc ≤ 0,
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δαc ≤ 0
III,a 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δαc ≥ 0,
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δ (λFRc0→c1αc0|0 + αc1|0 + αc1|0 (λFRc0→c1 − 1)) ≤ 0,
αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc −
αc0|1
[
αc1|0(pic1,0−pic0,1)−δαc
]
αc0|1+αc0|0
≥ 0
III,b 0.5
0.5αc0|0
αc1|0+αc0|0
1
αc1|0+0.5αc0|0
αc1|0+αc0|0
0 1 0 0.5 or 0
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δαc ≥ 0,
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δ (λFRc0→c1αc0|0 + αc1|0 + αc1|0 (λFRc0→c1 − 1)) ≤ 0,
αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc −
αc0|1
[
αc1|0(pic1,0−pic0,1)−δαc
]
αc0|1+αc0|0
≤ 0,
αc0|0pic0,1 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0
III,c 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 or 0
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0, αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0,
αc0|0pic0,1 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0,
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δλFRc0→c1αc0|0 ≤ 0
III,d 0.5 0 1 1 0.5 1 0 0.5
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δ (λFRc0→c1αc0|0 + αc1|0 + αc1|0 (λFRc0→c1 − 1)) ≥ 0,
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δ (λFRc0→c1αc0|0 + αc1|0) ≥ 0
III,e 0.5 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.5 or 0
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δ (λFRc0→c1αc0|0 + αc1|0 + αc1|0 (λFRc0→c1 − 1)) ≥ 0,
αc1|1pic1,1 − δαc1|0 − δαc0|0λFRc0→c1 ≤ 0,
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δλFRc0→c1αc0|0 ≥ 0,
αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≥ 0
III,f 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
αc1|0
(
pic1,0 − pic0,1
)− δ (λFRc0→c1αc0|0 + αc1|0 + αc1|0 (λFRc0→c1 − 1)) ≥ 0,
αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc1|0 − δλFRc0→c1αc0|0 ≥ 0,
αc0|0pic0,0 + αc1|0pic1,0 − δαc ≤ 0
Table 3.2: Optimal schemes
Chapter 4
Certification and Minimum Quality
Standards under Imperfect Competition
4.1 Introduction
Policy makers are frequently concerned about insufficient free-market qualities of
goods and services. Recent examples are energy efficiency or safety properties of elec-
trical devices, the quality of food, hazardous contents of play-toys, or the sustainability
in the production of timber.
Previous research has identified various reasons for the asserted lack of quality. Exter-
nalities that are not fully taken into account either by consumers or by producers pro-
vide a convincing explanation. Furthermore, firms may under-provide quality if the
marginal consumer has a lower taste for quality than the average customer [Spence
(1975)]. Another reason which has recently gained more attention in public discus-
sions is that customers often find it difficult or impossible to discern the products’
quality prior to purchase. Firms respond to this problem in various ways like promis-
ing warranties, signaling quality with the price or developing a reputation for high
quality goods. However, research on these market instruments has shown that they
may alleviate the problem but rarely provide a fully satisfactory solution.1
1See e.g. Gal-Or (1989) for warranties, Daughety and Reinganum (2008b) for signaling and the liter-
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Hence, there remains scope for governmental intervention. The adoption of minimum
quality standards (MQS) and the certification of high grade goods are popular instru-
ments to protect customers from poor quality products. A MQS restricts firms not to
sell goods whose quality is below this standard. Examples are abundant and include
safety standards for manufactured products, contents requirements for textiles or food,
occupational licensing for professional services or environmentally related standards.
Certification is a process where a third party verifies if a product fulfills certain crite-
ria. Often, the government designs and enforces certification either directly, or pro-
motes the creation of non-governmental organizations for these tasks.2 Certification is
used for similar goods as MQS: Among others, the New Car Assessment Programme
(NCAP) inspects the security of cars, the CFA Institute certifies an additional quali-
fication in accounting and finance and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certifies
timber from sustainable forestry.3
This chapter seeks to investigate the impact of MQS and of certification when adopted
in oligopolistic markets. In particular, we are interested in the effects of these instru-
ments on the firms’ quality choices, on the equilibrium prices and on entry. Further-
more, we identify situations where we can rank these instruments in terms of social
welfare. We focus on certification that indicates when a product exceeds some quality
threshold but does not disclose the actual product’s quality. Awarding a good with a
certificate if it meets a publicly known criterion is very popular and for example used
by the FSC and the CFA Institute. In contrast to the related literature surveyed be-
low, we account for the observation that in practice, firms may build a reputation for
producing goods above the lower quality bound even without any intervention.
To address these issues, we develop a model in which firms first decide on entry and
on the quality of their products and then compete in prices with vertically differen-
ature reviewed below for reputation.
2In contrast to a MQS, certification does not require the power of coercion and can in principle be
provided both by private and by public institutions. As discussed below, firms are often unable to build
up a private certifying institution because of credibility issues.
3The NCAP has been founded in 1996 by several European national road administrations (See
http://www.euroncap.com/home.aspx). The CFA Institute is a global not-for profit institution (See
https://www.cfainstitute.org/about/history/Pages/index.aspx). FSC is an independent, non-
governmental, not-for-profit organization established to promote the responsible management of the
world’s forests (See http://www.fsc.org).
Another example is the German label “Blauer Engel” which is directly awarded by the state (See
http://www.blauer-engel.de).
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tiated products. Some customers may discern the actual grade of the goods. These
customers refrain from buying poor quality goods for an inadequate price. The re-
maining consumers may not observe the actual quality of the offered goods and base
their purchase decision on the prices and on their belief concerning the qualities. The
uninformed customers anticipate that the fear of losing revenues from informed cus-
tomers incentivizes firms to produce goods above the lowest feasible quality level. Yet,
since uninformed customers may not respond to the goods’ actual quality, this repu-
tational mechanism works imperfectly: In equilibrium, each firm’s product quality is
below the level it would provide if all customers were fully informed. As the fraction
of informed customers shrinks, the quality which can be credibly produced and thus
the equilibrium profits plummet.
We study an environment where social welfare could be improved by inducing firms
to raise their quality, even if all consumers observed the goods’ actual qualities. In
our setup, the difference between marginal and average consumer valuation and the
firms’ desire to offer differentiated products so as to alleviate price competition in-
duces them to provide goods of too low quality. The incentive to invest in quality is
further reduced because some consumers cannot discern the actual quality as laid out
above. The government may intervene before firms set up the production technology
and either forbid to produce below some MQS or offer the opportunity that firms cost-
lessly obtain a certificate if they produce goods with a quality not below some publicly
announced threshold.
When the certification standard is set above the highest quality level that would be
offered in an unregulated market, all firms may be induced to raise their quality. To
see this, suppose two firms enter. In the unregulated market, each firm’s profit would
increase if it could commit to raise its quality level somewhat. With the certificate, a
firm can demonstrate that the quality of its product meets at least the certification stan-
dard. Therefore, one firm will match this level if the standard is not too demanding.
The remaining firm still produces a good below this level, because it would trigger a
too intense price competition otherwise. Since the first firm produces a high quality in
order to meet the certification threshold, the second firm may also raise its quality com-
pared to the no-intervention level without compromising the degree of differentiation
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between the goods. As we show, this form of certification leads to more differentiated
goods and to higher quality-weighted prices. Yet, we find that a suitable certification
standard may increase both consumer surplus and industry profit.
When setting the certification standard, the government has to assure that obtaining
the certificate is attractive for producers. A firm will only participate in the certifica-
tion of its product if the profit from producing a good of sufficient quality to meet the
threshold is not below the profit from selling a product without the certificate. There-
fore, the certification threshold has to be set such that the required investments for
quality are not unduly high compared to the expected revenues. In addition, the deci-
sion to sell a certified product crucially depends on the profit that a firm expects to earn
from selling a good without the certificate. As argued above, the quality level and the
resulting profit which can be sustained by help of reputational considerations without
the certificate is low when the fraction of informed customers is sufficiently small. This
leads to the surprising result that if the goods’ quality is difficult to discern, a firm is
more reliant on certification and tends to comply with a higher certification standard.
The government may exploit the informational problems and achieve a higher maxi-
mum quality by help of certification than in case the quality was perfectly observable.
Importantly, by conferring a certificate only if a good’s quality meets some fixed thresh-
old instead of fully disclosing the product’s quality, a firm may be induced to produce
goods above the quality it would choose when it could credibly communicate its qual-
ity. Indeed, concerning the FSC certificate mentioned above, the timber industry’s
attempts to install another certification system with a relatively soft standard provide
evidence that some firms would prefer less restrictive certification.4 The observation
that these attempts have been ineffective so far exemplifies that firms often lack the
power to install certification in which consumers have confidence. This in turn allows
the government - or institutions which may credibly enforce certification - to step in
and manipulate the qualities in the market by setting suitable certification standards.5
4For a detailed report, see http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/media/documents/
document_1890_1900.pdf.
5Our analysis is based on the assumption that policy interventions are adopted so as to maximize
social welfare. Although we speak of governmental interventions for concreteness, our results also
apply to non-governmental institutions whose objective is to maximize social welfare. For example, the
FSC is a non-governmental, not-for-profit organization that promotes “environmentally appropriate,
socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world’s forests” (See http://www.fsc.
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This may also explain why simple threshold schemes are so popular.
The impact of a MQS differs vastly compared to that of certification. By restricting
the admitted quality range and thus the firms’ ability to differentiate their goods, a
MQS intensifies price competition and requires higher minimum investments in qual-
ity. Therefore, adopting a MQS reduces the firms’ profits and may deter them from
entry. This is in line with Ronnen (1991) who analyzes a setup that essentially corre-
sponds to ours in the limit when quality is observable to all customers. We show that
this problem is particularly severe when the goods’ quality is opaque so that the firms’
ability to credibly produce a reasonable quality is further restricted. In contrast, our
analysis indicates that suitable certification does not restrict entry. We thus conclude
that suitable certification may improve welfare more than a MQS if only few customers
are informed. If instead almost all consumers may observe the actual quality, firms’
need not rely on certification so that the welfare gains from adopting a suitable MQS
are higher.
Related Literature
Several authors have emphasized that for reputational reasons, firms may credibly
undertake costly actions which are unobservable to consumers, like producing high
quality products.6 In their seminal work, Klein and Leffler (1981) have pointed out
that consumers may expect firms to undertake costly actions if the fear of losing repu-
tation exceeds the temporary advantage of cheating. This idea has been further refined
and applied both on competitive and on monopolistic markets.7 In our model, firms
may rely on reputation since we assume that the production technology determines
the quality of the goods and cannot be changed once it is in place. This allows con-
sumers that buy the products at a later time to infer the quality from the experiences of
org/vision_mission.html). This objective could be interpreted as maximizing social welfare.
6See Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) for a survey.
7Klein and Leffler (1981) consider fully competitive markets with exogenously given equilibrium
quality levels. Shapiro (1982) endogenizes the quality choice of a monopolist and Shapiro (1983) also
endogenizes the customers’ demand for different quality levels in a competitive environment. Shapiro
(1983) also shows that introducing a MQS harms consumers with a low taste for quality and helps those
that highly value quality. In a competitive model, Hoerner (2002) adds uncertainty about the firms’
ability to provide high quality and presents an equilibrium in which it is indeed optimal for customers
to abandon a firm after a negative experience. In all of these papers, a firm may decide on the quality
repeatedly.
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earlier customers. In this respect, our model is similar to Shapiro (1986), who studies
the interaction between investment in human capital and the provision of high qual-
ity services in a competitive environment. Shapiro (1986) also analyzes the effect of
certifying or imposing a minimum standard on the investment in human capital. He
assumes that the quality of the services has a binary support (low/high) and that the
policy interventions affect the quality only indirectly through the human capital. He is
thus rather interested in the market share of the low and high quality segment instead
of the endogenous quality levels. In contrast, our aim is to explore the effect of policy
interventions on markups, quality choices and entry when firms have market power.
Bar-Isaac (2005) and Dana and Fong (2008) also study reputation in an oligopolistic
market. However, they assume that quality may be either low or high and concentrate
on the non-monotonic effect of competition on the ability to sustain high quality.
Our model is closely related to the literature on oligopolistic competition and mini-
mum quality standards in markets of vertically differentiated goods. Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) point out that vertical product differenti-
ation is a common strategy used by oligopolistic firms in order to relax competition
and thus to raise profits.8 Based on this insight, Ronnen (1991) demonstrates that
regulatory authorities may increase welfare by adopting a MQS if improving a prod-
uct’s quality requires fixed investments but no variable costs.9 Crampes and Hollander
(1995) address the same question when firms incur variable costs for quality and ob-
tain the same qualitative effect of introducing a MQS on total welfare if the costs of
quality are convex enough.10 Based on the commonly used setup of Ronnen (1991),
we introduce consumers that may not discern the actual quality of the products in the
market. Apart from adding a relevant aspect, this ingredient allows us to compare
the efficiency of certification and MQS. Since the aim of certification is to reduce the
amount of asymmetric information in the market, this policy instrument is void in an
8Wauthy (1996) endogenizes the market coverage.
9The same setup which was originally inspired by Tirole (1988) has been also analyzed by Choi
and Shin (1992). Based on the same setup, Lehmann-Grube (1997) demonstrates that the high quality
provider usually earns higher profits and shows that this result survives when firms chose their quality
sequentially. In a slightly modified setup, Motta (1993) compares price and quantity competition.
10Kuhn (2007) shows that MQS may be detrimental in a setup with variable cost of quality if con-
sumers derive some baseline benefits from the consumption of the good that is independent from its
quality. Valletti (2000) demonstrates that a mildly restrictive MQS unambiguously reduces total welfare
when firms compete in quantities instead of prices.
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environment where all participants are perfectly informed.
Finally, our analysis investigates the effects of governmental certification as an instru-
ment to reduce informational asymmetries. Assuming perfect commitment and treat-
ing the seller’s quality as exogenously determined, Lizzeri (1999) studies the profit
maximizing policy of a monopolistic and of oligopolistic certifiers. Based on a similar
framework, Albano and Lizzeri (2001) endogenize the seller’s quality choice. Strausz
(2005) as well as Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) concentrate on the incentives
of certifiers to honestly rate the seller’s quality. All of these models focus on the be-
havior of certifiers and consider a rather simple structure of the market for the rated
goods.11 In contrast, we abstract from problems associated with dishonest certifica-
tion and focus on how costless certification affects the rated firms’ behavior in a rather
complex competitive environment. We are particularly interested in the interplay be-
tween certification and reputation which has not been investigated by any other paper
to the best of our knowledge.12 Daughety and Reinganum (2008a) examine how costly
certification affects signaling via prices when the seller’s quality is exogenously given.
Since in our model the firms’ quality choice is endogenous, we may also analyze the
effect of certification on the traded quality. Moreover, while Daughety and Reinganum
(2008a) consider disclosure of the actual quality level, we consider certification where
a label is conferred whenever a product’s quality does not lie below some threshold.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The basic framework is devel-
oped in Section 4.2. Section 4.1 derives the equilibrium prices for given quality choices.
In Section 4.4, we solve for the equilibrium qualities and the number of active firms in
the absence of any intervention. In Section 4.5 we carefully investigate the effects of
certification on customers’ beliefs and on the equilibrium quality choices. Moreover,
we characterize the welfare maximizing certification standard. Section 4.6 compares
the impact of a MQS to that of certification. Section 4.7 discusses an alternative model-
ing approach and Section 4.8 concludes.
11Similar to our model, Heyes and Maxwell (2004) consider the effect of MQS and certificates, but do
not model the marked for the rated goods explicitly.
12Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) consider the impact of middlemen in a model of reputation but do
not analyze how the power of reputation affects welfare-optimal certification.
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4.2 The Model
There are two identical potential entrants to the market. Each firm i is constrained
to offer products of a single quality qi ∈ Q ≡ [0,∞). Both firms face the same costs
C(q) of installing the production technology to produce goods of quality q. The cost
of the production technology is increasing and strictly convex for all feasible quality
levels, that is C
′
(·) > 0 and C′′(·) > 0. It also satisfies the regularity conditions C(0) =
C
′
(0) = 0 and limq→∞ C
′
(q) = ∞. Once the production technology is in place, any
quantity of products may be produced at zero unit production cost.
The demand comes from a continuum of consumers of measure one. They differ in
their taste for quality and are indexed by their taste for quality θ which is distributed
uniformly on the unit interval [0, 1]. Consumers buy up to one unit of the good. A con-
sumer with taste θ derives a net surplus of u(θ, q, p) = θq− p when buying a product
of quality q at price p.
Consumers also differ in their information about the product quality and the time they
enter the market. The fraction 1− α of consumers enters the market early and cannot
observe the actual quality of the products. Since all of these customers have the same
level of information, they form a uniform belief qˆi about the expected quality of each
offered good i. The remaining fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of consumers enters the market later
and observes the quality before deciding from which firm to buy or to abstain. This
assumption captures that the available information about a product’s quality increases
in the time the good is on the market and simplifies the analysis.13
All consumers are short lived and have to make their decision in the same period when
they enter the market. The information and the entry time of consumers is supposed
to be independent of the taste θ.
Governmental intervention plays an important role in our model.14 Before firms and
consumers move, the government may either adopt a MQS or offer firms the oppor-
tunity to certify their production technology. Once the minimum standard qMQS is
13In case of experience goods, some consumers have to buy and use the product before they can share
their experiences with others.
14We use the term governmental intervention in order to highlight that these instruments are used to
increase social welfare. We also abstract from problems like commitment, honesty etc.
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enacted, no firm may sell products of a lower quality. In case the government provides
certification, it determines a certification threshold qC. Any firm that installs a quality
level not below qC obtains a certificate that all consumers and firms may observe. Note
that the certificate only guarantees that a firm produces at least the quality level qC;
certification does not disclose the actual quality level of a particular firm.
The competition between firms takes place in three stages. At each stage, the firms
make their choices simultaneously. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or
not to enter the market. If a firm enters, it also chooses the quality level of the pro-
duction technology. In case of certification, all firms that have installed at least qC
obtain the certificate. Before the second stage begins, each firm in the market learns
whether a competitor has entered but does not observe the rival’s quality level. Like
consumers, each firm only observes if the competitor has obtained a certificate. Be-
cause firms have the same information about their rivals as the customers, we suppose
that they form the same belief. In the second stage, each active firm sets the price of
its product. Based on the prices and on their beliefs, early consumers decide which
product to buy or whether to abstain.15 Before the third stage begins, the firms learn
their competitor’s quality level. In the third stage, they may change their prices. Then
late consumers enter and choose their preferred product. The sequential structure of
the game reflects that changing the price can be done quickly while a change of the
production technology is usually very time-consuming. For simplicity, firms do not
discount their profits.16
Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Furthermore, we focus on
pure strategy equilibria where beliefs are passive in the sense that consumers and ri-
vals do not revise their beliefs about a firm’s quality when the latter charges an un-
expected price.17 Since the production technology does not affect the marginal costs,
15For concreteness, we assume that consumers which are indifferent between several quality levels
buy the highest one.
16If there is a discount factor δ < 1 between the two selling stages, then the resulting game with the
proportion of late consumers α yields the same equilibrium qualities as our setup without discounting
and the fraction α˜ ≡ αδ of late consumers.
17The restriction to equilibria with passive beliefs is commonly made in the literature on vertical con-
tracts and discussed in Rey and Tirole (2007). In our setup, the restriction to passive beliefs does not
affect the equilibrium qualities: The actual quality only affects the firms’ revenues of the informed cus-
tomers which do not depend on the uninformed customers’ beliefs. Hence, both firms choose the quality
so as to maximize the revenues of the informed customers minus the costs for quality. Yet, the beliefs
affect the equilibrium prices and thus the profits in the second stage which has an impact on the firms’
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firms cannot use the price as a signal for high quality.18 If a single firm has entered,
we use the index M. In case two firms have entered, we assign the firm that pro-
duces a weakly higher quality the index H and the remaining one the index L so that
qH ≥ qL. Accordingly, we will refer to firm H (L) as the high (low) quality producer. In
equilibrium, the beliefs (qˆL, qˆH) or qˆM have to be correct, consumers make the utility
maximizing choice and each firm’s strategy maximizes its profits given the belief and
the equilibrium strategy of the competitor and the consumers.19
4.3 Price Equilibrium
We first examine the equilibrium prices that obtain in the third stage. Ronnen (1991)
analyzes a setup where all customers know the quality of the offered products, that is
α = 1. In what follows, we refer to this special case as full information. For convenience,
we express the results in terms of the quality-deflated or hedonic price x ≡ p/q. If
both firms have entered, r ≡ qH/qL denotes the relative quality of the products. Ronnen
(1991) provides a detailed derivation of the following results:
Lemma 4.1 (Ronnen (1991)). Suppose that both firms have entered the market and that all
consumers observe the actual quality level with qH ≥ qL. In the unique price equilibrium,
the hedonic prices of firm L and H are x∗L =
r−1
4r−1 and x
∗
H =
2(r−1)
4r−1 , respectively. Defining
z∗ = 2r−14r−1 , consumers with θ ∈ [0, x∗L) abstain from buying, those with θ ∈ [x∗L, z∗) buy
from firm L and those with θ ∈ [z∗, 1] buy from firm H in equilibrium. The equilibrium
revenues of firm L and H are RL(qL, qH) ≡ qLx∗L (z∗ − x∗L) = qL r(r−1)(4r−1)2 and RH(qL, qH) ≡
qHx∗H (1− z∗) = qH 4r(r−1)(4r−1)2 , respectively.
decision to enter the market and on welfare.
18For example Daughety and Reinganum (2008b) examine a model of quality signaling in a market
of imperfect competition. In this model, the firms’ quality is exogenously given and high quality firms
necessarily earn lower profits in any separating equilibrium. Thus, when endogenizing the quality
choice, firms would not deliberately invest in high quality.
19Note that the customers’ beliefs about the sellers quality may differ even though the firms are ex-
ante identical. In particular, our restriction to passive beliefs implies that if firms produce vertically
differentiated goods in equilibrium but the low quality producer deviates and charges the same price
as its rival, the consumers maintain their negative beliefs about this firm. In this case, it may seem
unorthodox that customers correctly identify which firm produces a lower quality even though they
cannot distinguish between the prices. Yet, customers often have a rough understanding which of two
products has a higher quality, even when not being able to evaluate the exact quality of the goods.
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A firm’s revenue increases when holding that firm’s quality level fixed and raising the
degree of disparity r, as more differentiated products give rise to higher equilibrium
prices. If both firms produce the same quality, then the equilibrium prices are zero.
The marginal revenues of the low quality and high quality firm with respect to the
own quality are RLqL =
r2(4r−7)
(4r−1)3 and R
H
qH =
4r(2−3r+4r2)
(4r−1)3 , respectively.
20 They depend on
qL and qH only through the relative quality r.21 It is easy to verify that for qH > qL,
both firms’ revenues are concave in the own quality level. Besides, the cross derivative
RiqL,qH for i ∈ {L, H} is strictly positive on the relevant range, meaning that the quality
levels are strategic complements.22
Now we turn to the equilibrium prices that obtain in the second stage. Observe that the
prices in the second stage have no effect on the equilibrium revenues of the third stage.
Since customers do not revise their belief qˆi after they observe unexpected prices, we
may conclude:
Corollary 4.1. For given beliefs (qˆL, qˆH), the equilibrium prices x∗i in stage two are determined
by the formulas given by Lemma 4.1 after replacing qi by qˆi.
Based on Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.1, the total revenues for the beliefs (qˆL, qˆH) and
the actual quality levels (qL, qH) are
R˜i = (1− α) Ri(qˆL, qˆH) + αRi(qL, qH) , i ∈ {L, H} .
If the beliefs are correct, then R˜i = Ri. Let Πi(qL, qH) denote the profits of firm i in case
the consumers correctly anticipate that the provided qualities are qL and qH. Deducting
the cost of installing the production technology from the equilibrium revenue yields
Πi(qL, qH) = Ri(qL, qH)− C(qi).
For later use, we define a standard welfare measure which is the difference between the
aggregate value of consumption and the cost of supply: W = qL
´ z∗
x∗L
θdθ+ qH
´ 1
z∗ θdθ−
C(qL)− C(qH). Suppose two firms have entered the market and provide goods of the
quality levels (qL, qH) and the beliefs are correct. Then social welfare at the ensuing
20Subscripts refer to partial derivatives.
21Formally, RLqL and R
H
qH are homogeneous of degree zero.
22It is readily verified that RLqL increases in r while R
H
qH decreases in r.
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equilibrium prices amounts to
W(qL, qH) =
qH
(
12r2 − r− 2)
2(4r− 1)2 − C(qL)− C(qH) . (4.1)
In case a single firm has entered the market and thus becomes monopolist the revenue
maximizing quality-deflated price is x∗M =
1
2 . Assuming that consumers correctly an-
ticipate the actual quality, the equilibrium revenue and the welfare are RM(qM) ≡
qMx∗M
(
1− x∗M
)
= 14 qM and W
M(qM) = 38 qM − C(qM), respectively.23
4.4 Quality Choice and Entry without Intervention
This section examines the equilibrium quality levels obtaining in the absence of any
policy intervention. We are particularly interested in how the fraction of informed
customers α affects the equilibrium quality investment decisions.
We first derive the quality choice that maximizes firm L’s profit (1− α) RL(qˆL, qˆH) +
αRL(qL, qˆH)−C(qL) when the beliefs are (qˆL, qˆH). As mentioned above, revenues from
uninformed customers do not depend on the actual quality qL. Therefore, the restricted
best response bL(qˆH, α) ≡ arg max0≤q≤qˆH αRL(q, qˆH) − C(q) of the low quality firm
depends on the belief qˆH but not on the belief qˆL. This observation will be important for
our analysis below. Since any belief qˆL that differs from bL(qˆH, α) is inconsistent with
the firm’s desire to maximize its profit, we will also refer to bL(qˆH, α) as the quality
which firm L may credibly produce. Note that bL is only a restricted best response since
firm L is constrained to provide a quality below qˆH.24 The properties of RL and C
ensure that bL(qˆH, α) > 0 and that the associated optimality condition
αRLqL(qL, qˆH) = C
′
(qL) (4.2)
uniquely characterizes the best response whenever bL(qˆH, α) < qˆH. Observe that the
best response bL approaches 0 as α → 0 since RLqL is bounded above and C
′
(0) = 0.
23These formulae obtain from the ones already presented in the limit for qL → 0.
24We will later assure that the low quality firm has no incentives to provide a higher quality than its
rival.
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If bL(qH, α) < qH, then differentiating equation (4.2) and using the homogeneity of
degree 0 of RLqL yields
25
bLqH(qH, α) =
bL(qH, α)
qH
(
1− C′′ (bL(qH ,α))
αRLqL ,qL (b
L(qH ,α),qH)
) < bL(qH, α)
qH
.
Similarly, let bH(qˆL, α) ≡ arg maxq≥qˆL αRH(qˆL, q) − C(q) denote the firms’ restricted
best response when having to provide a quality which is at least as high as the belief
qˆL about the competitor’s quality. Since RHqH decreases in qH and C is convex, b
H is
uniquely defined by the optimality condition
αRHqH(qˆL, qH) = C
′
(qH) (4.3)
whenever bH(qˆL, α) > qˆL.26 In this case, after differentiating (4.3) we obtain
bHqL(qL, α) =
bH(qL, α)
qL
(
1− C′′ (bH(qL,α))
α RHqH ,qH (qL,b
H(qL,α))
) < bH(qL, α)
qL
.
Since the marginal revenue is downward sloping in the own quality level, condi-
tions (4.2) and (4.3) imply that the restricted best response increases in the fraction
of informed customers when holding the rival’s quality constant. Hence, bLα (qH, α) ≥ 0
and bHα (qL, α) ≥ 0 with a strict inequality if bL(qH, α) < qH and bH(qL, α) > qL, respec-
tively.
We can apply a similar reasoning as Ronnen (1991), who has examined the special case
with α = 1, to establish that at most one equilibrium exists.27
Proposition 4.1. For any α ∈ (0, 1], there is a unique pair of quality levels (q∗L, q∗H) that
satisfies conditions (4.2) and (4.3). When consumers correctly anticipate that the firms produce
at these quality levels, the profits are ΠH(q∗L, q
∗
H) > Π
L(q∗L, q
∗
H) > 0. These quality levels are
an equilibrium if C
′′′ ≥ 0.
25This property implies RiqL ,qL + R
i
qL ,qH r = 0.
26In the proof of Proposition 4.1 we show that bH(qˆL, α) always exists and is bounded above.
27It seems there is a minor mistake in the proof of Ronnen (1991), Theorem 1 which has been corrected
by Lehmann-Grube (1997).
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Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
Proposition 4.1 first stipulates that there is a unique candidate equilibrium where each
firm’s quality maximizes its profit when one firm is restricted to offer a quality below
and the other to choose a quality above that of the rival. This result relies on the ob-
servation that the best responses of both firms are increasing and that their slope is
bounded and satisfies bLqH b
H
qL < 1 on the relevant range. Proposition 4.1 further shows
that the high quality firm earns higher profits than the low quality provider. This re-
sult relies on the functional form of the firms’ revenue functions and on the convexity
of the costs and is not intuitive. In contrast, after rewriting the equilibrium profit as
ΠL∗ =
´ q∗L
0 R
L
qL (q, q
∗
H)− C
′
(q)dq, it is easy to see that the low quality firm earns a pos-
itive profit. The optimality condition (4.2) implies that the marginal profit with respect
to qL, RLqL (qL, qH) − C
′
(qL), must be non-negative at (q∗L, q
∗
H). The profit of firm L is
thus positive, because each firm’s marginal profit decreases in the own quality. Since
both firms earn positive profits, we may conclude that it is optimal for them to enter
the market in the first place. Moreover, the proposition verifies that firm H has no
incentive to deviate to a quality level that lies below that of its rival. Conversely, as-
suming that the cost of quality exhibits non-decreasing convexity (C
′′′ ≥ 0 ) is grossly
sufficient to guarantee that it is unprofitable for the low quality firm to deviate to a
higher quality level than its competitor.
Importantly, when some consumers cannot discern the actual qualities, each firm
would improve its profits if it could commit to producing higher quality goods. In
equilibrium, the beliefs are correct, and the optimality conditions (4.2) and (4.3) im-
ply that Πiqi(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) = (1− α) Riqi(q∗L, q∗H) > 0. Thus, if a firm increased slightly its
quality and consumers adapted their beliefs accordingly, the firm’s profit would in-
crease. However, the proportion 1− α of consumers does not react to changes of the
actual quality of a good, so that each firm has insufficient incentives to invest in qual-
ity. Therefore, it installs a production technology that maximizes αRi(qL, qH)− C(qi)
instead of the whole profit Ri(qL, qH)− C(qi).28
For later reference, we note that a single monopolist sets the quality level q∗M so as
to maximize αRM(qM)− C(qM). From limqL→0 RH(qL, qM) = RM(qM) and RHqH ,qL > 0
28A similar result has been discussed by Shapiro (1982) in a monopoly setup.
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follows that for any α > 0, the equilibrium quality level of the high quality firm exceeds
the equilibrium quality level of a monopolist.
Our next result relies on the observations that each firm’s best response increases in α
and that the qualities are strategic complements.
Lemma 4.2. The quality levels q∗L and q
∗
H increase in the fraction of informed customers α.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 4.1 we argue that q∗L necessarily satisfies B(q
∗
L, α) = 0
with B(q, α) ≡ bL (bH(q, α), α) − q and Bq(q, α) < 0 on the relevant range. We have
Bα =
(
bLα + bLqH
)
bHα > 0, where the arguments are omitted for brevity. Therefore, q∗L
increases in α by the implicit function theorem. Since q∗H = b
H(q∗L, α) and b
H
qL > 0, also
q∗H increases in α.
It is useful to relate the equilibrium qualities to those that maximize social welfare
in order to assess the scope for governmental interventions. Our interest is cen-
tered on instruments that affect the quality choice, but do not directly intervene in
the price stage.29 Accordingly, a pair of quality levels is second-best, if the ensuing
price equilibrium maximizes welfare: (qSBL , q
SB
H ) ≡ arg maxqL,qH W(qL, qH). Differen-
tiating equation (4.1) and comparing to the marginal profits yields WqL > Π
L
qL and
WqH > Π
H
qH .
30 The firms’ first order conditions (4.2) and (4.3) imply that Πiqi(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) =
(1− α)Riqi(q∗L, q∗H) > 0 for i ∈ {L, H}. Therefore, we may conclude that locally increas-
ing each firm’s quality raises welfare. The following Lemma asserts that indeed both
second-best quality levels lie above the equilibrium values.
Lemma 4.3. For any fraction of informed customers α ∈ (0, 1], both firms’ equilibrium quality
levels are socially too low: qSBL > q
∗
L and q
SB
H > q
∗
H.
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
According to Lemma 4.3, a social planner that controls the quality choices but not the
ensuing prices would implement a higher quality level than each firm does in equilib-
rium. The equilibrium quality levels do not correspond to those that maximize social
29Clearly, if the government could also determine the firms’ prices, it would be optimal that a single
firm serves the whole market at a price of zero. The first best quality level satisfies C
′
(qFB) =
´ 1
0 θdθ =
1
2 .
30 Formally, WqL(qL, qH) =
r2(20r−17)
2(4r−1)3 − C
′
(qL) >
r2(4r−7)
(4r−1)3 − C
′
(qL) = ΠLqL(qL, qH) and WqH (qL, qH) =
24r3−18r2+5r+1
(4r−1)3 − C
′
(qH) >
4r(2−3r+4r2)
(4r−1)3 − C
′
(qH) = ΠHqL(qL, qH).
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welfare for various reasons. First, we have already pointed out that the equilibrium
qualities plummet as the proportion of informed customers shrinks. This is in con-
trast to the second best qualities which are not affected by the information level of
customers. Second, firms usually chose the quality to cater the valuation of marginal
customers, while a social planner cares for the mean value of quality. In addition, the
quality choice usually affects how much of the total surplus can be optimally extracted
by a firm as pointed out by Spence (1975) in a monopoly setup. In our duopoly setup, a
third effect is present because of the strategic interaction between competitors. As dis-
cussed by Ronnen (1991), the total industry profit increases in the amount of product
differentiation.
Importantly, according to Lemma 4.3, the socially optimal qualities even exceed the
equilibrium levels (qFIL , q
FI
H ) when customers are fully-informed (α = 1). Put differ-
ently, our setup exhibits a general tendency that firms offer products of too-low quality
that is even reinforced when there are further informational problems.
4.5 The Effect of Certification
This section explores the effects of a simple certification scheme on qualities in the
market and on equilibrium prices. In contrast to most of the literature reviewed above,
we concentrate on certification that aims at manipulating the offered qualities into a
desired direction instead of maximizing some certifier’s profit. Indeed, certification
which is organized by the state or by many non-governmental institutions is frequently
offered at a negligible price which is at most intended to cover the costs of certifi-
cation.31 Since we will later examine certification that is designed so as to maximize
social welfare, we speak of governmental certification and keep in mind that the same in-
sights apply to non-governmental organizations that pursue the same objective. More
precisely, we assume that the government publicly announces a certification threshold
qC ∈ Q before firms decide about entry and about their production technology. The
government costlessly observes the quality of the products and awards a certificate to
all firms that produce goods which are at least of quality qC. We suppose that certifica-
31See the introductory examples.
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tion is costless for the firms. Formally, the variable si takes on the value 1 if a certificate
is awarded to firm i ∈ {L, H} and the value 0 otherwise.
Consumers incorporate the additional information which is made available by the cer-
tification system. They know that a firm obtains the certificate precisely when its qual-
ity is at least qC. To assure that consumers’ beliefs are compatible with their observa-
tions, it is natural that they adapt their belief when they observe that a firm is unex-
pectedly (not) awarded with the certificate. Formally, qˆi(si) captures the belief about
the quality of firm i contingent on having obtained a certificate (si = 1) or not (si = 0).32
Beliefs are in line with the certification outcome if qˆi(1) ∈ [qC,∞) and qˆi(0) ∈ [0, qC)
for i ∈ {L, H}. Although beliefs are adapted to the certification outcome, it remains
plausible that beliefs are passive with respect to prices, since observing an unexpected
price does not prove that the original belief regarding the quality is wrong.
In order to avoid implausible equilibria, we restrict attention to equilibria that survive
the following natural refinement of out-of-equilibrium beliefs:33 When a firm does
unexpectedly not obtain the certificate, then the resulting belief has to coincide with
the profit maximizing quality level within the interval [0, qC), holding fixed the belief
about the rival’s quality.34 Likewise, if a firm is unexpectedly awarded the certificate,
consumers believe that it produces the profit maximizing quality level within the inter-
val [qC,∞). In our setup this refinement is easy to apply, since the best response of firm
i does not depend on the others’ belief about this firm’s quality qˆi. Moreover, it is ap-
pealing because the revised beliefs after an unexpected certification outcome about the
deviant’s quality coincide with the most profitable deviation.35 Thus, this refinement
32Note that the belief may depend both on a firm’s identity and on the certification outcome. This
formulation contains the natural assumption that the belief about a firm’s quality does not depend on
whether the rival obtains a certificate.
33For example, the out-of equilibrium belief qˆH(0) = 0 implies a harsh punishment in case firm H
is unexpectedly not awarded the certificate. As an implausible consequence, a firm would meet any
certification threshold as long as it earns non-negative profits to avoid the stigma of not getting the
certificate. We discuss an alternative approach in Section 4.7.
34Define ϕ(q1, q2) ≡ αRL(q1, q2) − C(q1) if q1 ≤ q2 and ϕ(q1, q2) ≡ αRH(q2, q1) − C(q1) if
q1 > q2. Formally, our refinement requires qˆi(0) = min
{
arg maxq∈[0,qC) ϕ(q, q∗j )
}
and qˆi(1) =
min
{
arg maxq∈[qC ,∞) ϕ(q, q∗j )
}
for i, j ∈ {L, H}, j 6= i.
35This refinement can be thought of the reduced form of a more complex game, in which with a small
probability a firm is forced to obtain/ abstain from the certificate but may still choose its production
technology within the associated interval. This requirement resembles the concept of “wary” beliefs
introduced by McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
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leads to “more consistency” off the equilibrium path.
In any equilibrium, a firm either produces a quality that satisfies the first order con-
dition αRiqi(qL, qH) = C
′
(qi) or installs a production technology that exactly matches
the certification threshold qC. To see that firms produce at no other quality level in
equilibrium, suppose that consumers (and the rival) believed that firm i would install
a quality level with αRiqi(qL, qH) 6= C
′
(qi) and qi 6= qC. Then, this firm may profitably
deviate to some quality close to the anticipated level which would not change the out-
come of the certification so that uninformed consumers would have no reason to revise
their beliefs.
Moreover, there is no equilibrium in which both firms produce goods of the quality
qC, since they would both make zero revenues while having to incur the cost C(qC)
otherwise. Therefore, at most one firm will exactly match the certification threshold.
We are interested in certification that raises the quality in the market since the qualities
offered in the absence of any intervention are socially too low according to Lemma 4.3.
Moreover, it will become clear in Section 4.6 that adopting a MQS is more efficient than
certification when the government intends to manipulate primarily the lowest quality
in the market. Therefore, we focus in what follows on situations where the government
targets the high quality firm, that is, it chooses a certification threshold such that at most
one firm offers the quality qC or higher. Thus, in order to raise the offered qualities, it
is necessary that the certification standard is set above the equilibrium level q∗H that
would obtain in the absence of any intervention.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that a certification threshold qC ≥ q∗H is in place. There exists a
certification equilibrium in which two firms enter the market and produce the quality levels
qceL = b
L(qC, α) and qceH = q
C if and only if the feasibility conditions
ΠL
(
qceL , q
C
)
≥ ΠH
(
qC, bH(qC, α)
)
, (4.4)
ΠH
(
qceL , q
C
)
≥ max
{
ΠH
(
qceL , b
H (qceL , α)
)
,ΠL
(
bL(qceL , α), q
ce
L
)}
(4.5)
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hold. If additionally
ΠH (q∗L, q
∗
H) < Π
H
(
q∗L, q
C
)
, (4.6)
then this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
Proposition 4.2 asserts that whenever the feasibility conditions (4.4) and (4.5) are satis-
fied, then there is a certification equilibrium (denoted by the superscript “ce”) in which
one firm exactly matches the certification standard, while a second firm produces
goods of a quality below qC and consequentially does not obtain the certificate. Condi-
tion (4.4) assures that the firm which is expected to produce low quality goods has no
incentives to “leapfrog” the high quality producer, that is to install an even higher
quality level than qC.36 If firm L unexpectedly obtains the certificate, then by our
refinement consumers believe that this firm produces at the profit-maximizing level
bH(qC, α) which belongs to the set [qC,∞) and is thus compatible with the certification
outcome. Since qceL = b
L(qC, α) is a restricted best response, firm L has no profitable
deviation below qC. Hence, there is no profitable deviation at all if and only if condi-
tion (4.4) holds. Similarly, condition (4.5) assures that the high quality producer has
no incentive to deviate to a lower quality level than qC. Condition (4.5) requires that
the equilibrium profit be higher than the maximum this firm could earn either when
producing a quality below qC but still above qceL or when deviating to a quality that is
even below qceL .
The second part of Proposition 4.2 states a condition which guarantees that the de-
sired equilibrium is also unique. There is a second candidate equilibrium in which
firms behave as if certification was not available and install the quality levels (q∗L, q
∗
H)
characterized by Proposition 4.1. Condition (4.6) assures that (q∗L, q
∗
H) cannot be an
equilibrium since H could increase its profit by producing goods of quality qC and
signal this deviation by help of the certificate. For simplicity, we will assume in what
follows that the certification equilibrium is always selected whenever it exists.37
36Note that if qC = q∗H , then condition (4.4) is more restrictive than the related “no-leapfrogging”
condition in the setup without certification. This is because uninformed customers will revise their
beliefs upon observing that firm L unexpectedly obtains the certificate which makes deviating upwards
more profitable now.
37Indeed, there is evidence that governments have some power in selecting equilibria, for example by
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Compared to the equilibrium levels without any intervention, the certification equi-
librium entails a higher quality of both firms when qC > q∗H. Clearly, the high quality
firm produces a higher quality in order to match the required threshold. Anticipat-
ing this choice, firm L also raises its quality because the quality levels are strategic
complements. Altogether, since the reaction of the low quality firm is relatively small
(bLqH <
1
r ), the degree of vertical differentiation in the certification equilibrium is larger
than in the equilibrium without intervention: rce = qC/qceL > q
∗
H/q∗L. Thus, certification
improves the possibility for firms to credibly differentiate their products.
Since certification typically leads to more differentiated products, it also raises the equi-
librium hedonic prices by Lemma 4.1. Consumers thus benefit from higher quality
products but suffer from higher prices. Specifically, if consumers correctly anticipate
the qualities qL and qH, then consumer surplus is CS(qL, qH) ≡
´ z∗
x∗L
qL (θ − x∗L)dθ +´ 1
z∗ qH (θ − x∗H)dθ. Taking derivatives shows that CSqL > 0 is always true and that
CSqH > 0 if and only if r > 5/4.
38 The optimality condition (4.2) of firm L implies
that RLqL(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) > 0 which requires r
∗ > 7/4. Hence, moving from the equilibrium
without intervention to a certification equilibrium with qceH > q
∗
H increases consumer
surplus in our setup. Note however, that mainly customers with a high taste for quality
benefit from the increase in the goods’ grade and that the equilibrium utility of some
consumers shrinks.39
It remains to discuss how certification affects the firms’ profits. The low quality firm
clearly benefits from less intense competition resulting from more differentiated prod-
ucts. Moreover, it optimally augments the quality of its products which further raises
its profit.40 In contrast, the impact of certification on the profit of the high quality firm
is less clear. On the one hand, certification helps this firm to commit to producing
higher quality products which tends to augment its profit according to inequality (4.5)
when holding fixed the quality of the rival. On the other hand, the low quality provider
anticipates that firm H meets the standard qC and adapts its quality upwards by the
appealing to consumers’ beliefs through public advertising. See also Section 4.7.
38Formally, CS = qHr(4r+5)2(4r−1)2 , CSqL =
r2(28r+5)
2(4r−1)3 and CSqH =
r(8r2−6r−5)
(4r−1)3 .
39In contrast, the adoption of a small MQS benefits all consumers as shown by Ronnen (1991).
40Formally, rewriting the change in firm L’s profit yields ΠL(qceL , q
ce
H) − ΠL(q∗L, q∗H) =´ qceH
q∗H
RLqH (q
∗
L, q)dq +
´ qceL
q∗L
ΠLqL(q, q
ce
H)dq > 0 which is positive since the integrands of both terms are posi-
tive.
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strategic complementarity. This in turn reduces the high quality producer’s profit.
Especially when the certification standard it set very high, which requires large invest-
ment costs to obtain the certificate, firm H may thus earn less profit in the certification
equilibrium than without intervention.41
Since Proposition 4.2 states rather implicit conditions, we now turn to the ques-
tion which thresholds admit a certification equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume
C
′′′ ≥ 0 for the rest of the chapter. A threshold is feasible if it admits a certifi-
cation equilibrium. In the light of Proposition 4.2, the set of feasible thresholds is
QCH =
{
qC ≥ q∗H|conditions (4.4) and (4.5) hold
}
. For our next result, we implicitly
define q† as the unique solution to q = bH
(
bL(q, α), 1
)
.42 The quality level q† can be
interpreted as follows. Holding fixed the quality level of firm L at qL = bL(q†, α), firm
H would deliberately produce goods of quality q† if all consumers could observe the
quality of its goods.
Lemma 4.4. Condition (4.4) holds if the certification threshold qC is set at least at the full
information quality level of a monopolist qFIM ≡ arg maxq
(
RM(q)− C(q)). Condition (4.5)
is satisfied for qC ∈ [q∗H, q†].
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
According to Lemma 4.4, the set of thresholds that admit a certification equilibrium
QCH is non-empty and contains the interval [max{q∗H, qFIM}, q†].43 For thresholds above
max{q∗H, qFIM}, leapfrogging the high quality firm would require high investments in
quality and the ensuing revenues would not suffice to recover the initial costs. To see
that it is indeed optimal for firm H to adopt the certificate for thresholds up to q†,
suppose the threshold is set at q† and that firm L chooses qceL = b
L(q†, α). If early
consumers observed the actual quality of firm H, it would deliberately produce goods
of quality q† since q† = bH (qceL , 1). Since the early consumers’ correctly anticipate
the profit-maximizing quality level below the certification standard in case a firm is
unexpectedly not awarded the certificate, deviating downwards is clearly unprofitable
41Of course, the highest profit when deviating downwards would be also below the equilibrium profit
in the absence of certification.
42A similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4.1 implies existence and uniqueness of q†.
43It is readily verified that max{q∗H , qFIM} ≤ q† with a strict inequality for α < 1, by definition of q†.
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when the certification standard is q†. Note that QCH comprises at least this interval
according to Lemma 4.4 and we will see below that it will usually be larger than that.44
The most important insight related to Lemma 4.4 is that for α < 1 there are feasible
certification thresholds that induce both firms to provide a higher quality relative to
the no-intervention equilibrium. Since Lemma 4.3 points out that firms choose socially
too low equilibrium quality levels in the absence of any intervention, certification may
increase welfare.45 We summarize the results of this section as follows.
Corollary 4.2. Introducing certification with qC ∈ (max{q∗H, qFIM}, q†] admits a certification
equilibrium in which both firms’ quality levels, prices, welfare and the profit of firm L increase
relative to the no-intervention equilibrium.
Optimal Certification
Having seen that certification which improves welfare is feasible, we now turn to opti-
mal certification. A feasible certification threshold is optimal if the ensuing certification
equilibrium leads to the highest welfare among all qC ∈ QCH.46
Let us ignore the feasibility constraints (4.4) and (4.5) for the moment and instead as-
sume that the firms install the quality levels qH = q and qL = bL(q, α) with q ≥ q∗H. De-
note by qTB the third best quality level that maximizes welfare W˜(q) ≡ W (bL(q, α), q)
under this alternative assumption.47 The marginal welfare when increasing the quality
of firm H is W˜q(q) = bLqH(q, α)WqL
(
bL(q, α), q
)
+WqH
(
bL(q, α), q
)
where the first term
44Note however, that introducing certification may destroy all equilibria. If ΠL (q∗L, q∗H) <
ΠH
(
q∗H , bH(q∗H , α)
)
then after implementing the certification threshold qC = q∗H , the ensuing game has
no equilibrium any more. In particular, the qualities (q∗L, q∗H) cease to form an equilibrium. This is be-
cause the certificate allows early customers to infer that the former low quality firm has leapfrogged its
rival so that this deviation becomes more profitable.
45Formally, the change in welfare may be expressed as W(qceL , q
C) − W(q∗L, q∗H) =´ qC
q∗H
WqH
(
bL(q, α), q
)
+ bLqH (qH , α)WqL
(
bL(q, α), q
)
dq where the integrand is necessarily positive
for qC ≤ q†. For any q ∈ [q∗H , q†], bH(bL(q, α), 1) ≥ q, so that optimality condition (4.3) and the
concavity of RH in qH imply that ΠHqH
(
bL(q, α), q
) ≥ 0. Together with WqH > ΠHqH , this implies
WqH
(
bL(q, α), q
)
> 0. The same reasoning also implies WqL
(
bL(q, α), q
)
> 0.
46An alternative objective function would be to maximize consumer surplus. This would even sim-
plify our results, since consumer surplus always increases in the high grade firm’s quality in any cer-
tification equilibrium. Therefore, the government would then set the certification standard as high as
possible and condition (4.5) would always bind at the optimum.
47The subscript “third best” indicates that in contrast to the second best quality levels, only the quality
of firm H may be chosen while firm L chooses a best response.
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reflects that the low grade producer adapts its quality and the second term is the direct
effect. Assuming that W˜(q) is quasiconcave, we may conclude that qTB > q† because
ΠHqH
(
bL(q†, α), q†
)
= 0 and because the marginal welfare with respect to qL and qH ex-
ceeds the respective marginal profit everywhere.48 Put differently, if the government
could assure that one firm adopts the certificate and the second firm stays below the
certification threshold, it would set a higher certification standard than q†.
Since the third best quality level lies above the feasible threshold q†, feasibility con-
straint (4.4) never binds at the optimum by Lemma 4.4 as a rather high certification
standard makes it unattractive for the low quality firm to leapfrog its rival.
In contrast, feasibility constraint (4.5) potentially restricts the optimal certification
threshold qC∗. According to the following proposition, implementing the certification
threshold qC = qTB is not feasible if the fraction of informed customers is sufficiently
large.
Proposition 4.3. i) If the fraction of informed customers is sufficiently small and
ΠM(qTB) > 0, then qC∗ = qTB. Moreover, the optimal certification level exceeds the
full information equilibrium level of the high quality firm: qC∗ > qFIH .
ii) If the fraction of informed customers is sufficiently large, then qC∗ < qTB and
ΠH
(
qceL , q
C∗) = ΠH (qceL , bH(qC∗, α)).
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
The first part of Proposition 4.3 covers optimal certification when the fraction of in-
formed customers is sufficiently small. In this case, implementing qC∗ = qTB is fea-
sible and therefore optimal. Intuitively, without the certificate, the quality level that
firm H may credibly produce and hence the deviation profits are relatively low. To
demonstrate high quality by means of the certificate, firm H will thus even install
rather expensive production technologies. Indeed, Proposition 4.3 establishes that the
optimal certification level is above the full information equilibrium quality level qFIH
that would obtain if all customers could observe the goods’ qualities. Hence, if suf-
ficiently few customers observe the actual quality level, the government may exploit
48A grossly sufficient condition for concavity of W˜(q) is C
′′′
(q) ≥ 0. Formally, WqH
(
bL(q†, α), q†
)
>
ΠHqH
(
bL(q†, α), q†
)
= 0 and WqL
(
bL(q†, α), q†
)
> ΠLqL
(
bL(q†, α), q†
)
> 0 implies qTB > q†.
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the high grade firm’s dependence on certification in order to raise the supplied qual-
ity towards the socially desired level. Proposition 4.3, part i) requires that a monop-
olist earns positive profits when selling goods of the third best quality level. Since
limqL→0ΠH(qL, q) = ΠM(q), this condition assures that firm H earns positive profits
when adopting the certificate. Otherwise, it would prefer to sell goods of a quality
below qTB without the certificate.
The second part of Proposition 4.3 asserts that when sufficiently many customers are
informed, then the government is forced to set a certification threshold below qTB such
that investing in the technology in order to obtain the certificate is sufficiently attractive
for firm H. If the proportion of informed customers is sufficiently large, then even
without the certificate, the profit of each firm is close to the level that it could earn
when all consumers were informed. Hence, in order to deter profitable deviations, the
government has to set the certification threshold sufficiently close to q†. In the limit
as α → 1, firms may credibly produce at their profit maximizing quality levels and
certification loses its bite, that is the feasible set shrinks to the singleton qFIH .
The next proposition explores comparative statics of the optimal certification thresh-
old with respect to the fraction of informed customers. These comparative statics are
highly relevant, since for example technological developments change the customers’
information level over time.
Proposition 4.4. i) If the fraction of informed customers is sufficiently small and
ΠM(qTB) > 0, then the optimal certification level increases in the proportion of informed
customers: dq
C∗
dα > 0.
ii) If the fraction of informed customers is sufficiently large and the marginal cost has non-
increasing elasticity, i.e. satisfies
(
qC
′′
(q)
C′ (q)
)′
≤ 0 ∀q, then the optimal certification level
decreases in the proportion of informed consumers: dq
C∗
dα < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
Proposition 4.4 highlights that the sign of the comparative statics crucially depends
on whether the feasibility constraint (4.5) binds at the optimum. If the fraction of in-
formed customers is sufficiently small and a monopolist would earn positive profits at
the third best quality level (ΠM(qTB) > 0), then setting the certification threshold at
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qTB is optimal according to Proposition 4.3 and the feasibility constraint (4.5) is slack.
Remember that the socially optimal quality levels are complements, that is WqL,qH > 0.
Since a small increase of α raises the quality that the low quality firm can credibly pro-
duce given qH, it also raises qTB by the complementarity of the quality levels. Since
the feasibility constraint (4.5) is slack, increasing the certification threshold is feasible,
which implies the claim of Proposition 4.4, part i).
According to part ii) of Proposition 4.4, the optimal threshold qC∗ decreases in the
fraction of informed customers when sufficiently many consumers are informed. As
discussed above, in this case the government is forced to set the threshold close to the
quality level that maximizes the high grade firm’s profit in order to deter a profitable
deviation. A further increase in the fraction of informed customers has two effects.
First, it allows the high grade firm to credibly produce higher quality goods even when
not obtaining the certificate. Holding fixed the rival’s quality, the profit of firm H thus
increases after a deviation below qC. Second, an increase in the fraction of informed
customers also triggers an indirect effect. Holding fixed the quality level of firm H,
an increase in α allows the low quality provider to credibly raise its quality which in
turn fuels price competition. This indirect effect reduces the high grade firm’s profit
even more when deviating to a quality below the certification standard. The result of
the proposition holds under the qualification that the first effect dominates the second.
This is guaranteed by the grossly sufficient condition that the marginal cost has non-
increasing elasticity or equivalently,
(
qC
′′
(q)
C′ (q)
)′
≤ 0 ∀q. This condition is satisfied by a
number of commonly used cost functions such as the power function C(q) = γqn with
γ > 0 and n > 1.
Figure 4.1 illustrates Proposition 4.4, part ii). It compares the optimal certification stan-
dards qC∗ and qC∗ that obtain when the proportions α and α > α of customers are
informed, respectively. In the figure, the equilibrium quality of the low quality firm
increases in α, that is qceL > q
ce
L
. Since a higher quality of firm L implies a more intense
price competition, ΠH(qceL , qH) < Π
H(qce
L
, qH) for any qH ≥ qceL . The dominant effect
on the deviation profit comes from the quality level that firm H may credibly produce
when not obtaining the certificate. This deviation quality level rises from bH
(
qce
L
, α
)
to bH (qceL , α) as α increases from α to α. Since this increases the payoff from deviat-
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ing downwards, the certification threshold has to be reduced from qC∗ to qC∗ so as to
increase the payoff from obtaining the certificate in order to deter a deviation.
ΠH (qceL , qH)
ΠH(qce
L
, qH)
qH
ΠH
bH(qceL , α) q
C∗bH(qce
L
, α) qC∗ qTB qTB
Figure 4.1: Comparative statics of the optimal certification standard
4.6 Certification versus Minimum Quality Standards
So far, we have examined the effect of awarding a certificate to firms if their quality
exceeds the threshold qC. Another way of increasing the quality of goods is to adopt
a MQS that forces active firms to produce at least a minimum quality level qMQS.49
Following Ronnen (1991), we assume that the government publicly announces a mini-
mum level qMQS before firms decide about entry and about the production technology.
Ronnen (1991) analyzes the effect of introducing a MQS in a model that essentially cor-
responds to ours when all customers observe the actual quality of the goods (α = 1).
He shows that introducing a suitable MQS is always welfare enhancing. If both firms
enter, a MQS that is set above q∗L forces firm L to install a higher quality compared to
the unregulated equilibrium level. Anticipating this effect, firm H also increases its
quality since bHqL > 0. Ronnen (1991) shows that under a MQS the goods are less differ-
entiated than in the unregulated market, which leads to lower quality weighted prices
and thus to a higher participation.
49The government thus commits to oust firms that have installed a production technology below that
level from the market.
CHAPTER 4. Certification and Minimum Quality Standards 164
Adopting a MQS may reduce the number of active firms. A MQS increases the mini-
mum investment which is required to enter the market. Ronnen (1991) points out that a
MQS which is set too restrictive does not allow both firms to recoup their initial invest-
ments in the production technology. This may result in only one or no firm entering
the market. In order to maintain the competitive pressure on prices, the regulator may
thus prefer to set a rather low MQS so as to assure that both firms enter.
The negative impact of a MQS on the firms’ entry decision is particularly severe if only
few customers observe the actual quality level. In this case, firm H has rather small
incentives to invest in quality and therefore provides goods of a mediocre quality as
discussed in Section 4.4. Adopting a MQS then quickly results in a small degree of
differentiation that leads to low equilibrium revenues of both firms. Hence, if few
customers are informed, then only a relatively low MQS still guarantees that both firms
enter. In contrast, we have seen that certification never has a negative effect on entry.
Enabling firm H to credibly produce a higher quality via certification increases the
level of product differentiation and always raises firm L’s profits. A small fraction of
informed customers may even be helpful to implement a relatively high certification
threshold.
On the other hand, we have seen that the set of feasible certification thresholds QCH
is tiny if almost all consumers are informed. The discussion so far suggests that ei-
ther MQS or certification may be preferred, depending on the costumers’ information
level.50 The next proposition refers to the welfare-maximizing quality in case a single
firm is active, which is uniquely defined as qSBM = arg maxq W
M(q).
Proposition 4.5. Suppose the government has to decide between introducing a MQS or de-
termining a certification threshold qC ∈ QCH in order to maximize welfare. If the proportion
of informed consumers α is sufficiently low and ΠM
(
qSBM
)
> 0, then optimal certification al-
lows to attain higher welfare than adopting an optimal MQS. In contrast, if a sufficiently high
fraction of consumers is informed, introducing an optimal MQS is preferred over certification.
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
50This result is important when the government decides between either MQS or certification. For
example, this may be the case if introducing either policy intervention produces high fixed costs.
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To see the intuition behind Proposition 4.5, assume first that almost all consumers do
not observe the actual quality of the goods (α → 0). In this case, the highest qMQS
that allows two firms to earn non-negative profits is close to zero. The reason is that
if the first firm offers goods of the quality qMQS, the second firm cannot credibly sell
goods of a much higher quality. This results in low revenues because of intense price
competition and thus the firms cannot recoup their initial investments. Accepting that
only a single firm enters and controlling the quality of this firm with a restrictive MQS
therefore yields a higher social welfare. If ΠM
(
qSBM
)
> 0, it is optimal to require that
the monopolist produces qMQS∗ = qSBM . In this case, certification can do better, since
setting qC = qMQS∗ will generally induce two firms to enter, with firm H producing
qH = qMQS∗. Albeit firm L may credibly produce only at a very low quality level due
to the small fraction of informed customers, this firms exerts some pressure on the
ensuing prices and thus helps to improve welfare. Since any optimal certification level
qC∗ must lead to a weakly higher welfare than qC = qMQS∗, optimal certification is
preferred. The condition ΠM
(
qSBM
)
> 0 assures that firm H has no incentive to deviate
to a quality below qC∗ for α small enough.
In contrast, if almost all consumers observe the actual quality level, according to Propo-
sition 4.3 the certification threshold has to be set close to the unregulated equilibrium
quality level q∗H in order to be accepted by firm H. Turning to a MQS, the drawback of
deterring entry is smallest when many customers may observe the actual quality level
as pointed out above. For α → 1, our model converges to that of Ronnen (1991), who
has shown that there exist welfare improving qMQS > 0. We thus conclude that MQS
is preferred when almost all consumers are informed.
Two remarks are in order. First, the results of Proposition 4.5 depend in parts on our
assumptions concerning the production costs. Since the marginal cost of quality con-
verges to zero for low quality levels, both firms enter unless a MQS hinders them. In
particular, this applies when only few customers are informed. Yet, if the marginal
cost would be positive at q = 0 so that only one firm would enter in the absence of
any intervention, certification may be preferred for a similar reason when α is small.
In this case, certification may raise the number of entrants since it improves the firms’
ability to differentiate their products. Second, we believe that our line of reasoning
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goes through if firms have to incur unit costs in addition to the fixed investments. In
this case, equilibrium prices would be always above firms’ unit costs. To what de-
gree the revenues also cover the fixed investments would again depend on the level of
differentiation. Hence, similar effects as discussed so far apply.
4.7 Discussion
In Section 4.2 we have introduced an refinement in order to rule out implausible equi-
libria. This refinement requires that uninformed players believe that a firm produces
the profit-maximizing quality that is compatible with a certification outcome even
when this outcome does not occur on the equilibrium path. Alternatively, we could
rely on equilibrium selection instead of imposing restrictions on beliefs. One possi-
bility is to treat all consumers as a single player and to argue that an equilibrium is
selected if it payoff-dominates all other equilibria, that is if this equilibrium gives rise
to the highest consumer surplus and to the highest profit for each firm. For qC > q∗H,
by our reasoning above, only two pairs of qualities may be part of an equilibrium: the
first pair is (q∗L, q
∗
H) defined by Proposition 4.1 and the second pair is (q
ce
L , q
ce
H) defined
by Proposition 4.2. In case both equilibria exist, only the pair (qceL , q
ce
H) possibly domi-
nates (q∗L, q
∗
H) since Π
L (q∗L, q
∗
H) < Π
L (qceL , q
ce
H) and CS (q
∗
L, q
∗
H) < CS (q
ce
L , q
ce
H). Thus, in
case both equilibria coexist, the condition
ΠH (q∗L, q
∗
H) ≤ ΠH (qceL , qceH) (4.7)
assures that the equilibrium associated with (qceL , q
ce
H) payoff-dominates (q
∗
L, q
∗
H). The
out-of equilibrium belief qˆi(si) = 0 for any off-equilibrium certification outcome sup-
ports the candidate equilibrium quality levels (qceL , q
ce
H) and (q
∗
L, q
∗
H) for the largest set
of parameters. In particular, if (q∗L, q
∗
H) are equilibrium qualities without certification,
then they remain equilibrium qualities if certification with qC ≥ q∗H is available. Like-
wise, it is readily verified that these out-of equilibrium beliefs support the certification
equilibrium for a large set of certification thresholds. Roughly speaking, this indicates
that condition (4.7) plays a similar role as condition (4.5) when computing the optimal
certification standard in Section 4.5. Since ΠH (qceL , q
ce
H) enters in condition (4.7) simi-
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larly as in condition (4.5), we believe that the results remain qualitatively unchanged
when relying on equilibrium selection rather than on the refinement we propose.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the effects of certification and of a MQS when not all cus-
tomers can discern the quality of traded goods. The presence of uninformed customers
reduces firms’ incentives to invest in quality. In equilibrium, quality is under-supplied
which reduces both consumer surplus and firms’ profits. By certifying their products,
firms may demonstrate that their goods are of higher quality than consumers would
expect otherwise. We have considered a simple form of governmental certification
where firms are awarded with a certificate if they produce goods of a quality not below
a publicly known threshold. The certification standard must be set low enough so that
firms indeed raise their profits by investing in quality in order to obtain the certificate.
Yet, a suitable certification standard may even induce some firms to raise their quality
above the highest level that would be attained if all consumers were fully informed.
We have pointed out that a large proportion of uninformed customers makes firms
more reliant on certification which in turn allows the government to implement a high
certification threshold. An increase in the proportion of informed customers typically
allows firms to earn higher profits when selling goods that lack the certificate. This
may force the regulator to lower the certification threshold so as to assure that firms
still invest in high quality to obtain the certificate. Finally, we have compared certi-
fication to a MQS. When the proportion of informed customers is small, certification
may be preferred over a MQS, since the latter potentially deters firms from entering
the market. In contrast, when the proportion of informed customers is high, a MQS is
typically more effective than certification.
Our results could be extended in several directions by further research. So far, we
have analyzed the relative merits of certification and MQS, but have not considered
adopting both instruments together. Introducing both instruments would improve the
government’s ability to manipulate the quality of active firms. In particular, if only
few customers are informed and two firms have entered, then a suitable certification
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standard allows firm H to provide high quality goods and the increased disparity of
goods results in higher revenues. Therefore, complementing a MQS with certification
allows to alleviate the entry-deterring effect of a minimum standard. Certification may
thus be particularly valuable when used in conjunction with a MQS.
The industry’s ability to provide itself a certification system is also an interesting point
that deserves further attention. We have pointed out that certification standards may
increase the profits of all active firms. This suggests that firms may have an interest
in building up an own certifying institution whose certification scheme is designed to
maximize the industry profit rather than welfare. Why do we observe that firms rely
on governmental certification, nevertheless? One important issue from which we have
abstracted in our model is that a certifier must have correct incentives for designing
and enforcing a certification scheme honestly.51 The current experiences with private
certifiers that have issued inflated ratings for financial products suggest that this re-
quirement is more likely to be satisfied by governmental certification.52 Nevertheless,
the availability of privately run certification may restrict the leeway of the government
to manipulate the firms’ qualities by help of certification.
Another important aspect that could be incorporated in our framework is asymmet-
ric information regarding production costs or consumer tastes. Concerning these two
dimensions, firms are often better informed than the government. The government’s
lack of information may affect which policy intervention is preferred and how these
instruments are implemented.53
51Gehrig and Jost (1995) study the incentives of self regulating organizations to conduct costly moni-
toring.
52See e.g. Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009).
53This assumes that the government cannot commit to more complicated mechanisms in order to
extract this information.
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A4.1 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1
We first show that a unique candidate equilibrium that satisfies both conditions (4.2)
and (4.3) exists. Let q > 0 denote the unique solution to the equation αRHqH(q, q) −
C
′
(q) = 0. Define B(q) ≡ bL (bH(q, α), α) − q on [0, q]. By the properties of bL and
bH, B is continuous, B
′
(q) = bHqL b
L
qH − 1 < 0, B(0) > 0, and B(q) < 0. Thus, there
exists a unique q∗L with B(q
∗
L) = q
∗
L. By construction, q
∗
L and q
∗
H = b
H(q∗L, α)) satisfy the
equations (4.2) and (4.3).
Next, we show that αRH(q∗L, q
∗
H) − C(q∗H) > αRL(q∗L, q∗H) − C(q∗L): Generally,
RH(qL, qH) − RL(qL, qH) = (qH − qL) r4r−1 . Next, r
∗
4r∗−1 ≥ RHqH(q∗L, q∗H) =
4r∗(2−3r∗+4(r∗)2)
(4r∗−1)3 is equivalent to 4r
∗ − 7 ≥ 0 which is true since RLqL(q∗L, q∗H) > 0
implies r∗ > 74 . Hence, R
H(q∗L, q
∗
H) − RL(q∗L, q∗H) ≥ (q∗H − q∗L) RHqH(q∗L, q∗H). To-
gether with αRHqH(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) = C
′
(q∗H), this implies α
(
RH(q∗L, q
∗
H)− RL(q∗L, q∗H)
) ≥
(q∗H − q∗L)C
′
(q∗H) > C(q
∗
H) − C(q∗L) where the last inequality is due to the convexity
of C. The last inequality also means that RH(q∗L, q
∗
H)− RL(q∗L, q∗H) > 0, which implies
that ΠH(q∗L, q
∗
H) > Π
L(q∗L, q
∗
H).
Generally, αRL(bL (q, α) , q)− C(bL (q, α)) increases in q by the envelope theorem and
because RLqH > 0. Similarly, for q < q, αR
H(q, bH (q, α))−C(bH (q, α)) decreases in q by
the envelope theorem and because RHqL < 0.
Now we show that q∗H is a global best response for qˆL = q
∗
L and qˆH = q
∗
H. Clearly, de-
viating from q∗H does not affect the revenues of the second stage, so it suffices to show
that αRH(q∗L, q
∗
H) − C(q∗H) ≥ maxq≤q∗L
[
αRL(q, q∗L)− C(q)
]
= αRL(bL (q∗L, α) , q
∗
L) −
C
(
bL (q∗L, α)
)
. By our results above, we have αRH(q∗L, q
∗
H) − C(q∗H) > αRL(q∗L, q∗H) −
C(q∗L) > αR
L (bL (q∗L, α) , q∗L)− C (bL (q∗L, α)).
It remains to show that C
′′′ ≥ 0 is sufficient for q∗L to be a global best response for
qˆL = q∗L and qˆH = q
∗
H. Similarly as above, it suffices to show that αR
L(q∗L, q
∗
H) −
C(q∗L) ≥ αRH
(
q∗H, b
H (q∗H, α)
) − C (bH (q∗H, α)). Using, C′′′ > 0 and RHqH (q, q) >
RHqH (q, q˜) for q˜ > q, we have αR
H (q, bH (q, α))− C (bH (q, α)) = ´ bH(q,α)q αRHqH (q, q˜)−
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C
′
(q˜)dq˜ − C(q) <
(
αRHqH (q,q)−C
′
(q)
)2
2C′′ (q)
− C(q). Moreover, using again C′′′ ≥ 0 and in-
tegrating by parts yields C(q) >
(
C
′
(q)
)2
2C′′ (q)
so that αRH
(
q, bH (q, α)
) − C (bH (q, α)) <
RHqH (q,q)
2C′′ (q)
(
αRHqH (q, q)− 2C
′
(q)
)
. Clearly, αRH
(
q, bH (q, α)
)−C (bH (q, α)) < 0 if C′(q) ≥
α
2 R
H
qH (q, q). Condition (4.3) implies that C
′
(q∗H) = αR
H
qH(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) >
α
4 where the last in-
equality comes from the fact that RHqH is bounded below by
1
4 . Hence, C
′
(q∗H) >
α
4 >
2α
9 =
α
2 R
H
qH (q, q) and thus αR
H (q∗H, bH (q∗H, α))− C (bH (q∗H, α)) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
First we check concavity of W: U(qL, qH) ≡W(qL, qH) +C(qL) +C(qH) = qH(12r
2−r−2)
2(4r−1)2
is homogeneous of degree 1. Therefore, 1r UqL,qL +UqL,qH = 0 and rUqH ,qH +UqL,qH = 0.
Therefore, UqL,qLUqH ,qH −
(
UqL,qH
)2
= UqL,qLUqH ,qH −UqL,qLUqH ,qH = 0. Differentiating
yields UqL,qL = − r
3(4r+17)
qH(4r−1)4 < 0 and UqH ,qH = −
r(4r+17)
qH(4r−1)4 < 0, so that U is concave
and since C is strictly convex, W is strictly concave. Moreover, this implies WqL,qH =
r2(4r+17)
qH(4r−1)4 .
From the equilibrium conditions we have Πiqi(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) = (1− α)Riqi(q∗L, q∗H) > 0 and
therefore Wqi (q
∗
L, q
∗
H) > (1 − α)Riqi (q∗L, q∗H) > 0. Since W is strictly concave and
Wqi(q
∗
L, q
∗
H) > 0, as well as WqL,qH > 0, we have WqL(q
∗
L, qH) > 0 for qH > q
∗
H and
WqH(qL, q
∗
H) > 0 for qL > q
∗
L which implies q
SB
i > q
∗
i by the concavity of W.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
The following beliefs that support this equilibrium are generically uniquely pinned
down by our refinement as follows: qˆL(0) = bL(qC, α), qˆL(1) = bH(qC, α) and
qˆH(1) = qC. In addition, qˆH(0) = bH(qceL , α) if αR
H (qceL , bH (qceL , α))− C(bH (qceL , α)) >
αRL
(
bL(qceL , α), q
ce
L
)− C(bL(qceL , α)) and qˆH(0) = bL(qceL , α) otherwise.
First we show that qH = qceH globally maximizes a firm’s profit for the belief
qˆH, when the competitor produces the quality bL(qC, α) and given the certification
threshold qC. Clearly, deviating upwards is unprofitable since for q > qC ≥ q∗H,
αRHqH(q
ce
L , q)− C(q) < αRHqH(qceL , qC)− C(qC) < αRHqH(bH(qceL , α), qC)− C
(
bH(qceL , α)
)
=
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0 because bH(qceL , α) = q
C and RHqHqH < 0. Suppose first that αR
H (qceL , bH (qceL , α)) −
C(bH (qceL , α)) > αR
L (bL(qceL , α), qceL )− C(bL(qceL , α)). Then deviating downwards with
qC > q > qceL yields at most R
H (qceL , bH(qceL , α)) − C (bH(qceL , α)) and condition (4.5)
guarantees that this deviation is unprofitable. Deviating downwards with q <
qceL yields at most (1− α) RH
(
qceL , b
H(qceL , α)
)
+ αRL(bL (qceL , α) , q
ce
L )− C
(
bL (qceL , α)
)
<
RH
(
qceL , b
H(qceL , α)
)−C (bH(qceL , α)) so that this deviation is also unprofitable. If instead
αRH
(
qceL , b
H (qceL , α)
) − C(bH (qceL , α)) ≤ αRL (bL(qceL , α), qceL ) − C(bL(qceL , α)), then by
the same reasoning, the highest deviation payoff is RL
(
bL(qceL , α), q
ce
L
) − C(bL(qceL , α))
which does not exceed the equilibrium payoff by condition (4.5).
Now we show that qL = qceL globally maximizes a firm’s profits when condi-
tion (4.4) holds, consumers have the belief qˆL, the competitor produces the qual-
ity qH = qC and given the certification threshold qC. Clearly, deviations with
qL < qC are unprofitable since qceL = b
L (qC, α). When deviating to some q ≥ qC,
then we have (1− α) RH (qC, bH(qC, α))+ αRH(qC, q)− C (q) ≤ RH (qC, bH(qC, α))−
C
(
bH(qC, α)
) ≤ ΠL (bL(qC, α), qC) where the first inequality is due to the definition of
bH (·, α), and the second is satisfied by condition (4.4).
In the proof of Proposition 4.1 we show that ΠH
(
bL(qC, α), bH(bL(qC, α))
)
>
ΠL
(
bL(qC, α), qC
)
. Therefore we have ΠH
(
bL(qC, α), qC
)
> ΠL
(
bL(qC, α), qC
)
> 0,
so that both firms enter.
To prove uniqueness, recall that in any equilibrium necessarily either the quality lo-
cally maximizes a firm’s profits, or the firm produces exactly the quality qC. This
means that there are only two other candidate equilibria, in which the firms either
produce (q∗L, q
∗
H) or
(
qC, bH(qC, α)
)
. Condition (4.6) assures that (q∗L, q
∗
H) is no equi-
librium, since the high quality firm has a profitable deviation when producing qC
instead of q∗H. To see that
(
qC, bH(qC, α)
)
cannot be an equilibrium, consider two
cases. If ΠL
(
qC, bH(qC, α)
) ≤ ΠH (qC, bH(qC, α)), then ΠL (bL(qC, α), bH(qC, α)) >
ΠL
(
bL(qC, α), qC
) ≥ ΠH (qC, bH(qC, α)) ≥ ΠL (qC, bH(qC, α)) where the first inequal-
ity is true since RLqH > 0 and the second is true by condition (4.4). Thus the low quality
firm has a profitable deviation. If instead ΠL
(
qC, bH(qC, α)
)
> ΠH
(
qC, bH(qC, α)
)
,
then ΠL
(
bL(qC, α), qC
) ≥ ΠH (qC, bH(qC, α)) > ΠL (qC, bH(qC, α)) where the first in-
equality holds by condition (4.4). Thus, in this case the former high quality firm prof-
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itably deviates to bL(qC, α).
Proof of Lemma 4.4
We first prove that condition (4.4) holds for qC ≥ qFIM . In Proposition 4.1, we have
shown that C
′′′ ≥ 0 implies αRH (q, bH (q, α)) − C (bH (q, α)) < 0 if αRHqH (q, q) ≤
2C
′
(q). Applying this result for α = 1 we can infer from C
′
(qFIM) = R
M
qM
(
qFIM
)
= 14
and RHqH (q, q) =
4
9 ≤ 48 = 2C
′
(qFIM) that R
H (q, bH (q, α))− C (bH (q, α)) < 0 for q ≥ qFIM
since C
′
(q) increases in q.
Next, we show that condition (4.5) is satisfied for qC ∈ [q∗H, q†] with q† being
uniquely defined by q† = bH
(
bL(q†, α), 1
)
. Note that ΠH
(
qceL , q
C) = RH (qceL , qC) −
C(qC) ≥ RH (qceL , bH (qceL , α)) − C(bH (qceL , α)) since RHqH (qceL , q) − C′(q) > 0 for q ∈[
bH (qceL , α) , b
H (qceL , 1)
)
. In addition, for qC ∈ [q∗H, q†], there is some α˜ ≤ 1 s.t.
qC = bH(qceL , α˜) by continuity of b
L in α. In Proposition 4.1 we have shown that
if q
C
qceL
≥ 74 (which is necessarily satisfied since qceL = bL(qC, α)), then α˜RH(qceL , qC) −
C
(
qC
)
> α˜RL(qceL , q
C) − C (qceL ) which implies RH(qceL , qC) − C
(
qC
)
> RL(qceL , q
C) −
C (qceL ). Since also R
L(qceL , q
C) − C (qceL ) −
[
RL(bL(qceL , α), q
ce
L )− C
(
bL(qceL , α)
)]
=´ qceH
qceL
RLqH(b
L(qceL , α), q)dq +
´ qceL
bL(qceL ,α)
ΠLqL(q, q
ce
H)dq > 0 because the integrands of both
terms are positive, we have RH(qceL , q
C)− C (qC) > RL(bL(qceL , α), qceL )− C (bL(qceL , α)).
Hence, for qC ∈ [q∗H, q†], condition (4.5) is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Part i):
Since limα→0 bL(q, α) = 0 and limα→0 bH(q, α) = q for any q ∈ Q,
limα→0ΠH
(
bL(q, α), bH
(
bL(q, α), α
))
= ΠL
(
bL
(
bL(q, α), α
)
, bL(q, α)
)
= 0 for any q ∈
Q. By our hypothesis, ΠM(qTB) = ΠH(0, qTB) > 0. Therefore, there exists an α˜ > 0 s.t.
condition (4.5) is satisfied for qC = qTB. Since WqH
(
bL(q, α), q
)
> ΠHqH
(
bL(q, α), q
) ≥ 0
and WqL
(
bL(q, α), q
)
> ΠLqL
(
bL(q, α), q
)
> 0 for all q ∈ [q∗H, q†], necessarily qTB > q†.
Hence, Lemma 4.4 implies that qTB ∈ QCH. Since qTB ∈ arg maxqC≥q∗H W˜(q
C), it remains
a maximizer subject to the condition qC ∈ QCH.
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To see that qC∗ > qFIH , note first that in any equilibrium with α = 1 (full infor-
mation), the equilibrium condition of the low quality firm implies RLqL
(
qFIL , q
FI
H
)
=
(rFI)
2
(4rFI−7)
(4rFI−1)3 > 0 with r
FI ≡ qFIH
qFIL
. This implies rFI > 74 . Thus, R
H
qH
(
qFIL , q
FI
H
)
=
4rFI
(
2−3rFI+4(rFI)2
)
(4rFI∗−1)3 < R
H
qH(qL,
7
4 qL) =
7
24 since R
H
qH decreases in r. Since WqH(qL, qH) +
C
′
(qH) = 24r
3−18r2+5r+1
(4r−1)3 decreases in r and limr→∞
24r3−18r2+5r+1
(4r−1)3 =
9
24 , necessarily
WqH(b
L(qH, α), qH) > RHqH
(
bL(qH, α), qH
)− C′(qH) = 0 for any qH ∈ [q∗H, qFIH ]. There-
fore qTB > qFIH .
Part ii):
Define the highest feasible certification level as follows: qC(α) ≡
max
{
q|ΠH (bL(q, α), q)−ΠH (bL(q, α), bH (bL(q, α), α)) ≥ 0}. Note that qC(α) ≥
q†(α) since ΠH
(
bL(q†, α), q†
)−ΠH (bL(q†, α), bH (bL(q†, α), α)) ≥ 0. By definition of
qC(α), the lowest derivative of ΠH
(
bL(q, α), q
)−ΠH (bL(q, α), bH (bL(q, α), α)) w.r.t. q
which is non-zero must be negative at qC(α). For simplicity of this proof we assume
w.l.o.g. that ddq
[
ΠH
(
bL(q, α), q
)−ΠH (bL(q, α), bH (bL(q, α), α))] |q=qC < 0.
We first compute limα→1
[
bH(qL, 1)− bH(qL, α)
]
: By definition of bH, we have
RHqH
(
qL, bH(qL, α)
) − C′ (bH(qL, α)) = (1− α) RHqH (qL, bH(qL, α)) and in par-
ticular RHqH
(
qL, bH(qL, 1)
) − C′ (bH(qL, 1)) = 0. These two equations im-
ply (1− α) RHqH
(
qL, bH(qL, α)
)
+
´ bH(qL,1)
bH(qL,α)
[
RHqH ,qH (qL, q)− C
′′
(q)
]
dq = 0 and
thus
[
bH(qL, 1)− bH(qL, α)
]
minq∈[bH(qL,α);bH(qL,1)]
{
−RHqH ,qH (qL, q) + C
′′
(q)
}
≤
(1− α) RHqH
(
qL, bH(qL, α)
)
. Since bH(qL, 1) is bounded,
minq∈[bH(qL,α);bH(qL,1)]
{
−RHqH ,qH (qL, q)
}
is bounded away from 0 and thus
lim
α→1
[
bH(qL, 1)− bH(qL, α)
]
≤ lim
α→1
 (1− α) RHqH (qL, bH(qL, α))
minq∈[bH(qL,α);bH(qL,1)]
{
−RHqH ,qH (qL, q) + C′′ (q)
}
 = 0.
Since also bH(qL, 1)− bH(qL, α) ≥ 0, the claim follows.
Next, we derive an upper bound for ΠH
(
bL(qC, α), qC
) −
ΠH
(
bL(qC, α), bH
(
bL(qC, α), α
))
and use bL = bL(qC, α) and bH = bH
(
bL(qC, α), α
)
for
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brevity.
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)
−ΠH
(
bL, bH
)
=
ˆ bH(bL,1)
bH
ΠHqH
(
bL, q
)
dq +
ˆ qC
bH(bL,1)
ΠHqH
(
bL, q
)
dq
< (1− α)
(
bH(bL, 1)− bH
)
RHqH(b
L, bH) +
ˆ qC
bH(bL,1)
RHqH
(
bL, q
)
− C′(q)dq
< (1− α)
(
bH(bL, 1)− bH
)
RHqH +
ˆ qC
bH(bL,1)
(
q− bH(bL, 1)
)
RHqH ,qH
(
bL, qC
)
dq
= (1− α)
(
bH(bL, 1)− bH
)
RHqH −
1
2
(
qC − bH(bL, 1)
)2
RHqH ,qH
(
bL, qC
)
where the first inequality comes from RHqH ,qH
(
bL, q
)− C′′(q) < 0 and ΠHqH (bL, bH) =
(1− α) RHqH(bL, bH) and the second inequality is due to RHqH(bL, bH) < R
H
qH ≡
maxqL,qH R
H
qH(qL, qH) =
4
9 and from R
H
qH ,qH ,qH > 0. Using our results from above we
get
lim
α→1
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)
−ΠH
(
bL, bH
)
<
1
2
(
qC − bH(bL, 1)
)2
RHqH ,qH
(
bL, qC
)
< 0
for all qC > q†(1). Since qC(α) ≥ q†(α), we conclude that limα→1 qC(α) =
limα→1 q†(α) = qFIH .
It remains to check that for α → 1 and any qC ∈
[
q†(α), qC(α)
]
, ΠH
(
bL, bC
)
>
ΠL
(
bL(bL, α), bL
)
. In the proof of Lemma 4.4 we have shown that, ΠH
(
qceL , q
†(α)
)
>
RL(bL(qceL , α), q
ce
L )−C
(
bL(qceL , α)
)
. Since the last inequality is strict, by continuity it also
holds for qC ∈
[
q†(α), qC(α)
]
for α→ 1.
Since for all α, q∗H < q
TB and limq↘q∗H W˜q(q) > 0, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
We maintain the notation used in the proof of Proposition 4.3 where we have derived
that limα→1 qC(α) → q†(α) and use bL = bL(qC, α) and bH = bH
(
bL(qC, α), α
)
for
brevity. We first prove the following auxiliary Lemma:
Lemma 4.5. If the elasticity of the marginal cost decreases in q, then there exists some e > 0 s.t.
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ΠH
(
bL, qC
)−ΠH (bL, bH) is convex in α ∈ [1− e, 1) for all qC ∈ [q†(1− e), qC(1− e)].
Proof. Taking derivatives yields
d
dα2
[
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)
−ΠH
(
bL, bH
)]
= bLα,α(q
C, α)
(
RHqL
(
bL, qC
)
− RHqL
(
bL, bH
))
+bLα (q
C, α)
[
bLα (q
C, α)
(
RHqL,qL
(
bL, qC
)
− RHqL,qL
(
bL, bH
))
− db
H
dα
RHqL,qH(b
L, bH)
]
−d
2bH
dα2
ΠHqH(b
L, bH)− db
H
dα
[
dbH
dα
ΠHqH ,qH(b
L, bH) + bLα (q
C, α)ΠHqH ,qL(b
L, bH)
]
where db
H
dα = b
H
α (bL, α) + bHqL(b
L, α)bLα (qC, α) and
d2bH
dα2 = b
H
α,α(bL, α) +
2bHα,qL(b
L, α)bLα (qC, α) + bHqL(b
L, α)bLα,α(qC, α). Simple algebra yields
lim
α→1
[
dbH
dα
ΠHqH ,qH(b
L, bH) + bLα (q
C, α)ΠHqH ,qL(b
L, bH)
]
= lim
α→1
[
bHα (b
L, α)ΠHqH ,qH(b
L, bH)
+bLα (q
C, α)
(
αRHqH ,qL(b
L, bH)
−αRHqH ,qH(bL, bH) + C′′(bH)
ΠHqH ,qH(b
L, bH) +ΠHqH ,qL(b
L, bH)
)]
= bHα (b
L, 1)ΠHqH ,qH(b
L, bH) .
Using this result and limbH→qC RHqL,qL
(
bL, bH
) − RHqL,qL (bL, qC) = 0,
ΠHqH(b
L, bH(bL, 1)) = 0, RHqL,qH(b
L, bH) + b
H
bL R
H
qH ,qH(b
L, bH) = 0 and using that
d2bH
dα2 as well as b
L
α,α(qC, α) are bounded, we get
lim
α→1
[
d
dα2
[
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)
−ΠH
(
bL, bH
)]]
=
dbH
dα
[
RHqH ,qH(b
L, bH)
(
bH
bL
bLα (q
C, 1)− bHα (bL, 1)
)
+ bHα (b
L, 1)C
′′
(bH)
]
.
A sufficient condition for limα→1
[
d
dα2
[
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)−ΠH (bL, bH)]] > 0 is thus
bH
bL b
L
α (qC, α) < bHα (bL, α). Writing this inequality explicitly and rearranging yields
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RLqL(b
L, qC)[
−αRLqL,qL(bL, qC) + C′′(bL)
] bH
bL
<
RHqH(b
L, bH)
−αRHqH ,qH(bL, bH) + C′′(bH)
⇔ α
[−RLqL,qL(bL, qC)
RLqL(b
L, qC)
−
(
bH
bL
)(−RHqH ,qH(bL, bH)
RHqH(b
L, bH)
)]
>
(
bH
bL
)
C
′′
(bH)
RHqH(b
L, bH)
− C
′′
(bL)
RLqL(b
L, qC)
Using RLqL,qL = − 2r
3(8r+7)
qH(4r−1)4 and R
H
qH ,qH =
−8r(5r+1)
qH(4r−1)4 we have
lim
bH→qC
(−RLqL,qL(bL, qC)
RLqL(b
L, qC)
−
(
bH
bL
) −RHqH ,qH(bL, bH)
RHqH(b
L, bH)
)
=
(
2rC
qH(4rC − 1)
)[
(8rC + 7)
(4rC − 7) −
(
1+ 5rC
)
2− 3rC + 4 (rC)2
]
> 0
since (8r+7)
(4r−7) − (
1+5r)
(2−3r+4r2) > 0 holds iff 21 − 16r + 16r2 > 0 which is always true for
r ≥ 74 . Therefore, a grossly sufficient condition is that
(
bH
bL
)
C
′′
(bH)
C′ (bH)
− C
′′
(bL)
C′ (bL)
≤ 0 or
equivalently b
HC
′′
(bH)
C′ (bH)
≤ bLC
′′
(bL)
C′ (bL)
which is satisfied since the elasticity of C
′
is decreasing
in q.
Part i):
Since limα→0 bL(q, α) and limα→0 bH(q, α) = q for any q ∈ Q,
limα→0ΠH
(
bL(q, α), bH
(
bL(q, α), α
))
= ΠL
(
bL
(
bL(q, α), α
)
, bL(q, α)
)
= 0 for any
q ∈ Q. By our hypothesis, ΠH(0, qTB) > 0. Therefore, there exists an α˜ > 0 s.t.
condition (4.5) is satisfied for qC = qTB.
Part ii):
By Lemma 4.5, there exists some e > 0 s.t. ΠH
(
bL, qC
) − ΠH (bL, bH)
is convex in α ∈ [1 − e, 1) for all qC ∈
[
q†(1− e), qC(1− e)
]
. This
implies together with limα→1
[
ΠH
(
bL, qFI∗
)−ΠH (bL, bH)] = 0 and
limα→1
[
d
dα
[
ΠH
(
bL, qFI∗
)−ΠH (bL, bH)]] = 0 that ΠH (bL, qFI∗) − ΠH (bL, bH) > 0
for α ∈ (1− e, 1). By continuity, for any α ∈ (1− e, 1) there exists some qC > qFI∗H s.t.
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)−ΠH (bL, bH) > 0, implying that qC(α) > qFI∗H .
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In the proof of Proposition 4.3 we have shown that for any qC > qFI∗H ,
ΠH
(
bL(qC, 1), qC
) − ΠH (bL(qC, 1), bH (bL(qC, 1), 1)) < 0. By Lemma 4.5,
there exists some α < 1 such that for any qC ∈ (qFI∗H , qC(α)],
ΠH
(
bL, qC
) − ΠH (bL, bH) is convex in α ∈ (α, 1). The convexity to-
gether with ΠH
(
bL(qC, 1), qC
) − ΠH (bL(qC, 1), bH (bL(qC, 1), 1)) < 0 implies[
d
dα
(
ΠH
(
bL, qC
)−ΠH (bL, bH))] |ΠH(bL,qC)=ΠH(bL,bH) < 0 for any qC ∈ (qFI∗H , qC(α)].
Recall that qTB(α) > qFI∗H for all α by Proposition 4.3. By the proof of that proposi-
tion, there exists some α˜ ∈ (α, 1) s.t qTB(α˜) ≥ qC(α˜) which implies ΠH (bL, qTB(α))−
ΠH
(
bL, bH
)
< 0 and hence qC(α) < qTB(α) for all α ∈ (α˜, 1] since qTB(α) increases in
α.
Fix any αˆ ∈ (α˜, 1). Proposition 4.3 implies that qC∗ = qC(αˆ) and that the con-
straint (4.5) binds. Applying the implicit function theorem yields sign
(
dqC∗
dα
)
=
sign ddα
[
ΠH
(
bL, qC∗
)−ΠH (bL, bH)] < 0 since ddqC [ΠH (bL, qC∗)−ΠH (bL, bH)] < 0
as derived above.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
We first prove the result for α → 0. Define q(α) as the unique solution to αRHqH (q, q)−
C
′
(q) = 0.54 Note that ΠH
(
q(α), bH(q(α))
)
= ΠH (q(α), q(α)) = −C(q(α)) < 0 since
the high quality firm cannot credibly produce any quality level higher than q(α). From
RHqH(q, q) =
4
9 follows that limα→0 q(α) = 0.
Define the highest MQS that entails an equilibrium in which two firms enter by
qˆ(α) ≡ max {q ≥ q∗L|ΠL (q, bH(q, α)) ≥ 0∧ΠH (q, bH(q, α)) ≥ 0}. Since ΠL and
ΠH are continuous, and since ΠL(q∗L, q
∗
H) > 0 and Π
H(q∗L, q
∗
H) > 0 as well as
ΠH
(
q(α), bH (q(α), α)
)
< 0, we know that for α > 0, qˆ(α) exists, is necessarily unique
and satisfies q∗L(α) < qˆ(α) < q(α). Since limα→0 q(α) = 0 and qˆ(α) ≥ 0, we also have
limα→0 qˆ(α) = 0.
Next we show that if α is small enough, then it is optimal to set the MQS such that
only one firm enters, i.e. WM(qSBM ) > maxqMQS≤qˆ(α) W(q
MQS, bH(qMQS, α)). Define
54Clearly, αMRH (q, q)− C′(q) = 49α− C
′
(q) decreases in q. Our assumptions on C assure that 49α−
C
′
(0) > 0 for α > 0 and that there exists a qˆ with 49α− C
′
(qˆ) < 0, so that a unique solution exists.
CHAPTER 4. Certification and Minimum Quality Standards 178
rMQS ≡ bH(qMQS)qMQS and ψ(r) ≡
(12r2−r−2)
2(4r−1)2 so that W(qL, qH) = qHψ
(
qH
qL
)
. Note that
maxr ψ(r) = ψ(1) = 12 . We have
max
qMQS≤qˆ(α)
W(qMQS, bH(qMQS, α))
= max
qMQS≤qˆ(α)
bH(qMQS, α)ψ(rMQS)− C(qMQS)− C(bH(qMQS, α))
≤ max
qMQS≤qˆ(α)
bH(qMQS, α)max
r
{ψ(r)} − C(qMQS)− C(bH(qMQS, α))
= max
qMQS≤qˆ(α)
bH(qMQS, α)
1
2
− C(qMQS)− C(bH(qMQS, α))
≤ 1
2
q(α)
where the last inequality holds because bH(q, α) < q(α). Hence,
limα→0 maxqMQS≤qˆ(α) W(qMQS, bH(qMQS)) = 0 since q(α) → 0. The optimal wel-
fare if only one firm enters corresponds to WM(qSBM ) > 0 with q
SB
M being characterized
by 38 q
SB
M = C
′
(qSBM ). Thus, W
M(qSBM ) > maxqMQS≤qˆ(α) W(q
MQS, bH(qMQS)) for α small
enough. By our hypothesis, ΠM(qSBM ) > 0, so that q
MQS∗ = qSBM induces one firm to
enter.
Now consider the certification level qC = qSBM . Clearly, W
(
bL
(
qM∗
)
, qSBM
)
>
limqL→0 W
(
bL(qSBM , α), q
SB
M
)
= WM(qSBM ) since WqL
(
q, qSBM
)
> ΠLqL
(
q, qSBM
) ≥ 0 for q ∈(
0, bL(qSBM , α)
)
. To see that qC = qSBM is feasible, note that limα→0Π
H (bL(qSBM , α), qSBM ) =
ΠM(qSBM ) > 0, limα→0Π
H (bL(qSBM , α), bH (bL(qSBM , α), α)) = 0 and
limα→0ΠL
(
bL
(
bL(qSBM , α), α
)
, bL(qSBM , α)
)
= 0, as well as limα→0ΠL
(
bL(qSBM , α), q
SB
M
)
=
0 and limα→0ΠH
(
qSBM , b
H (qSBM , α)) < 0 so that conditions (4.4) and (4.5) are satisfied
for α small enough.
Since maxqC W
(
bL
(
qC, α
)
, qC
) ≥W (bL(qSBM , α), qSBM ) > WM (qSBM ) the claim for a small
α is proved.
Our result for α→ 1 holds because when all consumers observe the actual quality level
of the goods, certification becomes void. Moreover, for α→ 1, our model converges to
Ronnen (1991), who has shown that there exist welfare increasing qMQS > 0.
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